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**THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
AND
MARWAR
(1803-1857 A.D)**

(Thesis approved by the University of Rajasthan for Ph D)

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FOREWORD

The Century following the exit of Maharaja Jaswant Singh and Durgadas from the political scene of Marwar had a naturally weakening effect upon the solidarity of the House of the Rathors which was built by the strenuous efforts of warlike Jodha and gallant Maldeva. It also witnessed the growing might of the Marathas, a perpetual source of threat and disquiet to Marwar. They lost no opportunity of adopting vigorous measures to ravage Marwar territories and to extract regular tributes from the desert state. But these aspects of the Maratha strategic policy were not destined to live long. In due course, the centre of power was shifted to the Company. The momentum of its influence increased in Marwar with the appearance of certain internal and external problems—Dhokal Singh's activities, Man Singh's contacts with Ranjit Singh, the Neth's influence over Man Singh, the Maharaja's apathy towards the British and the like.

The increasing strides of hostility between the rulers and the feudal lords of Marwar, during the 19th century, was advantageous to the dominant position of the Company in the region. Hardly had the situation of strife quelled, the occurrence of the Indian Mutiny of 1857 helped the Company in exercising substantial influence upon details of administration in Marwar. However, amidst diplomatic reverses one also finds, in the political actions of Dungji, Jeweharji and Kushal Singh of Ahua, thrilling sensations of medieval chivalry. Of course, these were the modest attempts of resistance of the persons who were to act and react within the narrow compass of passion and emotion, they were in fact indices of the vitality, resourcefulness and sense of self-respect of the period under review.

In the present thesis entitled "The East India Company and Marwar" Dr Zabar Singh has critically examined the currents and

cross-currents of the thoughts and actions relevant to the events of the history of Marwar from 1803-1857. In the pages of the present work he has commented on many motives, actuating policies on the basis of contemporary records in Rajasthan and non-Rajasthan. With a spirit of genuine researcher he has set down facts fairly and accurately. His assessment of Maharaja Man Singh, Maharaja Takht Singh, Thakur Kushal Singh and their associates is rational and impartial. The presentation of the social and economic structure of Marwar is lucid and informative. As one under whose supervision and guidance the work was commenced, pursued and completed, I commend it as a piece of scientific study of an important aspect of Rajasthan history.

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PREFACE

The chequered history of the relations between the State of Marwar (known as Jodhpur also) and the English East India Company constitutes an extremely important and interesting chapter in the history of Rajputana. Perhaps, no other aspect had influenced the politics and life of Marwar so much as the development of the British relations with the State between 1803 and 1857. The ere so full of dramatic developments with far reaching consequences presented a challenge and provoked various questions. In spite of the spade work done by Col Tod on the history of Marwar and the erudite works of Dr Ojha, Pandit Reu and a few others, the study of British relations with Marwar remained a desideratum and many central questions about this aspect had not been precisely answered.

In the present work an attempt has been made to trace and analyse the penetration and extension of the influence of the English East India Company in Marwar, till it entered the entire body politic of the State and became an all pervading influence. The study is, therefore, an attempt to reconstruct the history of the relations between the East India Company and Marwar on the basis of contemporary and authentic source material, most of which had hitherto remained untapped. This source material consists of the archival documents preserved in the National Archives of India, the Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, contemporary paintings (known as Pustak Prakesh Collection) preserved at the Umaid Bhawan Palace of His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur, the Mehemandir Paintings and the paintings at the Jodhpur Museum and the historical records from various other depositories.

This dissertation does not merely confine itself to a discussion of the Political aspects only but also attempts to depict an elaborate

picture of the social and economic conditions prevailing during the period. The study also presents a comprehensive survey and a systematic analysis of the administration of Marwar and the British impact thereupon.

Besides presenting a balanced and graphic picture of the effects of the upheaval of 1857 in Marwar, the thesis also offers an unbiased analysis of the events and the attitudes of the various sections of society and their consequences.

It is my pleasant duty to place on record my sincere gratitude to my revered guru, Dr G N Sharma, of Professor in the Department of History and Indian Culture, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, under whose able guidance and supervision I have made this study and from whom I have always received inspiration and encouragement.

I am also thankful to the Director of the National Archives of India, New Delhi, the Director of Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, the Librarian and the Staff of the Central Library of the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, and Dr B Tyagi, Head of the Department of Botany, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, for the various facilities extended by them in the preparation of this thesis. I am also grateful to the Comptroller of the Household of His Highness of the Maharaja of Jodhpur, for permitting me to consult the documents and take photographs of the paintings of the Pustak Prekash Collection.

My grateful thanks are also due to my esteemed friends for helping me in various ways. I am particularly grateful to Dr Sudhaker Mishra and Mr B L Tak for extending invaluable help in photographic work, Dr Dixit for helping me in reading the microfilms; Mr R P Bhatnager, Mr V D Singh and Mr D P Wanchu for reading portions of the manuscript and offering valuable suggestions. I owe a debt of gratitude to Mr I N Sopari and Dr K M Mathur who took extraordinary interest in the publication of my thesis and helped me in so many ways at every stage and offered valuable suggestions. I am thankful to my sons Rajendra,

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
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ABBREVIATIONS

Actg	Acting.
Adj	Adjutant
A.G.G.	Agent to the Governor-General
Asst.	Assistant
Capt.	Captain.
C.O D,	The Court of Directors of the English East India Company
Cons.	Consultations.
E I.C	English East India Company
Eriskine	Imperial Gazetteers of India, Provincial Series, Rajputana (1908)
F & P	Political Consultations of the Foreign Department, National Archives of India, New Delhi
F & Sec	Secret Consultations of the Foreign Department, National Archives of India, New Delhi
G.G	The Governor-General of British India
Hon	Honourable
<i>Ibid.</i>	<i>Ibidem</i> (in the same place)
J S R	Jodhpur State Records.
<i>loc cit.</i>	<i>Loco citato</i> (In the same place cited, in the passage last referred to)
Lt	Lieutenant
Ojha	History of Jodhpur State by G H Ojha
<i>op cit</i>	<i>Opera Citato</i> (in the work cited)
P.P.J.	Pustak Prakash, Jodhpur.

Raj Gaz	Rajputana Gazetteer, The W R S Residency and Bikaner Agency, Vol III-A (1909)
R A O H R	Rajputana Agency Office, Historical Records, National Archives of India, New Delhi
Reu	Marwar Ka Itihas by V N Reu in 2 vols
Secy Govt.	Unless indicated otherwise, it means a Secretary to the Government of India
Tod.	Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan by Colonel James Tod in 2 vols (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1957).
Walter	The Gazetteer of Marwar, Mallani and Jaisalmer (1877)



INTRODUCTION

Marwar and its Political boundary on the eve of 1818

Marwar,¹ the land of heroic Rathors,² was the largest in extent of the Rajputana States. The State popularly known as Jodhpur taking its name after its capital,³ covered more than one-fourth of the total area of Rajputana.⁴ It extended between 24°30' and 27°40' north latitude and 70°0' to 75°20' east longitude and contained an area of 37,000 square miles.⁵ On its north and west a great desert extended which separated this state from Bikaner and Jaisalmer, and on the south-east stretched the Aravali mountains, dividing it from the territory of Mewar.⁶ Tod had been precise in giving its

1 Marwar—Marwar is a corruption of *Maru-war*, *Marusthal* or *Marusthen* (The Imperial Gazetteer of India Vol XVIII, 1908 p 213). All these terms mean a vast desert. The earliest reference to it is found in the Ghosundi Inscription where it is described as *Marusthal* (*Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Vol 56, Pt I, No 2, p 80). The Bards frequently describe it as *Marudhai* or *Maru*, which is synonymous to *Marudesa* (*Manas Maudharia Manak Sami Moolga* II, *Umaidan*, *Umar Kaya*, p 322).

2 Rathors—The word Rathor is said to have been derived from the Sanskrit word *Rashtrakuta*. Their original kingdom was situated in the south from where they spread over Gujrat, Kathiawar, Rajputana, Madhya Pradesh, Gaya and Badayun (Ojha, G H, *Jodhpur Rajya ka Itihas* Vol I, p 84). The Jodhpur branch of the Rathors has been traced to Rao Siha as the descendants of Jaichand of Kannauj (*Mulmot Nenshi ki Khyat* Vol II, pp 50-55 and 58).

Dr G H Ojha has refuted this view and has related Rao Siha to the Rashtrakuta Dynasty of Badayun and considers the rulers of Kannauj as Garhwals (Ojha, *op cit*, pp 143 and 146).

3 Major C K M Walter, *Gazetteers of Marwar, Mallam and Jaisalmer*, (1877) p 1.

4 Imperial Gazetteers of India, Provincial Series, Rajputana, p 170.

5 Major C K M Walter, *Gazetteers of Marwar Mallam and Jaisalmer*, p 1.

6 *The Indian Chiefs, Rajas and Zamindars*, etc., Pt. I, p. 45.

extent and observed that "the extreme breadth of Marwar lies between two points in the parallel of the capital, namely, Girap, west and Shamgarh on the Aravali range, east. This line measures two hundred and seventy British miles. The greatest length, from the Sirohi frontier to the northern boundary is about two hundred and twenty miles. From the remote angle, N N E, in the Deedwaoh district, to the extremity of Sanchore, S W, the diagonal measurement is three hundred and fifty miles. The limits of Marwar are, however, so very irregular, and present so many salient angles and abutments into other states, that without a trigonometrical process we cannot arrive at a correct estimate of its superficial extent a nicely not indeed required"⁷ Roughly speaking, it may be said that it was bounded on the north by Bikaner, on the north-west by Jaisalmer, on the west by Sind, on the south-west by the Rann of Cutch, on the south by Palanpur and Sirohi, on the south-east by Mewar, on the east by Ajmer-Merwara and Kishangarh and on the north-west by Jaipur⁸

The country, as its name implies, is a sterile, sandy and inhospitable land. There is some comparatively fertile land in the north-east, east and south-east in the neighbourhood of the Aravali hills, but generally speaking it is a dreary waste covered with sand hills, rising sometimes to a height of 300 or 400 feet, and the desolation becomes more absolute and marked as one proceeds westwards. "The northern and north-western portion is a mere desert, known as the *thal* (*thar*) in which, it has been said there are more spears than spear-grass heads, and blades of steel grow better than blades of corn"⁹

Political Background

This inhospitable state of Jodhpur was occupied by the Rathors, sometime during the early decades of the thirteenth century, under the leadership of Siha¹⁰ He and his successors in persons of Asthan

7. Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol II, p 124

8. Imperial Gazetteers, Provincial Series, Rajputana, p 170, Ojha, *Rajputana ka Itihas*, Vol IV, *Jodhpur Rajya Ka Itihas*, Pt I, p 4, Hunter, *Imperial Gazetteers of India*, Vol VII, pp 234-235

9. Imperial Gazetteers, Provincial Series, Rajputana p 179

10. Buthu Inscription of the 12th day of the dark half of V S 1330 (9th October 1273) *Indian Antiquary*, Vol 40, p 301, Reu, V N, *Marwar Ka Itihas*, p.1 to V 39

(1273-1292 A D), Rao Dhuhad (1292-1309), Raipal (1309) and Chunda (1395-1424 A D), extended their kingdom and asserted their organized political power over the territories round about Mandor and Nagaur ¹¹

In the middle of the 15th century, however, Jodha appeared on the scene and extended his kingdom to the east and the west, including Mandor, Merta, Chhapar-Dronpur, Sojat, Siwana, Sambhar Ajmer and a large portion of Nagaur ¹² Maldev was a famous ruler of this dynasty, who reigned from 1532 to 1562, ¹³ subjugated the forts of Bhadrarjun, Jalor and Siwana, and strongly guarded the north-eastern region of Marwar against the Mughals and the Afghans ¹⁴

Another powerful prince of this dynasty was Chandrasen (1562-1581) whose name is still cherished in Rathor memory with reverence for his heroic struggle against the matchless power of Akbar. ¹⁵ Similarly, Jaswant Singh (1640-1678) also holds an important place in the history of Marwar. He was not only a learned prince, but also a diplomat possessing great powers of organisation and a wide outlook. He was held in high esteem as an eminent general in the Mughal cadre of Aurangzeb's time ¹⁶

It was the early 18th century which gave a death blow to the traditional glory of the Rathors. Maharaja Vijay Singh (1752-1793), ¹⁷ who was otherwise a devout follower of *Vaishnavism* and patron of art and learning, failed to patch up differences between his *poswan* (concubine) Gulab Rai and the high born nobles. This led to murders and disorder in the state ¹⁸ The seed of dissensions sown by the Maharaja and his concubine bore evil fruits during the reign of the princes who followed him

11 Nagar Inscription of 1629 A D , Ojha, *op cit* , pp 161-170, 200-208, Reu, V N . *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, pp 18-10

12 Daul Dass *Khyat* (MS), Vol I, p 187, Reu, Vol I, pp 97, 102

13 *Jodhpur Rajya Ki Khyat*, Vol I, p 68, *Vir Vinod*, Vol II, p 813

14 Baki Das, *Itihāsik Batan*, Nos 1508-09, *Vir Vinod*, Vol II, pp 808-09.

15 Abul Fazl, *Akbarnama* (Tr by Beveridge), Vol II, p 305, Vol III, pp 113-15 and 466

16 *Jodhpur Rajya Ki Khyat*, Vol I, p 193, *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*, E & D , Vol VII, p 271

17 *Jodhpur Rajya Ki Khyat*, Vol III, pp 1 & 105, *Vir Vinod*, Vol II, pp 851-52 and 1077

18 Surajmal, *Vamsha Bhaskar*, Vol IV, p 3920

Alongwith the ruling dynasty of Marwar the several clans and sub-clans of the Rathors and other Rajputs among whom may be included Champawats, Kumpawats, Udawats, Mertias, Karamsots, Bhattis, Jodhawats, etc., exercised their influence at different places under the ruling chiefs of Marwar, although in the beginning they were then too weak to assert any authority. The frequent engagement of Marwar in warfare against a new race of conquerors from beyond the Himalayas welded the rulers and their warrior feudatories into one political entity. They formed the backbone of the defence system of the state and it was with their support and active co-operation that the ruler could exercise his power within his sphere of influence and undertake any military expedition against any external danger or internal

But with the establishment of a stable Government under the Mughals in the North when the number of the external enemies of Marwar diminished, there appeared, among the chief-holders, a tendency to assert independence in their respective localities. The refractory attitude of Ram, Ramal, and Udai Singh, after the death of Maldeo are instances in point.¹⁹ The whole reign of Ajit Singh was distracted by repeated rebellion of Inder Singh and his followers.²⁰

However, during the Mughal period the rulers of Marwar could count upon the Imperial assistance against the rebellious thakurs and consequently the power of the thakurs was kept under restraint. But after the fall of Mughal empire there emerged a period of disturbance and anarchy resulting into an invitation to the Marathas and Pathans to indulge in their unprincipled acts of ravage and depredation in Marwar. Owing to these unfortunate developments and chaotic conditions in the state the thakurs gained new dimensions in their ambitions and developed a defiant attitude, resulting in undermining the prestige and authority of the rulers, and accelerating the dismemberment of the kingdom.

Towards the end of the 17th century of the Christian era, the influence of this type of feudal set up in Marwar and its functioning was on the whole injurious to the state and the people. The powerful thakurs were generally found taking sides in several succession issues

19 *Jodhpur Raja ki Khyat*, Vol I, pp 85-86

20 Dev Prasad, *Aurangzebname*, Vol II, pp 83-86, *Jodhpur Raja ki Khyat*, Vol II, pp 17, 38 and 43.

and other conflicts, resulting into the creation of a state of civil war and caused immense harm to Marwar. For instance the thakurs were found taking sides in the rivalry between Bijay Singh and Ram Singh. Later on Bhim Singh and Man Singh were found poised against each other. After the death of Bhim Singh in 1803 the claim of his posthumous son Dhokal Singh led to a prolonged and tragic struggle in Marwar in which we again find these feudal chiefs entrenched into two warring camps.

The Political Condition of India on the eve of the Eighteenth Century

The political condition of India towards the close of the 17th century and beginning of the 18th was by no means satisfactory. The country was divided into a large number of small states which were constantly fighting with each other over petty issues. The Rajputs who had an enviable and glorious historical past had stooped down to a deplorable level of political life and the glamour of the Rajput character had all but faded. The Sikhs had not yet achieved any status of importance. The Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam II, who was a blind old man, was a nominal ruler of the country. In fact he was under the thralldom of Perron, the French Commander of Sindhia, passing his days under the gloom of helplessness, misery and misfortune. Thus when Lord Wellesley took charge of the Governor-Generalship in May 1798, the most serious rival of the British in northern India was Daulat Rao Sindhia. The Rajput States had been reduced to a dependent status of paying tribute to Sindhia. Holkar had also become quite powerful and had extended his influence and dominions. In addition to the Maratha powers the increase in the French influence also caused a great anxiety to the British. Several French officers were at that time holding supreme command of the armed forces of many rulers of India. Sindhia's army was under De Boigne, M. Perron and Louis Borquin. Holkar had Duderne to help him. M. Raymond was commanding Nizam's army. M. Perron had not only established the supremacy of his masters in Northern India but had also spread his sway over the Rajput chiefs, especially those of Jaipur and Jodhpur and commanded them in a way as if he represented a sovereign state of a superior rank.²¹

21 Wellesley to Lake, dated 27th July 1807, vide *Wellesley's Despatches* by Martin, Vol III, p. 210.

Weakening of Maratha Power and its influence on Marwar.

In the chequered political history of India, the treaty of Bassero²² is undoubtedly a significant landmark. The treaty signed on the last day of December 10 1802 became the immediate cause of hostility between the British and Sindhia. The most irritating feature of the treaty was that it involved the entry of the Peshwa in the subsidiary system of Lord Wellesley and thus completely paralysed the head of the Maratha commonwealth. In fact it was a diplomatic triumph for the British and a severe blow at the very foundation of the Maratha Power,²³ because the Peshwa was still regarded as the centre of the Maratha unity and a symbol of Maratha prestige in the Anglo-Maratha contest for supremacy in India. The treaty made the further postponement of the Anglo-Maratha contest impossible and war became a certainty.

Sindhia realised the gravity of the situation well and made an untiring effort for effecting a coalition of all the Maratha chiefs against the British,²⁴ but unfortunately he could not succeed. The personal prejudices of Holkar and the Raja of Nagpur, combined with the effort of Arthur Wellesley's diplomacy, did not allow the Maratha chiefs to unite.²⁵

On 26th August 1803, General Lake received instructions from the Governor-General to commence active operations against Sindhia, Perron and their allies.²⁶ He was instructed to effect the complete elimination of the Maratha influence from North India.²⁷ Lord Lake immediately set out to execute the orders received by him from the Governor-General. In the first engagement with his formidable rival Perron, General Lake achieved a significant victory at Aligarh.²⁸ The fort of Aligarh was taken by assault. The Marathas suffered a still more severe blow in the form of Perron's resignation from Sindhia's service.²⁹ They were, thus deprived of the services of one

22 Aitchison, Vol VI, pp 52-58

23 Wellesley, *A Vindication of the Late War*, p 18

24 Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol III, papers 62 68 and 69

25 Sardesai, G S, *New History of the Marathas*, Vol II, p 758

26 Beveridge, Henry, *A Comprehensive History of India*, Vol II, p 758

27 Malcolm, John *Political History of India*, Vol I, p 258

28 Mill and Wilson, *History of India*, Vol I, p 483

29 Compton, Herbert, *European Military Adventurers of Hindustan*, p 307

of their ablest generals, at a critical period, when his services were extremely needed

Louis Bourquois, stepped into the shoes of Perrot. Under his command the Marathas tried to check the advance of General Lake towards Delhi, but Sindhia's forces were routed in the fierce battle and Lake entered Delhi in triumph³⁰ and relieved the Emperor Shah Alam from the Maratha thralldom.

After Delhi, Agra fell to General Lake on 18th October 1803 and finally he achieved a decisive victory at Laswari on 1st November, where the French contingent of Sindhia's army was completely annihilated³¹. This crippling blow left no other choice open for Sindhia but to accept the British terms, and the treaty of Surji Arjuna was signed on 30th December 1803. According to the terms of this treaty Sindhia surrendered all his territories in the Doab and all those northward of the Rajput states of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Gohad. The Raja of Berar was already defeated and compelled to sign the treaty of peace.

Negotiations with Holkar having failed Lord Wellesley issued orders to Lord Lake and General Wellesley on 16th April 1804 to subdue Holkar.³² Lord Lake defeated Holkar at Rampura and retired to Kanpur leaving Colonel Monsoon at the command. Holkar took full advantage of the absence of Lake and inflicted a heavy blow on the British forces and laid siege to Delhi on 8th October 1805, but he was soon repulsed and on 12th November his infantry was defeated at Deeg and the cavalry three days later at Farrukhabad. Lord Lake inflicted yet another defeat on Holkar and captured Deeg on 24th December 1804. Again a surprise attack was made and after this defeat Holkar retired beyond the Chambal. Later on peace was concluded with him by Lord Cornwallis. Although the immediate result of this policy of Lord Wellesley was that the Maratha influence was crippled in north India, the power of Sindhia and Holkar was yet formidable in Rajputana.

Wellesley's Policy Towards Marwar

Lord Wellesley was convinced that the resources of smaller states, particularly those of Rajputana, were a source of great strength

30 Mill and Wilson, *History of India*, Vol VI, p. 505

31 Lord Lake to Wellesley dated 2nd November 1803, *Wellesley's Despatches*, pp. 404-407

to the Marathas and he thought it necessary to take steps to deprive the Marathas of this advantage. This was to be the first step towards eliminating the French and Maratha domination of the north and the second step was to extend the British territory to the Jamuna and the British influence to the borders of the Deccan. Wellesley attached great importance to the alliance with the Rajput states, especially Jaipur and Jodhpur, because he believed that their resources were adequate to support a British subsidiary force³² and that such an alliance would be immensely helpful to the British in their fight against the Maratha power. He knew that the success of the campaign against the Marathas depended upon "the assistance or at least the neutrality of these powers"³³. He was quite hopeful that the British protection, if offered, would be welcomed and accepted immediately with gratitude, because in spite of the regard in which Perron was held³⁴ by these chiefs, they were completely fed up with the Maratha ravages and were eager to get rid of their domination and insatiable demands. However, the Rajput chiefs were not in a mood to cast their die before the results of the Anglo-Maratha contest were clear. So they followed the policy of sitting on the fence.

Lord Wellesley in pursuance of his plans delegated an extensive diplomatic authority to General Lake to negotiate and conclude treaties with the chiefs of Rajputana,³⁵ and expressed his belief that Jaipur and Jodhpur would readily "connect themselves with the British Government for the purpose of emancipating themselves from the oppressive control of the Marathas"³⁶. Another reason for the Britishers looking to Jodhpur as a possible ally in their struggle against the Marathas was their hope that the ruler of Jodhpur would be forthcoming to stand by them, as it would help him to restore

32 *Wellesley's Despatches*, pp 327-333. Wellesley to the Court of Directors dated 20th June 1803.

33 N. B. Edmonstone, Persian Secretary to Government of India to G. Mercer, July 22nd 1803, vide *Wellesley's Despatches*, Vol III, pp 228-229.

34 Governor-General to the Court of Directors, vide *Letters to the Court of Directors* 1805, Vol 20, May 20, 1805.

35 Colonel Collins, *Paper relating to Maratha war in 1803*, p. 17.

36 Wellesley to Lake dated 27th July 1803, *Wellesley's Despatches*, Vol III, pp 234-235.

37 Wellesley to Lake dated 26th July 1803, *Wellesley's Despatches*, Vol III, p. 241.

those districts of which Marwar was dispossessed by the late Mahadji Sindhia ³⁸ Lord Wellesley despatched a letter to the Maharaja of Jodhpur through Lord Lake in 1803 ³⁹ It contained the preliminary draft of the treaty of defensive alliance proposed between the British and the state of Jodhpur. But the reply to the letter could not be despatched in time due to the internal troubles of the state and the death of Maharaja Bhim Singh which occurred on the 19th October 1803

Thus the absence of a supreme power in India, the long warfare between the Company's forces and the Marathas, the weak government of the Rathors, which became exposed to grave internal situation, the disturbances caused by the conflicts between the ruler and the chiefs and the consequent necessity of defence of the state made the possibility of the dawn of the British influence in Marwar inevitable. In fact, the weakening of Marathas and the Rathors facilitated the British to cherish the ambition of the expansion of their political sphere of influence in Marwar the story of which is attempted in the following pages.

38 J Monckton, Assistant Personal Secretary to the Government to the Maharaja of Jodhpur, dated 22nd July 1804, Cons 2 March 1804 No 20 I & Sec.

39 Governor-General to the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur dated 22nd July 1803, Cons 2 March 1804 Nos 2 and 2-A, I & Sec

CHAPTER I

MAHARAJA MAN SINGH AND THE EAST INDIA COMPANY (1803-1818)

Maharaja Bhim Singh died in 1803 A D , after a reign of about ten years. As the deceased Maharaja had left no male issue, Man Singh, the son of Guman Singh ascended the throne of Marwar¹. The new Maharaja, being aware of the weak position of the Maratha power, realised that the need of the hour was to enter into a friendly alliance with the British Government. He, therefore, despatched on 5th November 1803, the reply of the pending correspondence which had been lying with him since Bhim Singh's death, through his *Vakil*, accepting broadly the treaty proposals².

The terms of the proposed treaty were agreed upon by Fateh Ram,³ the Jodhpur *Vakil* and the representative of the British Government on December, 1803. The treaty consisted of seven articles⁴. The first article envisaged the establishment of 'firm and permanent friendship and alliance between the two Governments'. According to the second article, the friends and enemies of one party were to be treated as friends and enemies of both. The third article was a guarantee against the British interference in the internal affairs of the Maharaja and assured that no tribute was to be demanded from him. The fourth article bound the Maharaja to send his entire forces to assist the company's army 'in the event of any enemy of the honourable Company evincing a disposition to invade the country lately taken possession of by the honourable Company in Hindustan'⁵. The fifth article demanded that the disputes with any other

1 Jodhpur State Records. Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 6, pp 44-48

2 Translation of a *Kharita* from Man Singh to the Governor General, received 8 December 1803, Cons 8 December 1803, No 259

3 Maharaja Man Singh to General Lake, Cons 2 March 1804, No 185-A, F & Sec

4 Aitchison, Vol III, p 126, Cons 2 March 1804, No 216, F & Sec

5 Cons 2 March 1804, No 216, F & Sec, Aitchison, Vol III, p 126

state were to be first submitted to the British Government so that "the government may endeavour to settle it amicably" According to the sixth article Maharaja's army was to be put entirely at the disposal of the British commander during war Last but not least, the final article provided that the Maharaja would not entertain into his service any European without the consent of the Company's Government ⁶

The treaty was ratified by the Governor-General on 15th January 1804⁷ and a copy was sent for ratification to Maharaja Man Singh But, meanwhile, Man Singh had entered into negotiations with Holkar⁸ and after protracted negotiations, had signed agreements against British The Maharaja refused to ratify the treaty with the British Government On the other hand, he now proposed a new treaty based on the principle of equality between the Maharaja and the British Government ⁹ The articles now proposed completely differed from the original terms agreed to by the Jodhpur *Vakil* and the result was that the British refused to accept it The weakening of Sindhia's power had also contributed to the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the British for any treaty with Jodhpur Lastly, the evasive attitude of the Maharaja and his friendly relations with Holkar annoyed the British Consequently, Lord Lake intimated to Maharaja Man Singh that his failure to return the ratified treaty in time has relieved the British of any obligation to bind themselves with its terms and he refused to discuss the treaty containing entirely new articles ¹⁰ The decision was guided by the evolution of the policy of non-interference by the British officers in the affairs of Rajputana States The Jodhpur Maharaja soon realised the hollowness of his policy of supporting Holkar against the British The downfall of Sindhia's power in North India had served as an eye-opener to him He now realised the value and importance of the British alliance Consequently he exerted sincerely and strenuously to achieve this end His *Vakils* now delivered

6 Ibid, Appendix No 1

7 Cons 2 March 1804, No 216, F & Sec

8 Jodhpur State Records Haqiqat Bahi No 8, p 444

9 Cons 14 June 1804, No 56-A, F & Sec

10 General Lake to Marquis Wellesley, 22 April 1804, Cons 14 June 1804, No 55, F & Sec

the original treaty duly ratified by him to Lord Lake,¹¹ but it was very late. The Governor-General, by a despatch dated 9th May 1804, had already dissolved the treaty.¹² The acting Resident with Sindhia was informed that Sindhia was not bound to acknowledge the independence of the Jodhpur Maharaja. The Governor-General firmly refused to reconsider the issue.¹³ Jodhpur Maharaja had committed a diplomatic blunder and had failed to avail himself of the favourable terms offered by the British and for which Jodhpur had to suffer the outrages and depredations of the Marathas and Pindaris for some time more, before it got British protection in 1818, but not on so favourable terms as offered earlier.

Jodhpur-Jaipur Rivalry

So far the negotiations with the British had not gone in the favour of Man Singh. His relations with Maharaja Jagat Singh of Jaipur also got strained on the question of Krishna Kumari, the daughter of Maharana Bhim Singh of Mewar. On this issue the rulers of Jodhpur and Jaipur entered into an armed conflict which proved ruinous to both and brought untold miseries and calamities to their subjects. The miserable plight of Jodhpur tempted many avaricious invaders and free-booters to fish in its troubled waters.

At the root of the Jaipur-Jodhpur hostilities was thakur Sawai Singh of Pokaran, whose cherished aim was to put Dhokal Singh, the alleged posthumous son of Bhim Singh, on the throne of Marwar. When he failed to get the abdication of Man Singh in favour of Dhokal Singh, he resorted to 'artful machinations' to achieve his object. On one hand he instigated Man Singh to claim the hand of Krishna Kumari, the beautiful and accomplished princess of Udaipur, on the ground of his being a successor to Bhim Singh, to whom she was betrothed and the marriage could not take place because of his death in 1803. In order to instigate Man Singh, the thakur of Pokaran told him that if Krishna Kumari was married to Maharaja

11 General Lake to Marquis Wellesley, 1 May 1804, Cons. 6 September 1804, No. 4-A, F & Sec.

12 Marquis Wellesley to General Lake, 9 May 1804, Cons. 14 June 1804, No. 57-A, I & Sec.

13 Marquis Wellesley to General Lake, 16 May 1804, Cons. 4 September 1804, No. 5, F & Sec.

Jagat Singh of Jaipur, he (Man Singh) would be 'eternally disgraced'¹⁴ On the other hand he succeeded in persuading the chief of Jaipur to insist on the marriage of Krishna Kumari, because her father Maharana Bhim Singh had offered her hand to him. Thus both the rulers were adamant, neither of them conceiving that it would be consistent with his honour and dignity to yield to his rival, a point of so delicate a nature among Rajputs of 'high descent'¹⁵ Furthermore, Sawai Singh achieved significant success in getting the recognition, by Jaipur and Bikaner, of the claim of Dhokal Singh to the throne of Jodhpur

Elaborate preparation for the impending hostilities were made and hectic activities started for winning allies Man Singh had counted on Holkar's aid but Jagat Singh succeeded in ensuring his neutrality by offering 'conditional bills of exchange to the amount of ten lakhs of rupees to be paid to him on his reaching Kotah, on his way to Deccan, but not before'¹⁶ The Pokaran thakur Sawai Singh at last played his trump card and joined the Jaipur camp followed by a number of thakurs of Marwar. Man Singh finding himself in a very precarious situation contacted Archibald Seton, Resident Delhi, through his *Vakil* Fateh Ram Vyas, and sought the British interposition for the amicable settlement of the dispute between Jodhpur and Jaipur¹⁷ But the request was rejected by the Resident on the plea that it was the principle of his government to avoid all mediatorial interference with foreign states excepting only when such interference was conformable to Treaties.¹⁸

Jaipur had purchased the active support of Amir Khan and his force on payment of one lakh of rupees¹⁹ Under such a difficult situation in the year 1807, Man Singh met the forces of the 'anti-

14 Tod Vol II, p 109

15 Resident Delhi to Secretary to the Government dt 28 December 1806, Cons 15 January 1807, No 6, F & P

16 A Seton, Resident Delhi to Secretary Government dt 10 February 1807, Cons 26 February 1807 No 26, F & P

17 A Seton to N B Edmonstone, Secretary Government dt 20 February 1807, Cons 12 March 1807, No 12, F & P

18 Ibid

19 A Seton, Resident Delhi to N B Edmonstone, Secretary Government, Cons. 26 February 1807, No. 29, F & P.

Jodhpur confederacy' headed by Jagat Singh of Jaipur at Gingoli in the Parbatsar *Purgana*²⁰ A majority of his thakurs along with their supporters deserted their ruler at the most critical juncture of the battle Man Singh fled to Merta and ultimately reached Jodhpur where he shut himself up in the fort and tried to strengthen his defences. The fort was besieged and the territory conquered was put under the authority of Dhokal Singh, who was proclaimed as the ruler

Man Singh had become exasperated and again contacted A Seton, Resident at Delhi. This time he made an alluring offer that 'If Mr Seton and the Hon'ble Governor-General, who are the lords of the country, will now assist me and preserve me from dishonour I will make a present to the British Government of the *Pargana*s of Sambhar and Didwana and two other districts and will moreover conform in every respect to the pleasure of the British Government.'²¹ It must be said to the credit of the Resident at Delhi that he refused to be tempted to accept such an offer and rejected the request on the ground that it was the determined system of the British Government not to "enter into any war for the purpose of obtaining an accession of territory"²²

Man Singli, however, continued to defend his fort with admirable determination and several encounters were fought at Fatehpol, Ranisar Lake and Lakhanpol in July 1807.²³ The loyal followers of Man Singh, though fighting with their backs to the wall, gave an excellent account of themselves. Gradually the fortunes of the besiegers began to recede. They were running short of supplies and faced great difficulty in their procurement. A large number of Rathor *Sardars* estimated at about ten thousand, were utterly disgusted with the troops of Amir Khan and Jaipur, who were laying waste the


20 Jodhpur State Records, Khas Rukla Parwana Bahi No 2 p 7, Ibid., Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 6, p 473

21 Translation of a letter from Thakur Dhes Akhbaravis, Cons 2 April 1807, No 65, F & P. A Seton to N B Edmonstone Secretary to Government dt 6 July 1807 Cons 23 July 1807, No 31 F & P

22 A Seton, Resident at Delhi to the Maharaja of Jodhpur dt 17 March 1807 Cons 2 April 1807, No 66, F & P

23 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 6, p 476

CHHATRI OF INDRA I SINGHI AND THE BODY OF JORNER IN



countryside of Jodhpur. They deserted Jagat Singh and marched towards Merta²⁴ Amir Khan followed the suit and joined the Jodhpur forces²⁵ The Rathor thakurs and their followers alongwith Amir Khan marched towards Phagi and a battle was fought there in which Sheolal, the commander-in-chief of Jaipur army, was defeated on August 18, 1807. Amir Khan and Thakur Shuvnath Singh of Kuchaman continued their victorious march till they reached the very suburbs of Jaipur and encamped at Jbotwara In Jaipur city the panic ran so high that the gates of the city were closed²⁶ The last nail in the 'coffin of the anti-Jodhpur confederacy' was put by the desertion of the chiefs of Bikaner and Shahpura Jagat Singh was completely unprepared for such unexpected developments He had no other alternative except to raise the siege of Jodhpur fort, which he did on 14th September 1807, and speedily returned to Jaipur in October 1807²⁷

Amir Khan and the Jodhpur thakurs who had returned after threatening the very capital of Jaipur were received at Jodhpur with great honour The turbans were exchanged between Man Singh and Amir Khan signifying the intimate and brotherly relations Amir Khan was offered a tempting reward if he could bring complete liquidation of the rebellion headed by thakur Sawai Singh and few others, who were strongly entrenched in the fort of Nagaur. True to his character Amir Khan got the four thakurs—Sawai Singh of Pokaran, the thakurs of Bagri, Pali and Chaudawal alongwith their two thousand followers treacherously slaughtered²⁸ at Mundwa near Nagaur. Amir Khan, on his return, was given ten lakhs of rupees and the towns of Mundwa and Kuchilawas, besides a daily allowance of one hundred rupees, as a reward for his 'signal infamy'²⁹ In addition to this he was already in possession of Nagaur and Nawa and his followers had partitioned the land at Merta amongst themselves³⁰

24 A Seton to N B Edmonstone dt 23 July 1807, Cons 11 August 1804, No 4, F & P

25 Jodhpur State Records Khas Rukka Parwana Bahi No 2, pp 3 & 137

26 Cons 1 September 1807, No 6 A and 14, F & P

27 Jodhpur State Khas Rukka Parwana Bahi No 4, p 6, Jodhpur State Khairita Bahi No 9, p 130, Cons dt 26 October 1807, No 21 F & P.

28 Jodhpur State Records Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 6, p 482

29 Tod, Vol II, p 114

30 Jodhpur State Records 'Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 6, pp 482-583

Wisdom had at last dawned upon the rulers of Jodhpur and Jaipur that their mutual dissension was responsible for a lot of bloodshed and had brought untold miseries and calamities to their subjects. They had fully realised that it was high time to relinquish their desire to marry Krishna Kumari, the princess of Udaipur and to concentrate their efforts to find ways and means to defend their territories against the never ending demands and aggressive depredations by the Marathas and Pindaris. Consequently, after some negotiations, both the rulers solemnly agreed to bind themselves by an oath to give up their desire of marrying Krishna Kumari, and also agreed to the proposals of a treaty of strict friendship and alliance between themselves, which was to be cemented by a double marriage, "it having been determined that the Raja of Jaipur was to marry the daughter of the Raja of Jodhpur and that the latter was to become the husband of the sister of the former"³¹ Meanwhile Amir Khan had succeeded in perpetrating the ghastly crime of securing the death of Krishna Kumari, who in obedience to her father's wishes drank the cup of poison. The father, Maharana Bhim Singh was compelled to accept the abnoxious proposal of Amir Khan, under threat of complete destruction.

Attempts for the Renewal of the Alliance with the British.

Fateh Ram Vyas, *Vakil* of Jodhpur at Delhi made an attempt to persuade the Resident at Delhi to give a kind of tacit British guarantee for the agreement. But the British Resident at Delhi firmly refused to oblige the Jodhpur *Vakil*.³² In addition to the clauses referred to above it was also decided that Jagat Singh should return the spoils of Gingoli,³³ the cause of Dhokal Singh should be given up and some amount should be paid to Amir Khan.³⁴

The desire, on the part of Jodhpur, to be admitted into an alliance with the British Government had grown stronger and in the

31 A Seton to N B Edmonstone dt 6 June 1810, Cons 21 June 1810 No 42 F & P

32 A Seton to N B Edmonstone, dt 19 June 1810 Cons 7 July 1810, No 37, F & P

33 The Battle of Gingoli was fought in 1807 near Parbatsar, where Man Singh was routed by Jagat Singh and his allies

34 Jodhpur State Records, Hakiqat Khata Bahi No 6, p. 530.

year 1814, yet another attempt was made by Jodhpur to achieve this end. The Jodhpur *Malik* contacted Charles Metcalfe, Resident at Delhi and communicated that the Maharaja of Jodhpur wished that the Treaty of 1803, which was not ratified by him at that time be adapted now and Jodhpur taken into the sphere of British allies. The offer was declared unacceptable by Metcalfe who repeated the old argument, that it was contrary to the policy of non-intervention being followed by the British Government and furthermore, the Government was bound by certain articles of the treaty with Sindhi³⁵ which formed another obstacle in the way of a British alliance with Jodhpur.³⁶

Amir Khan's hold on Marwar.

Amir Khan had, meanwhile, gained a key position in the affairs of the Jodhpur State. He visited Jodhpur several times,³⁷ but his visit in September 1814,³⁸ was fateful, for the destiny of Man Singh as well as Marwar. The Khan entered into a conspiracy with the disgruntled *sardars* and a high official of the state Mehta Akhai Chand, to murder Indra Raj, the commander-in chief of the army and Den Nath the spiritual head and the revered *Guru* of Man Singh. The Khan got both of them murdered in the fort by his Pathan soldiers.³⁹ Man Singh got infuriated and wanted to punish the offenders, but he was prevented from doing so by the party of the conspirators.⁴⁰ Finding himself helpless and in grave danger, Man Singh was terrified and he abdicated in favour of the young prince Chattr Singh and feigned insanity. On 19th April 1817 Chattr Singh, the only son of Man Singh assumed Regency. The administration was soon dominated by the conspirators and one of their leaders Akhai Chand became Dewan.⁴¹

35 Eighth article of the Treaty signed in November 1805 restrained 'the British Government from entering into treaties with chiefs of the states of Oodeypore, Jaudhpore and Colah and the state of Boondee and other substantive states on the left bank of the Chambul'.

36 C Metcalfe to John Adams, dt 3 April 1814, Cons. April 1814, No 11, F & P.

37 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 6, p 539, 603.

38 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 2, p 161.

39 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 10, p 89.

40. Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 6, p 611.

41. Tod, Vol. II, p. 116.

The Non-intervention Policy and its Influence

The policy of non-intervention, which had obsessed the minds of the British authorities from the year 1804, had done a tremendous harm to the British interests and proved ruinous to the states of Rajputana, particularly Jodhpur and Jajpur. Charles Metcalfe, the Resident at Delhi had opposed this policy and characterised it as 'unworthy and weak'. He had witnessed the development of political condition in Rajputana and had sincerely believed in the reversion of the non-intervention policy. He had expressed his feelings when he observed that, "it is impossible to live in this part of India and to see the scenes which pass before our eyes without regretting that the Rajput states are not under our protection. A confederation of the Rajput states under the protection of the central Government must be a favourite object with everyman who has any charge of political duties in this quarter"⁴². In fact he had suggested the formation of a confederation of Rajput states under the protection of the British Government. He hoped that by doing so the predatory forces would be deprived of their principal source of "ravage and plunder" and an era of peace could commence in Rajputana⁴³. He had denounced the Pindaris and wrote that "the whole of them are the enemies of all the states and they have all been engaged in ravaging either our own provinces or those of our allies"⁴⁴. The activities of Amir Khan and his predatory hordes were considered by Metcalfe as 'incompatible with the preservation of the tranquility of India'⁴⁵. The growing problem of the Pindari menace had started gaining the serious attention of British authorities and at last the Governor-General Lord Hastings obtained permission of the "Home" Government for the total annihilation of the Pindaris. To achieve this aim the friendship and co-operation of the Rajput states was considered as a necessary and useful pre-requisite. These Rajput states were embraced by Hastings as the natural friends of his government. He had formulated a plan to form the confederacy of Rajput states,⁴⁶ if not all, at

⁴² Cons. 12 July 1811, No. 1, F & Sec.

⁴³ C. Metcalfe Resident Delhi to N. B. Edmonstone, Secretary to Government, 20 June 1811, F. D. S. C., 12 July 1811, No. 1.

⁴⁴ *Life and Correspondence of Sir Charles Metcalfe* by John Kaye, pp. 435-438.

⁴⁵ *Life and Correspondence of Sir Charles Metcalfe* by John Kaye, pp. 435-438.

⁴⁶ Governor-General's Minute dt. 3 April 1817, Cons. 21 June 1817 No. 4, F & Sec.

The plan of the confederacy was to be achieved by concluding agreements with the Rajput states. The aim of these agreements was to place the British Government in entire control over their political relations and proceeding with each other and with foreign states, to secure to them the enjoyment of their territorial possessions and the independence exercise of their internal administration under British protection and guidance, and render their resources available for the service of the cause that will be required in the establishment and support of this system.⁴⁷ However, it was felt, right at the beginning, that the implementation of the confederacy plan would not have a smooth sailing. The Government had, therefore, to give consideration to an alternative plan to conclude separate agreements with each state on the conditions best adapted to its peculiar circumstances and situation. Consequently Metcalfe was instructed by the Government on 8th October 1817 that "there are some points of view in which the advantages of the former might be found to preponderate but it may be apprehended that, notwithstanding the similarity of features which in some respects they all exhibit, there are yet such distinctions as to render it difficult to frame any system of general confederation which could adapt itself to the circumstances of all. It is possible also that feelings of pride and jealousy might lead them to prefer a separate alliance with the British Government by which each would preserve

47 J. Admin to C. T. Metcalfe dt 8 October 1817, Cons. 28 October 1817, No. 26, F & P.

48 Political letter to Court of Directors, 19 May 1818. Select Documents, D. C. Ganguly, p. 210, Treaty of 1817, Article IX.

49 Secret Consultations, October 28, 1817, No. 13.

and form of a substantive power, to a union which would bring their common dependence on the British Government too prominently forward" ⁵⁰

Metcalf expressed his agreement with the views of the Government and opened the negotiations with the Rajput states separately ⁵¹ The instructions received from the Government by Metcalfe clarified that, Jodhpur was understood to be a country of small pecuniary resources, but the proverbial bravery of its inhabitants might enable that Government to bring forward a powerful body of auxiliaries for the service of the British Government and the allied states This should be the principal description of the aid to be required from Jodhpur in the event of British establishing an intimate connection with that state A pecuniary contribution, however, towards the expenses of the protecting force ought, if attainable, to be required from Jodhpur ⁵²

Metcalf lost no time in opening negotiations with Jodhpur State after receiving instructions from the Government but delay was caused because no Jodhpur *Vakil* with the authority to conduct negotiations arrived at Delhi till November 1817 ⁵³ However the negotiations started on the arrival of the Jodhpur *Vakils* Vyas Bishun Ram and Abhaya Ram at Delhi ⁵⁴ The approach of the Jodhpur *Vakils*, to the terms and conditions offered by Metcalfe, the Resident at Delhi, was extremely cautious The Jodhpur Government had instructed the *Vakils* to seek clarification on certain issues and secure British assurance on others before agreeing to the terms of the treaty. The issue of Jodhpur's contribution of cavalry to the British involved lengthy discussion The Resident demanded a big force whereas the Jodhpur *Vakils* pleaded that it was beyond the means of the scanty resources of the state to furnish a large contingent At last the Resident conceded the request of the *Vakils* that the strength of the contingent to be furnished by Jodhpur be fixed at 1500 horse and he

50 J Adam to C T Metcalfe dt 8 October 1817, Cons 28 October 1817, No 26, F & Sec

51 C Metcalfe to J Adam dt 18 October 1817, Cons 14 November 1817, No 50, F & Sec

52 Secret Consultations, October 28, 1817, No 26

53 Secret Consultations, December 19, 1817, No 112

54 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 10, p 330

also promised that the Jodhpur force should not be employed beyond Narbada.⁵⁵ Jodhpur had an apprehension that the British would extend their interference from external affairs to internal matters, and might enter into separate engagements with the feudatories of the state. The Resident tried to remove their fears and explained that the 9th article of the Treaty bound the British Government not to interfere in the internal affairs of Jodhpur. He clarified that the Article prohibited the British Government to entertain the applications of the Maharajas' thakurs or nobles and an assurance was given that the British Government did not wish to introduce its laws or jurisdiction into the territory of Jodhpur.

Assurance was also sought by Jodhpur regarding the *pargana* of Godwar that any future demand by Udaipur for the return of this territory would get no attention from the British Government. The Resident assured that the territory which continued under Jodhpur's possession for such a long time would be considered to be belonging to that state.⁵⁶ Similarly the Jodhpur Maharaja was promised a free hand if he decided to resume the jagirs given to Amir Khan. Vyas Bishun Ram told the Resident that Umarkot in Sindh belonged to Jodhpur and lately it was lost to the chiefs of Sindh because of treason of their own officers. He informed the Resident about the contemplated Jodhpur armed expedition to regain Umarkot and sought the assurance of non-intervention by the British Government. The Resident gave a conditional assurance on this point. The condition imposed was that such a measure should be resorted to by Jodhpur only when peaceful negotiations had failed.⁵⁷

As regards Sirohi the Jodhpur *Vakil* informed the Resident that it was a dependency of Jodhpur state paying tribute and rendering military service to his state since Vijay Singh's time. Metcalfe was requested by the *Vakil* to accept this fact and to assure that the British Government would not prohibit the continuance of this connection. The Resident assented to it "provided the circumstances were as stated".⁵⁸

55. Metcalfe to Adams, 15 January 1818, Cons. 6 February 1818, No 102, F & Sec.

56. C. I. Metcalfe to Adams, 15 January 1818, Cons. 6 February 1818, No 102, F & Sec.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

Charles Metcalfe conducted the negotiations admirably well and succeeded in satisfying the Jodhpur *Vakils* on all the points. When the fears and prejudices of that state were removed the way was paved for the treaty of alliance. Accordingly a Treaty was concluded on January 6, 1818. Metcalfe transmitted the Treaty to the Government on January 8, 1818,⁵⁹ which was ratified by Lord Hastings on January 16, 1818,⁶⁰ and later on by Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur and thus extended the horizon of the British paramountcy to embrace the largest of the Rajput states.

Thus, the collapse of the Mughal empire and the rising power and defiant attitude of the Marwar feudatories, the claim of Dhokal Singh leading to the creation of warring factions in Jodhpur, the Krishna Kumari episode and the consequent ruinous hostilities between Jaipur and Jodhpur state, the repeated and exorbitant demands and devastating depredations by the Marathas and the Pindaris resulting into the state of extreme anarchy, lawlessness and poverty, the murder of Indra Raj and Deo Nath followed by the usurpation of power by the conspirators and above all the radical change in the foreign policy of the British Government, initiated enthusiastically by Lord Hastings and executed admirably by Charles Metcalfe were the principal factors that led to the penetration of the influence of the East India Company into Marwar. The logic of history and the force of the above mentioned circumstances had placed Jodhpur in such a situation where the British protection had become an imperative necessity.

The treaty of 1818 with Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur—Its terms and operation

The treaty of 1818 signed between the British Government and the Jodhpur state was substantially different from the unratified treaty of 1803, both in letter as well as in spirit and was generally based on the principle of perpetual friendship, defensive alliance and subordi-

59 Consultations 30 January 1818, Nos 66-67, I & S

60 Jodhpur State Records, Kharita Bahi No 12, pp 327-328 Jodhpur State Records, Kharita Bahi No 10, p 361, The Treaty Book Vol IV, p 48 (The Treaty is printed at length in it), Aitchison, Vol III, pp 128-129, Appendix II

nate co-operation Metcalfe has written to the Secretary, Government of India on 15 January 1818,⁶¹ that "the Treaty was concluded in the name of Maharaja Man Singh, but with the persons deputed by his son, Chattrar Singh, who exercised the power of Regent with, it was presumed, the consent of his father though it was true that some said Chattrar Singh kept his father under restraint".⁶² The Treaty consisted of ten articles. The first article envisaged the establishment of "perpetual friendship alliance and unity of interests" and required to treat the "friends and enemies of one party as the friends and enemies of both". The second article contained the customary assurance of British protection to Jodhpur State. The third article contained the important promise on the part of Maharaja Man Singh and his heirs to "act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government", while the fourth prohibited them to "enter into any negotiation with any chief or state without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government". The fifth article re-affirmed the British supremacy and suzerainty and placed Jodhpur under an obligation to submit her disputes "to the arbitration and awards of the British Government".⁶³ The sixth article of the treaty related to the settlement of the issue of payment of tribute by Jodhpur and secured for the British Government the tribute hitherto paid by Jodhpur to Sindhia. The tribute originally payable to Sindhia was put at Rs 1,80,000. However, it was substantially reduced by established deductions of various kinds.⁶⁴ The final schedule, drawn afterwards, fixed the amount of tribute payable by Jodhpur to the British Government at Rs 1,08,000 per annum.⁶⁵ It was also declared that the engagements for tribute between Jodhpur and Sindhia were hence-forth to cease. The seventh article contained a declaration by the Maharaja that "besides the tribute paid to Sindhia by the

61 Letter No 693, dated 15 January 1818, from C Metcalfe to Government of India, Cons 6 March 1818, No 4, F & S

62 Ibid

63 The Treaty Book Vol IV, p 48, National Archives, Jodhpur State Records, Kharita Bahr No 12, pp 327-328, Aitchison, Vol III, pp 128-129, Appendix II

64 Metcalfe to Adams, dt 15 January 1818, Cons 6 February 1818, No. 102 1 & S

65 Metcalfe to Adams, dt 22 May 1818, Cons 12 June 1818, No 22, F & S, Appendix II

Jodhpur state, tribute has not been paid to any other state". It engaged the Maharaja to pay the tribute that it might have been paying to any power other than Sindhia, to the British Government and on the other hand, it engaged "the British Government to reply to claims advanced by Sindhia or any other power. This article, Metcalfe wrote to the Secretary to the Government of India, on January 15, 1818, is intended to give us a claim to any other tribute that Jodhpur may have paid to other states besides Sindhia, if any such has been concealed from us" ⁶⁶

Metcalfe had made no claim on account of the large sum of money formally paid to Mohammad Shah Khan whose brigade has been for some time, till his death in fact, in the service of the Jodhpur state. Justifying his magnanimous stand, Metcalfe wrote to the Secretary to the Government of India, that, "the resources of the state would not have sufficed for the regular payment of this demand to the British Government and the Maharaja would not probably have consented to so great a sacrifice" ⁶⁷ Similarly the large sums paid to Amir Khan were also not considered as tribute for the purpose of this article and no demand for its payment was made ⁶⁸

The eighth article was significant since it bound Jodhpur to furnish fifteen hundred horse for the service of the British Government whenever required. Furthermore, the whole of the disposable Jodhpur State force was to join the British army if considered necessary ⁶⁹. The only concession granted was that under such circumstances Jodhpur was allowed to keep such portion of the army as might be requisite for the internal administration of the country ⁷⁰. British Government was the sole arbiter to judge the necessity of circumstances. Metcalfe was not happy over this article since he had desired to get a much larger force from Jodhpur State, but had to yield due to the solemn declaration of the Jodhpur *Vakils* that,

⁶⁶ Metcalfe to Adams, dt 22 May 1818, Cons 12 June 1818, No 22, F & S

⁶⁷ Metcalfe to Adams, Letter No 693, dt 15 January 1818, Cons 6 March 1818, No 4, F & S

⁶⁸ Metcalfe to Adams, dt 15 January 1818, Cons 6 February 1818, No 102, F & S

⁶⁹ Jodhpur State Records Sanad Bahi No 74, p 27, Jodhpur State Records, Kharita Bahi No 12, p 339

⁷⁰ Appendix II

"this was the utmost that the resources of the state could furnish in a condition of efficiency"⁷¹ Being fully convinced, he wrote to the Secretary, Government of India, on 15 th Jaouary 1818, that, "The force of cavalry which the Raja cao collect including the contingents of his dependant thakurs and *jagirdars*, of which it is principally composed, does not, georally exceed 6,000 of which one fourth is by the article placed at our disposal for foreigo service, and there is reason to believe that the Government at present requires as many as it can keep at home for its support".⁷²

According to the ninth article the Maharaja and his heirs and successors were confirmed in the possession of the principality of Jodhpur by the British Government who promised not to introduce British jurisdiction into Jodhpur territory.⁷³

The tenth article was just customary and fixed a limit of six weeks for the exchange of the ratified instruments.⁷⁴

Operation of the treaty of 1818

The Treaty of 1818 came into operation at a very critical time in the history of Jodhpur. Soon after its conclusion Chattr Singh, the regent prince died from the effects of dissipation.⁷⁵ This sudden development plunged the state of Jodhpur into a difficult situation, Man Singh had no other son and he himself had entered into a self imposed seclusion and retirement from life or feigned madness. The British Government being the paramount power had to give a serious thought to the problem of entrusting the reigns of Jodhpur state to a legitimate claimant who could prove worthy of the task entrusted.

The Treaty of 1818 was pregnant with the seeds of several problems that sprouted their heads with the passing of time. Under the 8th article of the Treaty the state was bound to furnish a conti-

71 Secret Cons 6 February 1818, No 102

72 Cons dt 6 March 1818, No 4, F & S

73 Melcalfe to Adams dt 15 January 1818, Cons 6 February 1818, No 102, F & S

74 The Treaty Book Vol IV, p 48, Jodhpur State Records, Kharita Bahi No 12, pp 327-328, Kharita Bahi No 10, p 361, Aitchison, Vol III, pp 128-129, 159-160, Appendix II

75 Tod, Vol II, p 115 "He (Chattr Singh) died, some say the victim of illicit pursuits, others from a wound given by the hand of one of the chieftains, whose daughter he attempted to seduce", Aitchison, Vol III, Narrative "Jodhpur or Marwar", p 115

ngent of 1500 horse Accordingly a force, 1500 strong, was sent to Delhi in 1821, and it returned after staying for one year In 1832, a demand was again made to send a force to co-operate with British officers against the Parkar free-booters The contingent supplied, not only failed to give any co-operation, but it also proved worthless in its efficiency and maintenance It was soon realised that the article 8th, as it existed, could not serve any useful purpose to the British The mistake was corrected by another agreement, between the British and the Jodhpur state, under which this obligation was commuted to an annual payment of Rs 1,15,000 towards the Jodhpur region, which was then raised ⁷⁶

The sixth article regarding the payment of tribute of Rs 1,08,000 per annum proved a perpetual source of trouble and the state was found a chronic defaulter in the regular and punctual payment of the tribute Thus it became a constant irritant and obstacle in the way of smooth and cordial relations between the Jodhpur state and the British Government In 1847 a remission of Rs 10,000 was made in the tribute in lieu of the cession of the rights of Jodhpur to the district and fort of Umarkot to the British Government

Although the Treaty contained specific promise of non-intervention by the British in internal affairs, yet it opened the gates for the British intervention which increased rapidly Right at the beginning, while transmitting the accepted Treaty proposals to the Government, Charles Metcalfe had written that "some of the thakurs were said to be disaffected And against them had, however, not been sought If it were ever sought, it would be necessary to interfere in the internal affairs of the state" ⁷⁷ The Exiled thakurs sought British aid and intervention, but it was refused However, in 1824, the British Government decided to interpose, and accommodation was effected with the Maharaja through the British interposition regarding the exiled thakurs ⁷⁸

Subsidiary alliance and its Comparison with the Treaty of 1818

The system of subsidiary alliances and the "political connections of friendship and alliance with the states of Rajputana, plan-

⁷⁶ Atchison, Vol III (No VI) p 135 (1932 edn), See Chapter II for details

⁷⁷ Cons 6 March 1818 No 4 F & P

⁷⁸ Atchison, Vol III, No III, p 130 (1932 edn), See Chapter II for details

ned and executed by Lord Wellesley in 1803, varied decisively from the chain of Treaties concluded by the British Government with the Rajput states in 1818. All the subsidiary alliances had been formed upto the same principles. According to it "The British stipulated to furnish a specific force for the protection of the country, and maintenance of the sovereign's legitimate authority. This force was not ordinarily to be employed in the duties of civil administration, nor in the collection of the revenues, and the British Government generally agreed not to interfere in such matters. A subsidy, equivalent to the payment of the force, furnished by the protected state either in periodical money payments, or by territorial cession, more frequently the latter." ⁷⁹ In addition a certain native contingent as it was called was also maintained to act with the British troops, and the protected state had to bear the responsibility for its efficiency. The British relations with these states were conducted on a footing of equality at least in principle if not in practice. British residents were stationed at their courts. The extent of the interference to be exercised by the Resident in the Government of individual states varied according to the provisions of the different treaties ⁸⁰. The subsidiary alliance was based on the principle of reciprocal obligations, the British Government was to control their foreign relations and military resources and extended them protection ⁸¹.

In 1818 this policy received a radical change at the hands of Lord Hastings. In consonance with the increasing power and prestige by the British in India the ambitions of the British authorities also extended to new dimensions. This change was clearly reflected in the lofty plan of Lord Hastings that envisaged the formation of a confederacy of Rajput states, with British Government as head or a paramount power ⁸². When the confederacy plan was found unpracticable due to "the feelings of pride and jealousy" ⁸³ prevalent amidst

79 Princep, Henry T. *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during 1813 to 1823* Vol 1, p. 5 (1825 edn.)

80 Mehta M. S. *Lord Hastings and the Indian States* p. 259

81 Edmonstone's Minute dt. 29 April 1814, Cons. 21 June 1814 1 & 5

82 Governor-General's Minute dt. 3 April 1817, Cons. 21 June 1817 No. 4, F & S

83 Metcalfe to Adams dt. 16 October 1817, Cons. 14 November 1817, No. 50 F & S

the rulers of Rajputana, it was decided to develop a type of feudal relationship with these states through separate treaties. Consequently the treaties were signed with all the Rajputana states including Marwar, in the year 1818, and an almost uniform pattern was followed in stipulating their clauses⁸⁴ The underlying idea was to keep the ghost of 'confederacy' alive and to reduce these states to a state of complete subordination and making British Government their supreme arbitrator, thus leading to the establishment of a kind of feudal relationship.

The terms of the unratified treaty of 1803, as well as the treaties concluded with other Rajputana states that time, emphasised more on the status of equality and mutual respect whereas the main theme of the Treaty of 1818 is the assertion of British paramountcy. The third article of the Treaty stipulates that "Maharaja Man Singh and his heirs and successors will act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government and acknowledge its supremacy, and will not have any connection with other chiefs and states"⁸⁵ It is a categorical declaration of British suzerainty over Jodhpur expressed in unambiguous words. The articles four and five of the same treaty had brought the conception of a relationship of the British Government and the Rajput states on a feudal pattern. According to these articles, the ruler was deprived of his cherished right "to enter into any negotiation with any chief or state, without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government"⁸⁶ Furthermore, the British Government acquired the right of arbitration and award in the interstate disputes of the states⁸⁷ It was a complete reversal of the policy laid down in the unratified treaty of 1803. The fifth article of that treaty stipulated that "if any misunderstanding should arise between him and any other state, Maharajadhiraj will, in the first instant, submit the case of the dispute to the Company's Government that the Government may endeavour to settle it amicably, if from the obstinacy of the opposite party, no amicable terms can be settled, then Maharajadhiraj

84 J. Adam to C. T. Metcalfe dt 5 October 1817, Com. No. 26, 26 October 1817, I & S.

85 Appendix II

86 Appendix II

87 Ibid

may demand aid from the Company's Government. In the event abovesated it will be granted, and Maharajadhiraj agrees to take upon himself the charge of the expenses of such aid, at the same rate as has been settled with other chieftains of Hindustan" ⁸⁸ It is significant to note that this article also bound the state to refer the matter of peaceful settlement through British interposition. But in the event of the failure of peaceful means the state was also promised the support and military aid of the British Government. The only condition imposed for such aid was that the ruler was bound to take upon himself the charge of expenses. There was no such freedom of choice left for the discretion of the ruler in the Treaty of 1818.

In the system of subsidiary alliances there was no provision for the payment of tribute to the British Government. In keeping with this spirit the third article of the unratified treaty of 1803 with Jodhpur unambiguously and firmly declared that the "Honourable Company shall not interfere in the Government of the country now possessed by Maharajadhiraj, and shall not demand tribute from him" ⁸⁹ By the year 1818, when the treaty was signed with Jodhpur, and other Rajput states, a remarkable change had taken place in the British attitude, and now onwards, being the paramount power, British insisted on their prerogative to demand the payment of tribute as a pecuniary compensation for the protection it offered and services it was often required to render. This change is clearly visible in the treaty of 1818 under which Jodhpur was required to pay an annual "tribute hitherto paid to Sindhia by the State of Jodhpur" ⁹⁰ and that amount was fixed at Rs 1,08,000 per annum ⁹¹ Insistence on tribute was so emphatic that Metcalfe took every care that Jodhpur should not be allowed to conceal any tribute hitherto paid to any other power than Sindhia ⁹² In the seventh article the state was bound to pay any such amount, "if concealed at that

88 Appendix I, Terms of the Treaty of 1803, Aitchison, Vol III, pp 126-127 (1932 edn)

89 Appendix I, Terms of the Treaty of 1803, Aitchison, Vol III, p 126-127 (1932 edn)

90 Appendix II

91 Ibid Schedule attached to the Treaty of 1818, Aitchison, Vol III, p 130 (1932 edn)

92 Metcalfe to Adams dt 22 May 1818, F D S C, 12 June 1818, No 22

time", to the British Government as tribute⁹³ Thus in 1818 the policy of subsidiary alliance was replaced by a system of tributary dependence and subordinate co-operation to the British paramountcy⁹⁴

Military Clauses of the Treaties

The military clauses of the treaties of alliance signed during Lord Wellesley's time, differed substantially from the treaty of 1818 in spirit as well as nature. According to the fourth article of the unratified treaty of 1893, "in the event of any enemy of the Honourable Company evincing a disposition to invade the country lately taken possession of by the Honourable Company in Hindustan, Maharajadhiraj shall send the whole of his forces to the assistance of the Company's army, and shall exert himself to the utmost of his power in repelling the enemy, and shall neglect no opportunity of proving his friendship and attachment"⁹⁵ The implication of this article was that the military assistance to be given by the state was that of a friendly nature. Secondly, it was to be given only in a particular situation namely the event of an enemy evincing a disposition to invade the country. Thirdly the article was related to only that part of the country which was "lately taken possession by the Honourable Company" and that too in "Hindustan". The territories occupied by the East India Company earlier did not come under the purview of this clause and any enemy evincing a hostile disposition, to this part, did not bind the state to send the military assistance. There was no mention of any kind of right to demand military assistance. Whereas in the Treaty of 1818 the military clauses included in the Eighth article were in the nature of a demand from the paramount power. The force of 1500 horse was to be furnished by the Jodhpur state whenever required. This article was extremely mischievous in its implications and stipulated that "when necessary the whole of the Jodhpur force" were to join the British army. The circumstance under which such a demand could

⁹³ Appendix II

⁹⁴ Treaty of 1818 with Jodhpur as well as the treaties signed with other states of Rajputana at that time stood as an evidence to this policy change.

⁹⁵ Appendix I, Atkinson, Vol III, p 126

be made was not stated. The British Government enjoyed the sole authority to give its verdict on the necessity of the whole of the Jodhpur forces to join the British army.⁹⁶ The British Government could demand such military aid at her own sweet will, and Jodhpur had no other alternative but to submit to the demand.

The fundamental difference, between the military clauses of the subsidiary alliance and the Treaty of 1818, was that the idea of having separate subsidiary forces was given up altogether as designed by the Governor-General.⁹⁷ In its place it was considered more advantageous to post a sufficient military force at strategic points. The force to be furnished was specified in 1818,⁹⁸ whereas there was no such specification earlier. The paramount power was given an unlimited power to demand the military aid from the states whenever it considered necessary. In short, the Treaty of 1818 was decidedly at variance with the subsidiary alliance and it reflected the increasing power and prestige of the British in India. Militarily the Treaty of 1818, concluded with Jodhpur state along with the other states of Rajputana, characterised the transformation of friendly assistance of 1803, to the military obligation to a subordinate to the paramount power.

New changes in Marwar through the interference of the East India Company

The significance of the new changes would be appreciated better if placed in the context of the conditions prevailing in Jodhpur at the time of the establishment of the British relations with it. A brief review of the state of affairs shows that at the time of Chhattar Singh's death in the year 1818,⁹⁹ an oligarchy, headed by Salim Singh of Pokaran, supported by Dewan Akhai Chand, was at the helm of affairs at Jodhpur. Chhattar Singh's death caused this group a serious anxiety and apprehension that Maharaja Man Singh might re-establish himself to power. As a precaution against such an eventuality, Akhai Chand and the "Pokaran faction" managed to obtain the

96 Appendix II

97 J. Adam to C. T. Metcalfe dt 8 October 1817, Cons. 28 October 1817, No. 26, F & S

98 A contingent of 1500 horse was specified in the Treaty with Jodhpur State

99 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No. 6, p. 642

support of Chittar Singh's mother and forested the design of placing in the Revenue the least presumptuous, or the chief of Mar. Their design having failed they were compelled to accept the restoration of Man Singh Bahadur. Even after his restoration, Man Singh took no active interest in the affairs of the state and was kept under restraint. Walker reported to the Government "that as he has lived in 1818, Man Singh had been under restraint, had been exposed to various attempts on his life, snakes being put in his bed, and poison being mixed in his food, that he had not condescended himself to see at any time and among other precautions had refrained from all food that was not first eaten by the birds which he kept for that purpose". Similarly Captain Tod, at the end of his thirteen days' stay at Jodhpur, in a letter dated 25 November 1819, had communicated to his Government his views on the state of affairs in Marwar. As regards Man Singh he wrote that, "the dangers which he had undergone in his early years, when he had narrowly escaped the murderous hands of his brother, Blun Singh, who had made away with all the royal family of Marwar but himself, and the later treason of his son and minister had imparted to his disposition an extreme wariness and distrust". He saw clearly enough the character of those about him, but being doubtful of his power to effect any improvement, he determined to avoid exposing his authority to the risk of being proved insufficient, and "to bide his time till the sure turn of the tide came, till the power of his opponents was diminished, till the improving wealth of the country brought him a return of strength". The presence of a British officer would, Tod added, "help to hasten this desirable change"¹⁰²

The alarming state of affairs at Jodhpur did not escape the attention of Sir Ochterlony, the Resident at Delhi, who sent a memo of information on August 12, 1818, to the Government. He wrote that he received frequent reports and complaints of the disorder prevalent in the state¹⁰³. After tracing the past affairs he wrote that

100 Tod, Vol II, p 116

101 Cons 31 March 1821, Nos 13-14, F & P

102 Cons 22 January 1820, No 65, F & P

103 Memo of Information sent by Sir Ochterlony to Secretary, Government of India on 12 August 1818, Cons 5 September 1818, Nos 12-17, F & P

"the Treasury was, however, still rich when Man Singh ascended the *musnud*, but the absurd disputes between Jeypoor and Jodhpur respecting the daughter of Oodeypoor brought Amir Khan into Rajasthan, and the payments made to his troops not only emptied the treasury of its ready money but of valuable jewels to the amount of twelve lakhs of rupees" ¹⁰⁴ As regards the *Dewan*, the Delhi Resident wrote that, "Oekkey Chund, the present Manager, is said to have been a bania and a man of ordinary abilities, it does not appear from any account that his administration is oppressive, but it is asserted that the revenue of state is appropriated by himself or divided amongst a certain set, his partisans" ¹⁰⁵ The travelling was not safe and the administration lacked the power and inclination to repress the lawless and give security to commerce. Some of the thakurs were said to be in possession of larger force than their jagirs would afford. The thakurs had their personal enmities, and the strong attacked and plundered the property of the weak ¹⁰⁶

The Secretary to the Government of India instructed the Resident Delhi on 5th September 1818, to either go to Jodhpur himself or depute an officer of intelligence and discernment to collect further information of the affairs of that state ¹⁰⁷

In October, Sir David Ochterlooy received a *Kharita*, purporting to have been written by the Maharaja, in which British military aid was earnestly solicited. A sum of rupees two lakhs per annum was also promised to defray the expenses of such a force. The aim of this military aid was said to be ousting the *Dewan* Akhai Chand and place Fateh Raj at the head of his administration and to put to death "22 persons who had behaved contumaciously" ¹⁰⁸ The Delhi Resident deemed it wise to send his Head Munshi, Barkat Ali to Jodhpur to find out and report the actual situation existing in Jodhpur ¹⁰⁹ He was also to find out the real mental condition of

104 Memo of Information sent by Sir Ochterlooy to Secretary, Government of India on 12 August 1818, Cons 5 September 1818, Nos 12-17, F & P

105 Ibid

106 Ibid

107 Cons 5 September 1818, Nos 12-17, F & P

108 Cons 7 November 1818, Nos 33-36, F & P

109 Ibid, Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 10, pp 216-217, 221
Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 7, pp 1, 45, Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 11, p 126

Man Singh and to convey to him that the "British authorities could not take part in any scheme, however good its end, which was to commence with so great a waste of human life as that contemplated by the Maharaja" Munshi Barkat Ali also brought a letter from Sir Ochterlony addressed to Man Singh,¹¹⁰ and handed it over to the Maharaja and communicated his message also¹¹¹ In a private interview, in which none except the two were present, Man Singh opened his mind and narrated the difficulties¹¹² On returning to Delhi Munshi Barkat Ali submitted to Sir Ochterlony the report of his mission to Jodhpur in which he had ascertained that all the thakurs had desired the Maharaja's resumption of power, and he had been, at the close of his stay, witness to an imposing spectacle when "Man Singh, at length yielding to his people's prayers, had showed himself, put on a magnificent dress, and in public *Darbar* takes his seat on the *Musnud*"¹¹³ The Munshi reported that Man Singh had forcefully denied that he had ever written a letter to the Resident and Barkat Ali was of the opinion that Jodhpur *Yakil* Bishun Ram's request for the intervention of British force had not been authorised by the Maharaja Another observation made by Barkat Ali was that Man Singh's opinion was that "the Marwar officials could be more trusted as compared to Jaipur and Udaipur"¹¹⁴ As regards the insanity and retirement of Man Singh, Barkat Ali reported that the Maharaja, "accounted for his retirement from the active control of the administration by the grief which he felt at the death of his *Guru* Deo Nath, and his consequent distaste for the smallest conversation, and his continued retirement was due to the fresh grief in which he was plunged by the death of his son, the Regent, Chattar Singh, and the factions of the thakurs, which deprived him of all desire to rule over them, till his continued absence had made them feel the ill consequences" Barkat Ali had no doubt that the insanity of Man

110 Cons 7 November 1818, Nos 33-36, F & P, Jodhpur State Records
Kharita Bahi No 12, pp 343-344

111 Jodhpur State Records, Kharita Bahi No 12, p 343

112 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 10 p 216

113 Cons 26 December 1818, Nos 52-57, F & P

114 Ibid

Singh had been feigned. He added that, "in my opinion he has more sense than a hundred of his people" 115

Munshi Barkat Ali's report is a very important historical document. It was the historic meeting between Man Singh and Barkat Ali, that resulted into the dramatic change which rescued Man Singh from the agony of self imposed seclusion and feigned insanity. Since none else except the two were present in that meeting, there is no other source, except this document, that throws authentic light on the highly confidential and most significant deliberations that took place between them—the deliberations that proved to be a turning point in the chequered history of Marwar in general and Man Singh in particular.

A translation of the report of Munshi Barkat Ali was sent by Sir Ochterlony to the Government 116. He also communicated that F. Wilder, Political Agent, Ajmer had been deputed to go to Jodhpur, with the instructions to inquire into and arrange for the settlement of the complaints of plunder by Jodhpuris on Ajmer territory and to explain to Man Singh, that the Resident would be glad to see him again directing the management of this affairs. Wilder was instructed to make it clear that the British had no desire to meddle in the internal administration of the state. However, the Resident was prepared to recommend the employment of the British force in Jodhpur on the same pattern as it had actually been employed in Jaipur. In addition to this Wilder was to procure the contingent of 1500 horse for employment in the suppression of bandits and if possible, to get the consent of the Maharaja to attach a British officer to that force. Wilder was also entrusted the task of the settlement of the Sirohi Jodhpur dispute over the issue of tribute 117.

115 Ibid, Nos 55-56, Munshi Barkat Ali wrote that, "as to the report of the Maharaja's insanity, they are all false and the whole was put on an seeing discord prevalent among the different parties. The thakurs of Marwar had always been in the custom of joining any foreign army and forming a party with some of the officers of the court and it was from this that the Maharaja effected insanity and screened himself from their machinations. He is now throwing it off and assuming the reins of Government, as from his confidence in English."

116 Cons 26 December 1818, Nos 55-56, F & P

117 Cons 26 December 1818, Nos 52-57, F & P

F Wilder, Political Agent and Superintendent Ajmer, in pursuance of the Resident's instructions visited Jodhpur in 1819 and later on submitted the report of his mission. He described the Maharaja as a man of ability and discernment, but "far too mild to infuse anything of his own spirit to the administration".¹¹⁸ He was surrounded with men who were far too listless and ignorant to conduct affairs properly. Mr Wilder was deeply concerned to report that the utmost confusion was existing in every department and country was utterly impoverished by years of anarchy. The condition of the army was no better. It was dissolved into bands of plunderers and the payment to the armed forces was an impossible task owing to the emptiness of the treasury. However, a hopeful note was struck by Wilder that the Maharaja had showed him the determination to take this last pressing evil in hand and planned to discharge the large number of 'nominal soldiers' of the state, and to station the rest into compact bodies in different places, where they could check aggression and prevent outrages on the neighbouring states.¹¹⁹ The Maharaja had informed him that he contemplated a tour of personal inspection. Wilder, though he hoped of good results of this measure, yet had developed a strong conviction, that "in the country itself there were no materials or instruments to bring about a restoration of order and efficient administration". He, therefore, concluded his report with the view that "British interference in the internal affairs of Jodhpur would, much as it was to be deprecated, sooner or later become patently necessary". Sir Ochterlony quite agreed with the conviction expressed by Wilder.¹²⁰

The Governor-General, Lord Hastings, was however, not in favour of developing more close connections with Jodhpur and the idea of stationing a British Agent permanently at the Jodhpur court did not appeal to him. In a communication sent to the Court of Directors on 1st March 1820, the Governor-General wrote that "our views in an alliance with Jodhpur were accomplished by the exclusion of foreign influence, and the suppression of the predatory system. A

118 Wilder's report to Ochterlony Cons. 20 February 1819 Nos. 18-19, F & P

119 Wilder's report to Ochterlony Cons. 20 February 1819, Nos. 18-19, F & P

120 Cons. 20 February 1819, Nos. 18-19, F & P

more close connection in present circumstances was not an object of any political importance'.¹²¹ The remote situation of Jodhpur and its restricted foreign relations rendered a general control over its political measures quite sufficient to ensure the preservation of the tranquility.¹²²

Consequences of the British Alliance

Thus, many new changes of far reaching significance were brought about in Marwar through the interference of the East India Company. The establishment of British relations with Jodhpur in 1818 brought the state under the umbrella of British protection. The event brought a sign of relief to the people of Jodhpur who had the bitter memories of atrocious ravages of Amir Khan and his ferocious followers, as well as the repeated predatory expeditions of the Marathas, fresh in their minds. It brought a much needed sense of security from the external aggression and predatory raids. The interference of all foreign powers, except the British, in the affairs of Jodhpur State was completely eliminated. The era of anarchy chaos and uncertainty was brought to an end. Slowly and steadily the population of the towns and villages of Marwar regained their confidence and started returning to their hearths and homes. The promise of British desire to see peace and tranquillity and the improvement in the affairs of state led to many changes. Munshi Barkat Ali's visit was the beginning of the British interference and it proved to be a remarkable event, and led Man Singh to re-establish himself to power. Wiler's deliberations with Man Singh instilled in him a determination to bring about a restoration of order and regular administration. The unworthy administration headed by Alhai Chand and his faction was replaced by that of Fatch Raj Singhvi, in whom Man Singh could place full confidence. Though a slow, but steady improvement commenced in the state affairs, the peace and tranquillity, witnessed after a long time, invariably resulted into the development of trade and commerce and in improvement of the condition of the masses.

121 Letter from Governor-General to the Court of Directors, dt 1st March 1820, para 104

122 Letter from the Governor-General to the Court of Directors, dt 1 March 1820, para 104

The changes brought about could best be judged by F Wilder himself, when he again visited Jodhpur in 1823 and wrote, "Marwar offered a curious contrast to its state four years ago. There was no disorder and on the contrary much prosperity" ¹²³ However, the march to peace and prosperity was in fact hampered due to the usurpation of power by the Naths and Man Singh's clash with his nobles ¹²⁴

CHAPTER II

MAHARAJA MAN SINGH AND THE PERIOD OF CLASH (1818-1843)

Colonel Tod and Maharaja Man Singh

Soon after Wilder's visit to Jodhpur Captain James Tod was entrusted with the political duties of Marwar in February 1819, in addition to his existing jurisdiction of Udaipur, Kota and Bundi.¹ This administrative change was interpreted by Jodhpur as insulting and derogatory to its prestige and status. After a strong remonstrance a request was made by Jodhpur that her political relations might be associated with Delhi and not through an officer stationed at Udaipur.² The request was granted by the Governor-General and orders were issued to retransfer the charge of Jodhpur to the Resident at Delhi. Captain Tod had meanwhile made his preparations to visit Jodhpur. In spite of the Government orders for relieving him of his political charge of that state Tod undertook his contemplated journey. When he was at the point of arriving at Jodhpur, he received another letter dated 9th October 1819 from the Secretary, Government of India, dis-approving his action in strong terms. However, in order to avoid a blow to Tod's influence in the courts to which he was accredited, he was allowed to visit Jodhpur.³ It was left to his discretion to make the prescribed communication to the ruler of Jodhpur and to take leave of him without showing any sign that his proceedings were unauthorised.⁴ Under such embarrassing circumstances Captain Tod reached Jodhpur and was received on 4th November 1819 with due formality by Man Singh, advancing beyond the

1 Cons 9 February 1820, Nos 13-14, F & P, Tod, Vol II, p 117

2 Cons 9 February 1820, Nos 13-14, F & P

3 Secretary, Government of India to Captain Tod dt 9 October 1819, Cons 9 October 1819, No 31, F&P

4 Ibid

second gate of descent ⁵ Tod had several interviews with Man Singh, some of these were held in the presence of the state officials and *sardars* and others were in private ⁶

Tod fulfilled that role exceedingly well and his visit is of great historical significance. Tod wrote that "display of grandeur met our view for which we were totally unprepared. Here every thing was imitative of the imperial court of Delhi" ⁷ In his conversation with Man Singh the British Political Agent was impressed by his proficiency in that mixed language, *Hindustani* which he spoke with great fluency and much greater purity than those who resided about the 'Court in Delhi'. Tod found that Man Singh's demeanour was commanding and altogether princely. He added, "the features of Raja Man are good his eye is full of intelligence, and though the ensemble of his countenance almost denotes benevolence, yet there is ever and anon a doubtful expression, which, with a peculiarly formed forehead gave a momentary cast of malignity to it" ⁸ In these interviews he had an ample opportunity to judge Man Singh's character.

At the end of his visit to Jodhpur Tod sent a report on 25th November 1819, to his Government on the affairs of the state suggesting that the presence of a British officer would be helpful in effecting a desirable change ⁹ The strongest reprobation was lavished by him on the men who were in power. He further referred to the setting of an efficient administration, improving the finances and the condition of the Crown reserved lands. His report also covered the items like reorganization of the army, payment to the foreign troops, relieving the subjects at large, the merchants, mechanics, the cultivators etc., from the exorbitant taxes under which they all continued to groan ¹⁰

An regards external affairs he drew the attention towards the law and order situation on the frontiers, disorderly behaviour of the

5 Tod, Vol I, p 560, Personal Narrative

6 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 10, pp 275-278,
Tod, Vol I, p 562, Personal Narrative

7 Tod, Vol I, p 560, Personal Narrative

8 Tod, Vol I, pp 560-561, Personal Narrative

9 Cons 22 January 1820, No 65, F&P

10 Ibid, Tod, Vol II, p 118

Kolies, Meenas and Mats, Lar-Khanies, the Saharias and Khosas. He also referred to the conduct of relations with Jaisalmer and the problem of reacquisition of Umarkot and modification of the Treaty of 1818.¹¹ Tod concluded his report with the remarks that the exiled population of Marwar was gradually returning. The population was still, however, very scanty and cultivation was accordingly limited (except in Godwar). However, it was admitted by him that grain was abundant and cheap.¹²

Active Interference of the British in the Internal Affairs of the State

With all that has been said above, Marwar suffered from an inherent defect. Man Singh's attempt to suppress the nobility by a policy of repression plunged the whole kingdom into disorder and confusion. His revengeful conduct led to the horrible and ignominious death of Dewan Akhay Chand, followed by that of nine others.¹³ The climax was reached when Sultan Singh, the thakur of Nimaj was put to death.¹⁴ Mr Wilder, when he visited Jodhpur for the second time, on his arrival on 27th January 1821, found between twenty and thirty persons in prison awaiting their doom.¹⁵ Regarding them Mr Wilder was told by the Maharaja that considering his person to have been sufficiently secured by the removal of those from whom he had most to fear, he did not intend to take away any more lives.¹⁶

Wilder expressed the remonstrance of the British regarding the disorderly state of affairs in Jodhpur. Man Singh attributed it to

11 Coos 22 January 1820, No 65, F&P, Tod, Vol II, p 118

12 Ibid

13 Tod, Vol II, p 119

14 Tod, Vol II, p 120 has given a graphic account of the event as "The mercenary bands, to the number of eight thousand men, with guns, attacked Soorthan Singh in his dwelling. With one hundred and eighty of his clan, he defied himself against great guns and small arms, as long as the house was tenable, and then sallied out sword in hand, and his brother and eighty of his kin, fell nobly in the midst of his foes. The remaining retreated with their arms to defend Nimaj and their infant chief."

15 Wilder's report Cons 31 March 1821, Nos 13-14, F&P

16 Ibid

the contumacious behaviour of many of his thakurs who appropriated the *khalsa* lands in the late troubled period and constructed strong forts to make themselves independent. The Maharaja, therefore, clearly stated before Wilder that he intended to take the chastisement of the contumacious thakurs in hand with resolution and energy, to resume the *khalsa* land alienated and to level to the ground the strong places of the thakurs. Wilder, however, advised the Maharaja that the last act would result into great ill-feeling and it would be better to attempt it only in a case of absolute necessity.¹⁷

Success, and the taste of blood, whetted rather than appeased the appetite of Man Singh. The son of the murdered thakur of Nimaj was besieged and induced to surrender the fort on a promise of safety, and an attempt though foiled, was made to violate the solemn promise and to kill him.¹⁸ He escaped to Marwar and the resumption of Nimaj was completed. The thakurs of Asop, Chandawal and Ahore followed by that of Ahua, Ras and Budso were alarmed and fled hurriedly to the neighbouring states.¹⁹ Their estates were also resumed by the Government. Thus the bloody scenes at the capital and the repeated confiscations had finally estranged men's heart from Man Singh, so that of the eight principal feudatory heads of clans in Marwar, only one, and that the least considerable stood by him, the rest being either in exile in Mewar or Bikaner or holding aloof.²⁰

Finding themselves in a desperate situation the exiled thakurs turned to the British for interposition. Having failed to get an encouraging response from the British authorities at Ajmer and Delhi they sent a representation to Captain Tod, Political Agent, Mewar in August 1821, requesting that, "the English are our rulers, our masters. Sri Man Singh has seized our lands, by your government

17 Ibid,

18 Cons. 8 December 1821, Nos. 42-43, F & P, Tod, Vol. II, p. 121. "To the eternal disgrace of the Raja, he broke this pledge, and the boy had scarcely appeared in the besieging camp, when the civil officer produced the Raja's mandate for his captivity and transmission to the presence."

19 F. Wilder to Ochterlony, 18 January 1822, Cons. 20 March 1822, No. 32, F & P.

20 Cons. 8 December 1821, No. 42, F & P.

interposing these troubles may be settled, but without its guarantee and intervention we can have no confidence whatever. Let us have a reply to our petition. We will wait it in patience, but if we get none, the fault will not be ours, having given everywhere notice. Hunger will compel men to find a remedy" ²¹

Sir Ochterlony as instructed by the Government obtained reports on the matter from Captain Tod and F. Wilder. Tod pleaded strongly in favour of British interference. He held that the fiefs dated from the time of Ranmal, the son of Jodha and were inalienable and unresumable, that "even in case of proven incapacity or treason on the part of existing incumbent, the estate only went to another member of the house" ²². Mr Wilder, however, completely differed and reported that the patents of the estates were renewed on each succession, which showed that the fief was not hereditary, it depended on the will of the prince whether a son should succeed his father or not ²³. He held that the thakurs could not have any reason to complain against the severity of Man Singh because they had been guilty of their own long continued course of violent opposition to his Government and murder of his ministers. After giving a history of the thakurs who signed the representation to Captain Tod (Asop, Ahua, Pokurn, Rass, Chundawal, Nimaj and Budso), Wilder strongly deprecated any British interference on behalf of the exiled thakurs. He added that such interference would be against the spirit of the Treaty of 1818 and was likely to aggravate the situation ²⁴.

The Government instructed Sir Ochterlony to send Mr Wilder to Jodhpur *Darbar*, to try once more the effect of "friendly counsel and explanation" ²⁵. Consequently, Wilder paid his third visit to Jodhpur and commenced negotiations with Man Singh. On 6th March 1824, he reported ²⁶ that Man Singh had appealed to the

21 Tod, Vol II, p 160. A true translation of full representation given. The representation was forwarded along with his own comments by Captain Tod on 12th November 1821. Cons 8 December 1821, Nos 42-43, F & P.

22 Cons, 20 March 1822, No 30, F & P.

23 Cons 20 March 1822, No 32, F & P.

24 Cons 20 March 1822, No 32, F & P.

25 Cons 9 January 1824, No 9, F & P.

26 Cons 30 April 1824, No 19, F & P.

Treaty obligations under which British Government was pledged to abstain from direct interference in his internal affairs. Furthermore he had shown great reluctance to pardon the persons guilty of the murder of three ministers and his own *guru*²⁷ Wilder using his extraordinary ability to shape his arguments, observed that the Maharaja was taking unfriendly if not unfair advantage of the Treaty in punishing for the former offences those who by that very treaty were disabled from redressing themselves,²⁸ and that consequently the British Government was called upon in justice to see that the measure of chastisement did not exceed the crime. Lastly he suggested that it would be more becoming as well as politic in a prince of his high station to pardon and forget misconduct.²⁹ These arguments did cut some ice, but Man Singh raised another objection that if the exiled thakurs were reinstated through British interference, it would cause a severe blow to Man Singh's prestige and they would never submit to his authority, and it would encourage the other thakurs also to become refractory, always expecting a similar intervention. To this Wilder pleaded that the British would not recommend their case again if they offended any more, and a letter from the Governor-General to this effect addressed to Man Singh was also promised.³⁰ At last the agreement to reinstate all except the thakurs of Budso and Chandawal was concluded.³¹ However, Wilder wrote that the thakurs' offences were of such an atrocious nature that he really did not feel justified in pressing their restoration.³² Wilder's pledge to the Maharaja induced the Governor-General to write that, such a pledge may obviously entail considerable eventual embarrassment, and would be a virtual acknowledgement that the British have in the

27 Wilder to Secretary Government dt 6 March 1824, Cons 30 April 1824, No 19, F & P

28 Ibid

29 Ibid

30 Wilder's report to George Swinton, Secretary Government dt 6 March 1824, Cons 30 April 1824, Nos 19-20, F & P

31 Cons 30 April 1824, Nos 19-20, F & P, Enclosure No 1 Translation of the agreements signed by Gulch Raj, Deewan of Jodhpur and F Wilder, Political Agent, Ajmer dt 25 February 1824, Atchison, Vol III, pp 130-131

32 Cons 30, April 1824, Nos 19-20, F & P

present instance transgressed the limits prescribed by the Treaty³³ However, he approved Wilder's proceedings and assured him that a letter would be written to Man Singh in conformity with the pledge³⁴

It is strange yet true that the British interference did not remain limited to the affairs of the state but extended even to the private life and family affairs of Man Singh³⁵ The opportunity was of course given by Rawal Bersal of Jaipur, who represented to the British about Man Singh's conduct towards his *Kachhawah Rani* Man Singh informed Wilder that he had a long standing grievance against the Jaipur consort but he considered it very un-befitting for him to refer a subject purely of a family and private nature to British arbitration He rejected the accusations made by the Jaipur minister as completely unfounded However, Man Singh agreed to effect a friendly adjustment of this delicate business by the mutual deputation of agents³⁶ by Jaipur and Jodhpur.³⁷ The Jaipur consort of Man Singh was to remain at Jodhpur and was allowed to have a *Kamdar* from Jaipur

The interposition of the British and the resulting agreement for the reinstatement of the exiled thakurs, whetted their appetite for further demands The thakurs of Ahua, Asop, Neemaj and Rass were issued summons by Man Singh, but they failed to return to their jagirs When Wilder asked their vakils to proceed to Jodhpur to receive the grants prepared for them, they sought an assurance that the fort of Ahua would not be pulled down for two years, and demanded that no *Nazrana* of inauguration should be exacted from the thakur of Neemaj and Asop This promise having been given led to another demand that they must have a pledge of the Maharaja's forgiveness under his own seal This being granted more demands related to the *Sannds* of certain villages and certain allow-

33 Secretary, Government to F Wilder dt 30 April 1824, Cons 30 April 1824, No 35, F & P

34 Ibid

35 Cons, 30 April 1824, Nos 19-20, F & P

36 Ibid, Enclosure No 2, Agreement signed by Nazir, Imrat Ram incharge of the inner apartments is given in full

37 Man Singh's daughter was married to Jaipur Maharaja and Jaipur Maharaja's sister was married to Man Singh See Chapter I

ances were put forward³⁸ At this stage the vakils were asked to return to their masters, as the Political Agent declared that Man Singh had entirely fulfilled his stipulations with the British Government regarding the exiled thakurs He declared their character as unworthy of British interposition or favour³⁹ The Governor-General entirely approved the resolution to abstain from pressing Man Singh any further in favour of men, who had shown themselves to be so little deserving of British interference and support⁴⁰

The course of events in the beginning of 1828 again led to the creation of circumstances attracting British interference The thakurs of Pokurn, Asop, Ahua Nimaj and Rass had raised the standard of rebellion and were plundering the country⁴¹ Man Singh had sent a force of 3000 horse and foot supported by 8 guns to suppress them The rebels retreated towards the sandy plains of Shekhawati where the Maharaja's guns could not move They were concocting a plan to invite Dhokal Singh and place him as their head⁴²

Sir Edward Colebrooke, Resident at Delhi, getting the intelligence of these developments immediately asked the Beraitch Nawab to keep an eye on Dhokal Singh so as to prevent as far as possible his leaving the territory for the purpose of joining the rebellious thakurs⁴³ The Governor-General was also alerted and he desired that the Resident at Delhi, as well as the political Agent at Ajmer, should observe attentively the progress of the dispute between Maharaja Man Singh and his thakurs and keep him fully informed⁴⁴ As regards the direct British intervention, he observed that the Treaty

38 F Wilder to Ochterlony dt 22 December 1824, Cons 25 February 1825, No 9, F & P

39 Ibid

40 Secretary Government to the Resident in Malwa and Rajputana dt 25 February 1825, Cons 25 February 1825, No 10, F & P

41 Cavendish, Political Agent, Ajmer to E Colebrooke Resident Delhi dt 7 February 1828 Cons 21 March 1828, No 14, F & P

42 Ibid

43 E Colebrooke to Secretary Government dt 14 February 1828, Cons 21 March 1828 No 14, F & P

44 Secretary to Government to E Colebrooke dt 21 March 1828, Cons 21 March 1828 No 15, F & P

with Jodhpur did not bind the British Government to protect its chief against internal enemies, or to assist him in putting down rebellion. Secondly, no aid was sought by Man Singh and lastly the disturbance was not sufficiently injurious to the British interest or their allies to warrant spontaneous and authoritative interference on the ground of self-defence. However if the thakurs attempted to subvert the Maharaja's rule and Man Singh solicited British interposition to preserve his throne, the Governor-General thought that aid could not be refused. In that case British Government must undertake to investigate and settle the just rights and claims of the expatriated thakurs.⁴⁵

Dhokal Singh's Activities and British Interference

Dhokal Singh did not wish to miss this golden opportunity and managed to escape from Georg Garh alongwith a few followers.⁴⁶ The Raja of Khetri, ignoring the remonstrance addressed by Colebrooke, gave a grand reception to Dhokal Singh, befitting the status of a sovereign prince.⁴⁷ Dhokal Singh then proceeded towards Shekhawati so as to join the rebellious thakurs. He was helped by the Raja of Khetri⁴⁸ and the agents of Jaipur *Darbar*.

The Government adopted a very cautious approach and held that if Man Singh sought the British military aid, it would require to be very seriously and maturely weighed, whether the Government was bound by the Treaty to maintain on throne a sovereign whose misconduct had goaded his subjects to rebellion, and whose authority was so unsettled as to be shaken to the foundation by the rumoured appearance of a rival in the field.⁴⁹ However, Colebrooke was instructed to press Jaipur *Darbar* to restrain its subjects from extending any aid to Dhokal Singh. The conduct of the Raja of Khetri was to be investigated and if he had given actual aid to Dhokal Singh then the question of the confiscation of his *jagir* was to be considered.⁵⁰ The Governor-General took a very serious view of the

45 Ibid

46 Colebrooke to Secretary to Government dt 6 May 1828, Cons 13 June 1828, No 2, F & P

47 Colebrooke to Secretary to Government dt 21 May 1828, Cons 13 June 1828, No 3, F & P,

48 Ibid

49 Cons 13 June 1828, No 5, F & P

50 Ibid

attitude of Jaipur *Darbar*, who had ignored Mr. Clerk's strong remonstrances, and allowed his subjects to secretly help Dhokal Singh by collecting troops for him and giving him financial aid. The Political Agent was directed to issue a warning that such a serious violation of the Treaty engagements warranted, nay called for the strongest measures.⁵¹

Dhokal Singh entered Marwar from the side of Bikaner on 18th June with a strong force of 7500 horse and foot and on the following day occupied Didwana.⁵² He was accompanied by several important and powerful thakurs of Jodhpur.⁵³ Furthermore, Dhokal Singh was promised aid by the thakur of Pokurn, the most powerful of the Marwar feudatories.

The position of Man Singh had also become precarious regarding another affair. The siege of Ahua by his troops was seriously affected by large scale desertations by the soldiers for want of pay. The money sent for the payment of their dues was misappropriated by Jusrup and other officials. There was a deep discontent among the remaining *Pardesi* soldiers and it was feared that a great majority of them will desert if asked to fight. These developments landed Man Singh in a very difficult situation and when he found that the exertions of his *vakil*s had not succeeded in getting British interposition, a written request was made by him for British aid.

The Resident at Delhi as well as the Political Agent at Ajmer, was instructed by the Government that any British assistance to Man Singh should be promised only after concluding a written engagement by him to abide by the British arbitration in the settlement of the just rights and claims of the insurgent thakurs.⁵⁴ Man Singh had no hesitation in accepting this condition and consequently sent a *kharita* to the Political Agent, Ajmer,⁵⁵ expressing his gratitude for the friendly gesture of the British Government.⁵⁶ A *kharita* was

51 Cons 20 June 1828, No 10, F & P

52 Cons 29 July 1828, No, 11, F & P

53 Ibid

54 Cons 29 July 1828, No 26, F & P

55 Cavendish to Colebrooke dt 14 July 1828, Cons 16 August 1828, No 18, F & P

56 Ibid

also addressed to the Governor-General stating that "fire of many kinds of troubles and anarchy is blazing It is necessary and proper for you to adopt whatever measures most steadily to extinguish this fire, for I have great confidence in your wisdom and what more need be written" ⁵⁷ The proposed British arbitration was also accepted by the Maharaja and a request for the speedy interposition was made ⁵⁸

The preliminary condition having been fulfilled, the Political Agent at Ajmer sent a notification to Dhokal Singh, on 14th July 1828, to retire from the territory of Marwar He was warned that the non-compliance of it would lead to the severest displeasure of the British Government Man Singh was told to take the preliminary steps to restore the *jagirs* of the refractory *thakurs* ⁵⁹ Cavendish observed in his letter dated 14th July 1828 that, "the written notification will be of more service to the His Highness than an army of 20 000 Rajputs and *Pardesees*" Confidence would be restored and loans offered Those who were lukewarm would become most zealous to remove the impressions of their former conduct during Dhokal Singh's success ⁶⁰

Dhokal Singh received the notification, when he had made a march from Parbatsar towards Merta and he sent a written reply to the Political Agent at Ajmer He wrote that the expatriated *thakurs* had placed him at the position of their head and looked to him for restoration ⁶¹ The expatriated *thakurs* added that 'both we and Maharaja Dhokal Singh have possessions and rights in Marwar Without a head (*Malik*) there is no redress We are dying for want of bread let us, therefore, take our *Malik* with us and die in Marwar,' ⁶² Dhokal Singh requested the Political Agent, Ajmer to

⁵⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ Cavendish to Colebrooke dt 14 July 1828, Cons 16 August 1828, No 18, F & P

⁶⁰ Cons 8 August 1828, No 25, F & P

⁶¹ Cavendish to Colebrooke dt 21 July 1828, Cons 16 August 1828, No 20 F & P.

⁶² Ibid

recommend him the course he should follow Cavendish asked him to obey the injunction without delay and made it clear that "Dhokal Singh can never be permitted to be a party in any arrangement regarding the expatriated thakurs"⁶³ The firm attitude of Mr Cavendish compelled Dhokal Singh to quit Marwar⁶⁴ After Dhokal Singh's departure, Man Singh settled his differences with the thakurs of Asop Nimaj and Rass⁶⁵ but moved his force against Ahua where they faced a humiliating defeat However, arrangements were ultimately made with all the remaining thakurs, including that of Ahua, and their *jagirs* restored⁶⁶

Thus the British interference in the internal affairs of Jodhpur helped, no doubt, in extinguishing the blazing fire of civil war and effected an arrangement restoring the expatriated thakurs to their rights and possessions To Man Singh it brought a great sigh of relief which was rightly acknowledged by the Jodhpur deputation that went to Ajmer⁶⁷

Asylum to Appa Sahib

When the relations between the Maharaja and the Company had been anything but friendly in the year 1824, Man Singh gave asylum to Appa Sahib, the deposed ruler of Nagpur who was considered to be an enemy of the British The repeated representations by the British for his seizure and delivery were of no avail⁶⁸ Man Singh refused to "disgrace himself" by the expulsion of Appa Sahib and pointed out that there was no obligation to do so under the terms of the treaty⁶⁹ Furthermore, he tried to mediate in the

63 Ibid

64 Cavendish to Colebrooke dt 23 July 1828, Cons 16 August 1828, No 21, F & P

65 Cons 29 August 1828, No 15, F & P

66 Cons 3 October 1828, No 3, F & P, Cons 31 October 1828, No 6, F & P

67 Cavendish to Colebrooke dt 7 August 1828, Cons 5 September 1828 No 19, F & P

68 Secretary Government to Colebrooke dt 19 June 1829, Cons 19 June 1829, No 28, F & P, Colebrooke to Secretary Government dt 4 July 1829, Cons Nos 19-20, F & P

69 Cavendish to Hawkins dt 23 September 1829, Cons 7 November 1829, No 3, F & P

issue and communicated to the Agent to the Governor-General that the sister's son of Appa Sahib should be dethroned and a jagir should be granted to him (Appa Sahib) ⁷⁰ His relations with the British became so strained that the defence preparations were made in Jodhpur and the muster was opened for the recruitment. ⁷¹ However, Man Singh realised the futility of opposing the might of the British power and got the matter to an amicable settlement through negotiations with the Governor-General ⁷² Man Singh's request was accepted by the Government. He was allowed to give asylum, subject to the condition that he would secure the person of Appa Sahib and be answerable for his abstaining in future from disturbing the public tranquility by any attempt to regain possession of his lost territories ⁷³ Appa Sahib was thus allowed to stay at Mahamandir, ⁷⁴ where he passed the remaining days of his life, till he breathed his last on 15th July 1840 ⁷⁵

Man Singh's Contacts with Ranjit Singh

At the end of 1831 Man Singh attempted to open direct correspondence with Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab. But the letter was sent to the Resident Delhi by that chief. Ranjit Singh did not want to annoy the British authorities by entering into direct communications with Man Singh ⁷⁶ When this matter was brought to the notice of the Governor-General, Man Singh was sent a strong remonstrance and was required to give his explanation ⁷⁷ Man

70 Cavendish to Hawkins dt 12 October 1829, Cons 13 November 1829, No 9, F & P

71 Hawkins to Swinton dt 10 November 1829, Cons 4 December 1829, No 10, F & P.

72 Kharita from Man Singh to the Governor-General received on 16 October 1829, Cons 7 November 1829, Nos 5-7, F & P

73 Governor-General to Man Singh dt 6 November 1829, Cons 7 November 1829, No 7, F & P

74 Cavendish to Hawkins dt 12 February 1829, Cons 16 February 1830, No 16, F & P

75 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 15 July 1840, Cons 3 August 1840, No 123, F & P

76 Lockett to Secretary Government dt 28 September 1832, Cons 26 November 1832, No 14/14A, F & P, Cons 30 January 1832 Nos 40-41 F & P.

77 Ibid

Singh's confidential agent explained to A Lockett, in their personal meeting on way to Pokaran, that the letter was never written by Man Singh and it was forged by his enemies.⁷⁸

William Bentinck's Visit to Ajmer

The high water mark of Man Singh's attempt to oppose the British power was reached in March 1832, when he was the most conspicuous absentee in the gathering of the rulers of Rajputana, who had clustered round the Governor-General William Bentinck, who had visited Ajmer.⁷⁹ The rulers of almost all the states of Rajputana who were invited, considered it a matter of privilege to wait upon the Governor-General. Man Singh, however, had completely different notions and preferred to remain absent. In those days of power and prestige of the East India Company, very few rulers could have the courage to act in the manner Man Singh did. He had to suffer for this. The attitude of the British Government and the British officials hardened towards him. Man Singh had a peculiar way of conducting his relations with the British. Whenever an opportunity came, he never missed it to oppose the British power, but his attempt was always followed by a diplomatic move through which he tried to cover his real motives. Consequently he sent a *khariṭa* to the Governor-General as well as the Vice-President on 6th April 1832,⁸⁰ explaining that Colonel Lockett's letter, informing that the Governor-General would be leaving Ajmer on 28th March 1832, was received by Jodhpur Court on 7th of that month.⁸¹ Orders for the preparations of his journey to Ajmer were given but, meanwhile, his troops had become clamorous for the arrears of pay and had seized all the passes of the fort.⁸² Under such circumstances he was compelled to write letters of excuse to the Governor-General, and his Agent in

78 Cons 26 November 1832, No 14/14A, F & P

79 W F Briggs, Officiating Assistant, Agent to the Governor-General "Sketch of British relations with Jodhpur" dt Nil Cons 21 March 1828, No 111-112, F & P

80 Man Singh to the Governor-General dt 6 April 1832, Cons 7 May 1832, No 32, F & P

81 Ibid

82. Ibid.

Rajputana, A Lockett⁸³ The British Government did not accept the explanation submitted by the Maharaja, still it did not consider it prudent to express its feeling of dislike⁸⁴

Fresh Negotiations

The adamant attitude and undue strictness of the British officials had become a peculiar feature of conducting British relations with Marwar. A Lockett, Agent to the Governor-General to Rajputana, passed through the Jodhpur territory, in September 1832, on his way to Jaisalmer⁸⁵. In response to his letter addressed to Man Singh demanding him to comply with the terms of the treaty, the chief of Jodhpur had promptly assured the Agent that he was anxious to perform the compliance of the terms of the Treaty faithfully in every respect⁸⁶. Furthermore, he deputed two confidential agents and ministers of the state, Vyas Kuchur Das and Hurak Chaud Mehta, to communicate with him and settle all the points according to the wishes of the British Government⁸⁷.

The Ministers accompanied the Agent from 20th September 1832 for about a week, during his journey from Tiwari⁸⁸ to Pokaran.⁸⁹ Negotiations were conducted throughout this journey. Throughout the negotiations, conducted during this journey the ministers made repeated entreaties explaining the tremendous difficulties in furnishing the contingent of Jodhpur horse and remainder of the forces to co-operate with the British troops against the Parkars,⁹⁰ but Lockett refused to budge an inch from his demand to fulfil strictly the stipulations of the treaty including the immediate payment of the arrears of tribute⁹¹.

⁸³ Cons 7 May 1832, Nos 32-33, F & P

⁸⁴ Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 8, p 5

⁸⁵ A Lockett, Agent to the Governor-General to Secretary Government dt 28 September 1832, Cons 26 November 1832, No 14/14A, F & P

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ Ibid

⁸⁸ A village near Jodhpur

⁸⁹ A village near Jaisalmer

⁹⁰ A Lockett to Secretary Government dt 29 September 1832, Cons 26 November 1832, No 14/14A, F & P

⁹¹ Ibid.

As a result of the extreme strictness and the rigidity of the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana, the Jodhpur ministers were compelled to sign a written agreement in the form of questions and answers on 26th September 1832⁹² Accordingly the following terms were agreed to —

1 One year's tribute would be paid to the Agent on the spot in *hundis* payable at Delhi 61 days after date (The *hundis* were dated 20th September 1832)⁹³

2. *Hundis* for another year's tribute were to be transmitted to the Agent within two months and would be payable at Ajmer, as desired by the Agent, two months after their receipt

3 Man Singh would send 1500 horse according to the terms of the Treaty, on 8th October 1832 and they will arrive in Ajmer in five or six days

4 1000 *paidals* (infantry) and 500 *Sawars* will be at the points proposed viz 'Sindri, Nagaur and Gurah' (on the Luni) in order to be ready to act with the British troops when called on⁹⁴

The treaty provision to supply the contingent of 1500 horse by Jodhpur and the strictness of the British officials for its compliance proved to be a great source of strain on the relations between the East India Company and the Jodhpur state. The contingent sent to Ajmer also became a subject of complaint for the British officers. It was alleged that a party of that contingent was involved in a plundering raid on Rampura, a village in Udaipur territory⁹⁵ When a muster was taken by the British officers,⁹⁶ they reported that 1207 were present and out of them "500 only were declared serviceable. A great portion of the remaining were Ponies and tatoos mounted by grass cutters and boys, who were totally unarmed"⁹⁷

92 Ibid

93 Ibid

94 Ibid

95 Cons 6 June 1833, No 16-18 F & P

96 The muster was taken on 24 April 1833 at an early hour by Mr Edmeston and Mr Trevelyan, Assistants to the Agent to the Governor-General as desired by him

97 A Lockett to Secretary Government dt 24 April 1833, (Paras 51 and 52), Cons 6 June 1833, No 12, F & P

The Jodhpur force sent to join the British force against the Parker free-booters was reported to have offered no co-operation, and their officers showed no disposition to pay attention to the orders of the British officers⁹⁸ On the contrary, it was alleged that "they systematically conducted themselves more like open enemies, than friendly allies They secretly protected the free-booters and concealed some of them in their camps"⁹⁹ At the end of the operations they indulged in depredations and destruction on the Jaisalmer territory¹⁰⁰

The Government took a serious view of all these lapses on the part of Man Singh to perform his Treaty obligations and instructed, the Agent to Governor-General in Rajputana, to send back the Jodhpur contingent without delay, and clearly informed Man Singh that if, on the next occasion when the services of the contingent were required, and if he failed to fulfil the obligations required by the treaty in all the points, the Government will employ its own force and the cost of which would have to be borne by the state of Jodhpur¹⁰¹ Furthermore, he was to produce the agreement with the Rawal of Jaisalmer, on the issue of plundering raids by Jodhpur troops and the payments of compensation If it was not complied within the prescribed limit of days, he was warned that the British Government would take other measures to enforce compliance with its demands¹⁰²

However, Man Singh's attitude and proceedings led the British Government to give a serious consideration to the nature of measures which were required for the purpose of vindicating the supremacy of the British power, which had been repeatedly insulted¹⁰³ by that chief It was found that by open attacks upon the neighbouring weaker states of Jaisalmer, Kishangarh and Sirohi, Man Singh was

98 Cons 28 January 1833, Nos 6-9, F & P, India Despatch to Secret Committee, No 4 of 1834,

99 A Lockett to Secretary Government dt 24 April 1833 (para 43), Cons 6 June 1833, No 12, F & P

100 Ibid, paras 3-8

101 Cons 11 July 1833, Nos 20-22, F & P

102 Ibid

103 C S Trevelyan, Secretary Government to Major N Alves, Offg Agent to the Governor-General dt 15 May 1834, Cons 15 May 1834, No 37, F & P

- guilty of three distinct and most serious violations of the Treaty. Furthermore, the Maharaja had admitted these aggressions and given a plea that in case of Jaisalmer and Sirohi they aimed at obtaining redress of certain grievances.¹⁰⁴

In spite of these remonstrances the Jodhpur Maharaja had positively declined to co-operate in the execution of British plan to exterminate the *thugs* and insisted on the privilege which had traditionally been exercised by his ancestors of giving shelter to refugees irrespective of their description.¹⁰⁵ Several *thugs* being pressed by the British operations, throughout the country, found their way to Jodhpur. They were pursued by the parties headed by Mr Mcleod, sent from Sagaur, the headquarters of the operations. When the pursuing British party reached Alaniawas,¹⁰⁶ the thakur not only refused to deliver them but also treated its members with marked contumacy. The local authorities at Sambhar also behaved in similar manner and allowed the *thugs* under their custody to escape. The *Amil*, the local official at Sambhar, who had refused to surrender the *thugs* to the British party was publicly conferred the honour of *khilat* by the Maharaja. In like manner, no sincere co-operation was given by Man Singh to the British in the apprehension of a notorious free-booter Upjee, who had taken refuge in Ghanerao, and the thakur helped him to escape.¹⁰⁷

Man Singh's conduct on such issues was interpreted as constituting aggression of the most serious description upon the subject and territories of the British Government.¹⁰⁸ The Governor-General accordingly sent a letter in June 1833 to Man Singh expressing his remonstrance towards his conduct. But Man Singh did not send any reply for about one year.¹⁰⁹ It was characterised as a personal disrespect towards the representative of the British power in India.

104 Ibid.

105 Man Singh to N. Alves received 19 December 1833, Cons. 15 May 1834, No. 37, F & P; Man Singh to N. Alves received 2 August 1834, Cons. 15 May 1834, No. 37, F & P.

106 A village in Jodhpur territory close to the border of Ajmer.

107 F. S. Trevelyan Secretary Government to N. Alves, dt. 15 May 1834, Cons. 15 May 1834, No. 37, F & P.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

The Government instructed N Alves, the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General, that the violations of Treaty of which Man Singh has been guilty, have been so frequent, so outrageous, and so wilful and the whole course of his conduct for several years past has been so directly calculated to set an example of contumacy towards the supreme Government which if allowed, by the other states in a much inferior degree, would lead to the general disorganisation of the political system of India, that His Excellency, the Governor-General-in-Council "might with justice declare war against the Maharaja and proclaim his deposition from the *garhi* of Marwar" ¹¹⁰ However, the Government was not in favour of coercive measures and suggested further use of conciliatory means and to make efforts "to induce the Maharaja to listen to reason" ¹¹¹ In this respect the Agent to the Governor-General was told to rely on negotiations through a properly accredited agent of Man Singh and to explain him clearly the grave situation that existed and the dangers that awaited if the Maharaja failed to comply with the following British demands —¹¹²

1. Indemnity for lives which had been lost and property which had been destroyed at Jaisalmer, Sirohi and Kishangarh by the aggressions of Jodhpur troops or subjects
- 2 Settlement of the Sirohi claims due to Jodhpur's depredations brought to the notice of the Governor-General, when he visited Ajmer in 1832 ¹¹³
- 3 Indemnity for the losses suffered by Dr Mottley when his house was attacked ¹¹⁴ The full value of the property robbed or destroyed was to be paid.

110 Ibid

111 E S Trevelyan, Secretary Government to N Alves, dt 15 May 1834, Cons 15 May 1834, No 37, F & P

112 Ibid

113 Ibid

114 Ibid The Governor-General 'considered it established by the evidence and the traces of the Delinquents that the outrage on Dr Motley's house in Ajmer was committed by the subjects of Marwar Hence the demand for indemnity from the chief of that state was fully justified, who were the particular individuals who perpetrated the crime was a question for the Raja's consideration, in his capacity of Supreme Criminal judge over his own subjects'

- 4 As regards the *thugs*, the Maharaja would give his adhesion to the British plan which had been acceded by all other states of India or to point out some other plan more acceptable to him by which the object of the extirpation of these miscreants may be equally effective
5. After the payment of the indemnities which was a compensation for the losses, the chief of Jodhpur would be required to 'submit the British Government his repentance for the repeated violations of the treaty of which he was guilty'.
6. The Maharaja was to explain the cause of the unprecedented delay in replying to the Governor-General's *kharita* ¹¹⁵

In reply to the two *kharitas* written by the Agent to Governor-General on 23rd and 27th May 1832,¹¹⁶ Man Singh informed him about the deputation of Vyas Anup Ram as *wakil*, through whom all matters could reach a negotiated settlement ¹¹⁷ It was followed by the mission of Sawai Ram who was vested with the powers to settle all the outstanding questions except that related to the *thugs*.¹¹⁸

The Governor-General, however, felt that the character and disposition of Man Singh left little hope for the acceptance of the British terms. Valuable time was being lost and the season for active operations was rapidly approaching. Guided by these considerations he issued orders for the assembly of Field Force at Ajmer, under the command of Brigadier General Stevenson ¹¹⁹ The Agent to the Governor-General was instructed that at the time when the Field Force was ready to advance against Jodhpur, he was to address Man Singh once more requiring him to comply with the original

115 Secretary Government to N Alves dt 15 May 1834, Cons 15 May 1834, No 37, F & P

116 N Alves to Man Singh, Cons 26 June 1834, No 57, F & P, Cons 11 July 1834, Nos 46-47, F & P Ootacamund

117 Kharita from Man Singh to N Alves dt 2 June 1834, Cons 26 June 1834, No 59, F & P

118 H W Travelyan, Assistant Agent to the Governor-General to E S. Travelyan (Private letter) dt 9 September 1834, Cons 6 November 1834, No 19, F & P

119 N H Macnaghten, Offg Chief Secretary to the Government to N Alves dt 22 August 1834, Cons 13 September 1834, No 8, F & P.

British demands as well as two new demands that were to be added.¹²⁰ The first was that the Maharaja was to defray the whole of the expenses incurred in assembling the Field Force,¹²¹ and second was that in lieu of the 8th article of the Treaty of 1818, regarding the obligation to furnish a contingent of 1500 horse, the Maharaja should agree to pay to the British Government the sum of rupees three lakhs and fifty thousand per annum,¹²² for the body of 1000 horse to be commanded by a British officer.

Man Singh was to be allowed a period of forty-eight hours to take the decision, from the time of the receipt of the British ultimatum.¹²³ He must be clearly told that once the British troops were put in motion against his capital, nothing less than his abdication of sovereignty will satisfy the British Government. However, if the Maharaja gave his consent to abdicate at any stage of the operations, before the commencement of actual hostilities, he was to be promised a place of retirement within the Company's provinces, on a suitable provision. In case the person of Man Singh was secured after an unsuccessful resistance, he was to be detained as prisoner, but with liberal treatment pending the receipt of the orders of the Government. Under such circumstances Dhokal Singh was to be called and elevated to the *gaddi* of Jodhpur, provided he agrees to comply with all the British demands and promises to be a sincere dependent ally of the British Government.¹²⁴ A proclamation,¹²⁵ was sent by the Governor-General to N. Alves who was instructed to circulate its Persian and Hindi translation throughout Marwar

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 The Agent to the Governor-General was told that "the Governor-General in Council has no means at present of ascertaining the amount of the Jodhpore revenue, but should you be of opinion that this demand in addition to the existing tribute is greater than the state can bear with reference to its resources, you were authorised to reduce to the demand on this to a sum not less than two lakhs of rupees"

123 Macnaghten to N. Alves dt 22 August 1834, Cons 13 September 1834, No. 8, F & P

124 Macnaghten to N. Alves dt 22 August 1834, Cons 13 September 1834, No. 8, F & P.

125 N. H. Macnaghten, Offg. Chief Secretary to N. Alves dt. 22 August 1834, Cons 13 September 1834, No 8, F & P

and the surrounding Rajputana states, before the march of the Field Force into Jodhpur territory ¹²⁶

The news of the preparations for the assembly of Field Force caused a great alarm in Jodhpur and made a far reaching change in the attitude and conduct of the Jodhpur chief and immediately a high powered mission was despatched, which arrived at Ajmer on 29th September 1834 ¹²⁷ It placed its own plan, concerning the measures against the *thugs*, before the Agent to the Governor-General and made a request to give a trial at least for one year It was, however, assured that if their plan was found unsatisfactory the Maharaja would extend full co-operation to the British Government, as the other Rajput states had done After prolonged discussion the mission submitted to all of the original demands and agreed to the payment of the expenses for assembling the Field Force upto a maximum of five lakhs of Surat rupees ¹²⁸ As desired by the Agent to the Governor-General, a *kharita* was written by Man Singh to Governor-General explaining the unusual delay in replying to his letter and expressing his regret for the past conduct ¹²⁹

The Governor-General was not in favour of extending any leniency towards Man Singh He, therefore, wrote to his Agent, N Alves that he should have insisted on the immediate payment of the armament expenses and the commutation of the horses footing for a money payment He was directed to get the sequestration of Jodhpur's share of Sambhar Salt Works, as material guarantee for the fulfilment of all the promises, particularly the payment of the expenses of assembling the Field Force ¹³⁰

The Superintendent Ajmer, according to the instructions, took the possession of Sambhar on 29th January 1835 ¹³¹ Mao Singh

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Man Singh to the Vice-President, received 6 October 1834, Cons 6 October 1834, No 34, F & P

¹²⁸ N Alves to N H Macnaghten dt 7 October 1834, Cons 2 December, 1834 No 23, F & P

¹²⁹ Kharita from Man Singh to the Governor-General, Cons 2 December 1834, No 28, F & P

¹³⁰ W H Macnaghten to N Alves dt 2 December 1834, Cons 2 December 1834, No 36, F & P

¹³¹ Cons 19 February 1835, Nos 33-35, F & P

bowed to the dictates of the Governor-General, but he made an appeal to reconsider the issue. Finding his appeal having no effect on the Government,¹³² Man Singh represented that the occupation of Sambhar was in violation of the Treaty. The Government replied that "the act had been rendered necessary by Man Singh's violations of his treaty obligations, that it was not intended however as a penalty but as security and that, as soon as the money due by Marwar state to the British Government was liquidated, the tract would be restored."¹³³ H. N. Trevelyan, the Assistant Agent to the Governor-General, was deputed to Jodhpur for the adjustment of remaining issues by personal conferences with Man Singh. An agreement was reached and on 20th September 1835, he forwarded a *kharita* from Man Singh in which he consented to the commutation of the obligation to furnish a contingent of 1500 horse for an annual payment of a fixed sum of Rs 1,15,000 Surat rupees.¹³⁴ The Government's acceptance was given to the agreement and the Agent's suggestion for raising and maintaining a body of horse and foot under the command of a European officer received entire approval.¹³⁵ However, the final agreement was concluded on 7th December 1835 and was forwarded by N. Alves to the Government on 18th January 1836 and was promptly approved.¹³⁶ The obligations regarding the payment of compensation money was fulfilled and orders to the principal nobles and the officers of the state were given to co-operate with the British officers in their measures against the thugs.¹³⁷

The Problem of the Naths and the British Officers

The Naths were the disciples of Jallunder Nath, the saint and were known by the names of *Jogeshur*, *Sarup* or *Aisji*. Their ears

132 Cons 19 February 1835, No 27, F & P

133 Cons 6 April 1835, Nos 37-40, F & P, Cons 18 May 1835, Nos 23-24, F & P

134 N. Alves to the Secretary Government, Cons 19 October 1835, No 32, F & P

135 Secretary Government to N. Alves dt 19 October 1835, Cons 19 October 1835, Nos 34-35, F & P

136 N. Alves to the Secretary Government dt 18 January 1836, Cons 8 February 1836, Nos 64-66, F & P, Agreement is given in full, Aitchisoo, Vol III, p 135, Jodhpur State Records, Saad Bahi No 100, p 76, Ibid, Haqiqat Bahi No 36, p 147, Ibid, Kharita Bahi No 10, p 347

137. N. Alves to Macoaghten dt 23 October 1835, Cons 16 November 1835, No 30, F & P

were slit and they wore peculiar cylindrical rings, and were generally considered *Gurus* of some of the Rajput clans¹³⁸ The conduct of Man Singh towards the Naths also contributed to disastrous results The Nath problem in Marwar had developed to such a proportion that it not only engaged the attention of the British authorities, but also required an all out effort on their part to meet the challenge Its origin could be traced to the days when Man Singh was caught in the throes of misfortune and when an unexpected event, the death of Bheem Singh, freed him from all the perils, and placed him on the *gaddi* of Jodhpur He attributed his escape to his *guru* Deo Nath¹³⁹ "The gratitude of Raja Maun had no limits, no honours, no grants were sufficient to mark his sense of obligation"¹⁴⁰ Extensive jagirs were conferred upon the Nath, until his estates far exceeded, in extent, those of the proudest nobles of the land and his income amounted to a tenth of the revenue of the state "During the few years he held the keys of his master's conscience, which were conveniently employed to unlock the treasury"¹⁴¹ He erected no less than eighty-four *mandirs* with monasteries attached to them "for the *Chelas* or disciples, who lived at free quarters on the labour of the industrious"¹⁴² Deo Nath leagued with the "minister Indraj and together they governed the prince and country", He exceeded the sphere of his duties so much that his religion was exposed to contempt In order to swell the revenues of the high priest, sequestrations of the lands of the thakurs had been resorted to frequently His retinue on ordinary occasions surpassed that of any chieftain,

138 Report on the Census of 1891, Vol II, the Castes of Marwar, p 93

139 Tod, Vol I, p 565 Man Singh had stood a long siege at the fort of Jalore and was completely exhausted in 1803 He was almost at the verge of surrendering to the besieging troops of Bhim Singh, when Deo Nath assuming the mantle of prophecy, pronounced that "no capitulation was inscribed in the book of fate whose page revealed brighter days for Maun" Man Singh obeyed his *Guru* and decided to continue resistance The prophecy turned out to be true and Man Singh occupied the throne because of the sudden death of Bhim Singh

140 Tod, Vol I, p 565

141 Ibid, p 563

142 Ibid

and not unfrequently he was attended by the whole insignia of the state, the prince attending on such ceremonies ¹⁴³

Though, Deo Nath's life was cut short by Amir Khan,¹⁴⁴ still he had laid the foundation on which his successors not only flourished but, in many respects surpassed him. His son Ladoo Nath succeeded him. He further extended his hold on the affairs of the state and went a step further in emptying the treasury of the state. He was almost worshipped by Man Singh who used to say that the 'Raj was his *urpan*' ¹⁴⁵ After Ladoo Nath's death Bhim Nath occupied the *gaddi* of the spiritual head, and soon became so powerful that in all state affairs he only mattered. He had achieved notoriety for the maladministration and the chaotic condition in which Marwar had been placed. The Governor-General had reported to the Court of Directors that, "the system of plunder and rapine prevailing in that quarter is traceable to the ascendancy which an individual named Bhim Nath, *guru* or spiritual guide of Raja Man Singh, had acquired over the councils of that prince" ¹⁴⁶ Bhim Nath was characterised as "rapacious, unjust and cruel" Man Singh was completely under his spiritual control and was totally averse to active business. Consequently, Bhim Nath had paralysed the whole of the administration ¹⁴⁷ The state finances had reached such a critical stage that Man Singh was obliged to borrow money even for domestic expenses ¹⁴⁸

The Government at Jodhpur had long been in a condition of total inefficiency due to the influence of the Naths. The Nath's plundered the city with impunity and the chiefs plundered the provinces. Man Singh had given himself up Estate, body and soul to the "corrupt and grasping Nath priesthood". The most powerful thakurs of the state

143 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No. 10, p. 89, Tod, Vol. I, pp. 563-564

144 Tod, Vol. II, p. 115

145 Cons. 29 July 1828, No. 24, F & P (*Urpan* means present)

146 India Political Despatch to the Court of Directors, No. 32 of 1837, para 36

147 Ibid

148 N. Alves to Macnaghten dt. 29 January 1838, Cons. 21 March 1838, No. 111, F & P

being deprived of the greater part of their patrimonial possessions and wholly estranged from their sovereign, who neither sought to conciliate nor was able to coerce them, followed a course of general plundering for the subsistence of themselves and their followers. The utmost confusion and disorganisation that prevailed in Marwar rendered it impossible for her to fulfil the obligations of the treaty. The payment of the tribute to the British Government had fallen lamentably in arrears¹⁴⁹. Jodhpur's frontier on the side of Shekhawati and Bikaner had been disturbed for a long time¹⁵⁰. Remonstrances addressed to Man Singh did not bring any relief from the plundering raids. The Maharaja only requested Bhim Nath to take the necessary action,¹⁵¹ who however, paid no attention to it and the border situation became worse. The Agent's letters addressed to Man Singh requesting him to take strong measures for making his administration efficient, proved fruitless¹⁵². Finding that the prospects of the payment of the arrears of the dues to the British were extremely low, N. Alves suggested to his Government to sequester Nawa and Gudha¹⁵³. The Government approved his suggestion¹⁵⁴ which was complied with and the sequestration of Nawa and Gudha was effected without actual use of force though for a long time it appeared that it might be resisted¹⁵⁵.

149 The tribute payment had fallen in arrears for three years. But Alves had suspected a mistake in the account and thought that the arrears were probably for four years. Cons. 14 February 1838, No. 38, F & P, Cons. 7 March 1838, No. 27, F & P, Cons. 6 June 1838, Nos. 57-59, F & P.

150 Alves to Princep, Secretary Government dt. 29 January 1838, Cons. 21 March 1838, No. 112, F & P.

151 Abstract from Jodhpur Akhbar dt. 9 January 1838, Cons. 7 March 1838, No. 27, F & P.

152 N. Alves to Man Singh dt. 26 January 1838, Cons. 7 March 1838, No. 27, F & P.

153 N. Alves to Princep dt. 29 January 1838, Cons. 21 March 1838, No. 112, F & P. The salt works at Nawa and Gudha were a substantial source of revenue for Jodhpur.

154 Macnaghten to Alves dt. 7 March 1838, Cons. 13 June 1838, No. 2, F & P.

155 Cons. 25 July 1838, No. 48, F & P, Alves to Man Singh dt. 7 May 1838, Cons. 26 September 1838, No. 66, F & P.

Meanwhile there seemed no end of the increasing and widespread maladministration of Jodhpur. However, N. Alves the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana was nourishing a hope that Bhim Nath's death¹⁵⁶ might prove a turning point in the affairs of Marwar. He hoped that the event might deliver Man Singh and his principality from all the evils of the Nath domination and maladministration¹⁵⁷. But the British expectations were not fulfilled and Nath influence over the Maharaja and domination over the state continued unabated¹⁵⁸. Laxmi Nath, who succeeded Bhim Nath was considered to be the supporter of the cause of the disaffected thakurs, yet he failed to bring any reconciliation between them and the Maharaja.

Lt Col J. Sutherland had replaced N. Alves as the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana in March 1839. He informed Man Singh that he intended to leave Ajmer to pay a visit to the Maharaja and expressed a hope that all matters would be amicably settled through friendly intercourse¹⁵⁹. Accordingly Sutherland accompanied by Captain J. Ludlow, Dr. Russel and Lieutenant Thomas reached Jodhpur on 3rd April 1839,¹⁶⁰ and was given a cordial welcome by Man Singh¹⁶¹.

Next day Sutherland communicated to Man Singh the sense of regret which the Governor-General felt at the state of anarchy and misrule which had been prevailing in Marwar for a long time. He also placed a written note in the hands of the Maharaja in which the British demands were explained¹⁶². These were the formation of an efficient administration enjoying the confidence of the thakurs as well

156 Bheem Nath died on 21st July 1838. N. Alves to Man Singh dt 27 July 1838, Coos 30 August 1838, No 50, F & P, N. Alves to Macnaghten dt 12 September 1838, Coos 26 September 1838, No 111, F & P.

157 Ibid

158 N. Alves to Macnaghten dt 14 December 1838, Coos 9 January 1839, No 66, F & P.

159 Sutherland to T. H. Maddock, Secretary Government dt 10 June 1839, Coos 24 July 1839, No 38, F & P.

160 Ibid

161 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 12, p 253, Ibid, Haqiqat Bahi No 12, p 219, Ibid, Kharita Bahi No 12, p 347.

162 Sutherland to Maddock dt 8 June 1839, Coos 17 July 1839, No 72, F & P.

as the people. This involved the dismissal of Naths, reparation to the inhabitants of the neighbouring states for the depredations committed from the Jodhpur territory, restoration of the diseffected thakurs to their jagirs and power. Lastly, the note demanded payment of all the pecuniary claims of the British Government and an assurance for their regular and punctual payment in future.¹⁶³

Man Singh agreed after a prolonged discussion to the immediate payment of the arrears of tribute and promised to fulfil other pecuniary demands within a year.¹⁶⁴ However, the negotiations were deadlocked on the issue of the dismissal of the Naths and their partisans. Sutherland believed that Man Singh had resigned himself and his country to the tyranny of an ignorant, depraved and a mendicant priesthood who had drawn within the circle of their own sanctuaries of his capital all the riches of the country, and all the worst characters in it, while they had driven from office and employment all that was good or honourable about his Government.¹⁶⁵ He insisted on the entire overthrow of the Naths and their partisans. For Man Singh it was a struggle of the most painful kind, whether he should remove from power the Naths, to whom he had sworn to devote himself in estate, body and soul, or whether he should himself retire from the exercise of the power and become their companion in their downfall.¹⁶⁶ Man Singh was thus not inclined to yield on this point.

A conference of the Ministers, loyal thakurs and the "outside thakurs" (diseffected chiefs) also proved a failure because of the rigidity in their attitudes.¹⁶⁷ Finding that the negotiations were not going to help in the achievement of the British objects, Suther-

163 Sutherland to Maddock dt 8 June 1839, Cons 17 July 1839, No 72, F & P, The total amount claimed was Rs 8,85,000/-

164 Sutherland to Maddock dt 10 June 1839, Cons 24 July 1839, No 39, F & P

165 Sutherland to Maddock, Cons 17 July 1839, No 72, F & P, Cons 31 July 1839, No 75, F & P

166 Sutherland to Maddock, Cons, 17 July 1839, No 72, F & P, Cons 31 July 1839, No 75, F & P

167 Sutherland to Maddock dt 10 June 1839, Cons 24 July 1839, No 39 F & P

land was annoyed and left Jodhpur abruptly,¹⁶⁸ without even taking leave of the Jodhpur Maharaja and reached Ajmer on 1st June 1839.¹⁶⁹ In a report sent to the Government on the 8th June he described Mao Singh as "a chief whose hostility to the British power was notoriously anticipated"¹⁷⁰ and suggested that the fort of Jodhpur should be besieged. He thought that a blow to Jodhpur, the most insolent of all the states, would have the best effect in Rajputana, where for some years a very bad spirit had been manifested. The month of September was suggested as ideal for commencing the operations.¹⁷¹

The Governor-General endorsed the views expressed by Sutherland and issued orders to vindicate British authority by force of arms. Sutherland was empowered by the Government, through a confidential letter dated 11 July, 1839 to make preparations for the organization of a force such as may be deemed sufficient for operations against Marwar in September.¹⁷² He was instructed that though the restoration of the disaffected thakurs was one of the main objects yet the Government did not wish to appear as their partisan, but as "the paramount authority acting with justice to all whether incumbents or claimants"¹⁷³

On 22nd August 1839 a light detachment under Brigadier Rich crossed the Jodhpur frontier.¹⁷⁴ No resistance was offered, on the contrary it was welcomed by an officer on the part of the Maharaja, who was sent from Jodhpur to furnish the usual supplies.¹⁷⁵ At

168 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 12, p 236, Ibid, Arzee Bahi No 6, pp 203-205

169 Sutherland to Maddock dt 8 June 1839, Cons 17 July 1839, No 72, F & P, Cons 24 July 1839, No 39, F & P

170 Sutherland to Maddock dt 8 June 1839, Cons 17 July 1839, No 72 F & P

171 Ibid.

172 H. Torrens, Deputy Secretary to the Government dt 11 July 1839, Cons 7 August 1839, No 27, F & Sec

173 H. Torrens to Sutherland dt 11 July 1839, Cons 7 August 1839, No 27, F & Sec

174 Sutherland to Maddock, dt 23 August 1839, Cons 6 November 1839, No 43, F & Sec

175 Ibid

Bishalpur, Rich was joined by the Shekhawati Brigade and the Merwara Battalion¹⁷⁶ While the advance of the Field Force continued towards the capital of Marwar Man Singh wrote to Sutherland that, "let an accredited British officer be sent, attended by 10 or 20 persons, to whose hands my fortress may be delivered"¹⁷⁷ Man Singh had encamped at Bunar¹⁷⁸ with the declared peaceful intention to meet Sutherland The meeting took place and Sutherland described briefly the British demands It was soon noted that the expulsion of the Naths and their partisans was the most unpalatable thing that could be urged on the Maharaja Man Singh said that, "the measure was of character calculated to destroy his honour and reputation in this world and his hopes of salvation in the next"¹⁷⁹

The sense of the danger aroused by the advancing Field Force and the firm attitude of Sutherland ultimately resulted into the submission of the Maharaja to the dictates of the British Government¹⁸⁰ An agreement was concluded between Maharaja Man Singh and the British Government on 24 September 1839¹⁸¹ It was agreed that "the Maharaja and Colonel Sutherland and the *sardars* and *Ahul-i-kars*, and the *Khwas Pasbans* of the Raj will meet and institute rules for the Government of the country which are to be acted upon now and hence forward". They were also to define and settle the rights of the several chiefs and officers of the Government and of others according to the ancient usages¹⁸² The British Political Agent and the '*Ahul-i-kars*' of the Raj of Jodhpur were empowered to conduct the affairs of the Government according to these rules, after having counselled together and having consulted the Maharaja

176 Brigadier Rich] Sutherland dt 16 September 1839, Cons 8 January 1840, No [96, F & Sec

177 Man Singh to Sutherland received 28 August 1839, R A O Historical Records 227, File No 14 A, Jodhpur 1839, Collection No VI, p 3

178 Bunar, a village about two miles away from Jodhpur

179 Sutherland to Maddock dt 20 October 1839, R A O Historical Records 227, File No 14 A, Jodhpur 1839, Collection No VI, pp 12-13

180 Ibid, pp 47-51.

181 Ibid, Jodhpur State Records, Kharita Bahi No 10, p 350, Ibid, Haqiqat Bahi No 12, p 220

182 R A O Historical Records 227, File No 14A, Jodhpur 1839, Collection No VI, p 47

Man Singh agreed to the admission and retention of a British garrison into the Jodhpur fort ¹⁸³ This demand was accepted with great hesitation and reluctance on the part of the Maharaja. The fifth article of the agreement stipulated that "*Shree jee ka Mandir*," ¹⁸⁴ *Saroop* ¹⁸⁵ and *jogeswar*, ¹⁸⁶ their followers and associates, the *Oomraous*, ¹⁸⁷ the *Keekas*, ¹⁸⁸ *Mutsudees*, ¹⁸⁹ the *Khawas Pasbans*", soldiers and others should experience no diminution of their dignity, honour or possession ¹⁹⁰ The engagement assured the restoration of the rights and possession of the thakurs The 9th article stipulated the arrangements of the payment of the arrears of the tribute and *Sawar Khurch* as well their regular and punctual payment ¹⁹¹ The British Government bound itself to withdraw the British Political Agent and the garrison from the fort within a period of Six months, a year or eighteen months, depending on the adjustment of the affairs of the Maharaja ¹⁹²

Accordingly, the fort was vacated and was occupied by the British troops on 28th September 1839. ¹⁹³ The occupation was effected peacefully, but for the incident that occurred at the Surajpol gate, where Captain Ludlow was suddenly attacked by Rathor Bhom Singh and was slightly injured Bhom Singh was seriously wounded by the British soldiers and succumbed to the injuries after five days Man Singh expressed his great sorrow to Ludlow ¹⁹⁴

183 Ibid , p 48

184 Meaning the Mandirs of the Naths

185 Meaning Laxmi Nath, Prag Nath and their relatives

186 Meaning the Naths

187 Meaning the inside thakurs

188 Meaning the illegitimate children of the Maharaja

189 Meaning Kusal Raj, Fouz Raj etc

190 R A O Historical Records 227, File No 14A, Jodhpur 1839, Collection No VI, p 48

191 Ibid , p 50

192 R A O Historical Records 227, File No 14 A, Jodhpur 1839, Collection No VI, p 50

193 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 13, p 218, R A O Historical Records 227, File No 14 A, Jodhpur 1839, Collection No VI, p 54,

194 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 13, p 222; Ibid , Haqiqat Khata Bahi No 12, p 263

The Governor-General communicated his satisfaction to Sutherland for the mode under which the operations were conducted and it was appreciated that he insisted on the commission of a British garrison in the fort as the measure was considered to be of political necessity and as a warning to other powers ¹⁹⁵

On 29th December 1839 Colonel Sutherland reported the following arrangement for the payment of the arrears of tribute and *Sawar Khurch* —

ARREARS TO BE PAID

1.	The annual amount on account of tribute	Rs 1,08,000/-
2	-do- -do- -do- -do- for 5 years	5,40,000/-
3	-do- -do- -do- <i>Sawar Khurch</i>	Rs 1,15,000/-
4	-do- -do- -do- -do- for the current year V S 1896	Rs 1,15,000/-

This amount was to be paid partly by a contribution of Rs 6,53,000 from the '*Rekh*' i.e., at the rate of about Rs 300/- per 1000 '*Rekh*', partly by contribution of Rs 3,45,000 levied as a *ghar-bab* or house-tax on every house in the principality ¹⁹⁶

The sub-feudatories, the ministers and '*Khawas pasbans*' were each to pay their share of the contribution from '*Rekh*' and that of levied by *ghar-bab*, two thirds of the whole amount was to be paid to the British Government by the middle of January 1840, and the remainder by the middle of December 1840 ¹⁹⁷

Sutherland found it impossible to levy these arrears from the Naths, because they had disappeared with their wealth. However, the Naths who still remained as Man Singh's spiritual advisers, were interdicted from interfering in the affairs of the State ¹⁹⁸

The tribute amounting to Rs 1,08,000 was to be paid in future from the Sambhar revenue and if any deficiency remained, it was to

195 Maddock to Sutherland, dt 7 November 1839, Cons 24 February 1840, No 35, F & P

196 Sutherland to Maddock, dt 29 December 1839, Cons 24 February 1840, No 37, F & P

197 Ibid.

198 Ibid

be made good from other sources of the state. The *Sawar Khurch* amounting to Rs 1,15,000 likewise to be paid in future from '*Rekh*' by the thakurs of the State.¹⁹⁹

Dual Government and Its Consequences

The occupation of the fort having been achieved, Sutherland's next object was to get the terms of the agreement complied with. A Council of Regency or *Panchayat* consisting of ten persons from amongst the principal thakurs and the officers of the Government was set up.²⁰⁰ The *Panchayat*, with the concurrence of the Maharaja and the Agent, drew up the 'Code of Rules' by which Captain Ludlow and the ministers were to be guided in the future government of the state.²⁰¹ Ludlow was appointed as the first Political Agent at Jodhpur. In the transitional period Ludlow attended and assisted in all proceedings at the *Durbar* and also to the complaints of all persons demanding redress of grievances, and in the ordinary affairs of the Government. According to the 'code of rules' ²⁰² the Nathis were to confine themselves to the priestly duties and to remain in their dwellings. Nominations to the offices of *Pradhan*, *Dewan*, *Bukshee*, *Khansama* were to be made by the Maharaja. In doing so he was to appoint qualified officers without being influenced by any party. Undue countenance or encouragement to any person was prohibited. The entire administrative set up was to be remodelled and the affairs of the state were to be conducted after the manner observed in the times of Maharaja Bijay Singh.²⁰³

Sutherland reported to the Government on 29th December 1839, that the conduct of all parties at Jodhpur had been exemplary and merited every consideration on the part of British Government.

199 Sutherland to Maddock dt 29 December 1839, Cons 24 February 1840, No 37, F & P

200 Sutherland to Maddock, Cons 24 February 1840, Nos 31-35, F & P

201 Sutherland to Maddock, Cons 24 February 1840, Nos 31-35, F & P

202 Translation of the 'Code of Rules' Cons 15 March 1841, No 37, F & P, R A O Historical Records 228, File No 14 A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No VII, pp 31-41, For details see Chapter VII

203 Translation of a 'code of rules' Cons 15 March 1841, No 37, F & P, R A O Historical Records 228, File No 14 A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No VII, pp 31-41, for details see Chapter VII

importance²¹¹ His functions, in addition to the regular duties of a political agent, were many and multifarious. He had a difficult task to perform because the 'Council of the thakurs and the minister's was, though presided over by the Maharaja, conducted the administration with the concurrence of the Political Agent. It was his duty to exercise his authority to restrain the evil dispositions of the thakurs and yet to govern the country through their instrumentality and in conformity with their institutions. The appointment of the ministers and other important officers of the state was no doubt a prerogative of the Maharaja but, the Political Agent was to see that the selected officers possessed ability and authority enough to carry the duties of their offices, and when it was proved that they did not possess the requisite qualities and where they failed they should be removed.²¹³ Ludlow had all the time to be watchful against falling into the hands of a party. He had to maintain a disposition to inspire confidence in him and all should feel that he was an impartial umpire. He should be above either seeking or needing the assistance of any party. His object was the general benefit of all classes and of the country.²¹⁴ The resolution, that appeals for justice would be received once a week before the Maharaja, the Political Agent and the Council of thakurs and ministers, had imposed an important function on Ludlow. But at the same time it had opened the door of Justice to the great body of people. Sutherland instructed Ludlow specifically to keep the Nath influence under check.²¹⁵ He wrote, "their (Nath's) entire exclusion from state affairs must of course continue to engage your attention. This is a duty which we owe to Marwar and which we alone can perform. They must continue to feel assured that on the first proof of their interference in those affairs, we are prepared either to seize or expel them from the country"²¹⁶ Lastly the Political Agent was directed to have occasional tours through the country

211 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 13, p 291

212 Sutherland to Ludlow dt 22 September 1841, Cons 8 November 1841, Nos 121-123, F & P

213 Ibid

214. Ibid

215 Ibid

216 Sutherland to Ludlow dt 22 September 1841, Cons 8 November 1841, Nos 121-123, F & P

and to keep himself informed on the condition of all classes and to suggest to the administration, and to assist in carrying through any measures that may be necessary for the amelioration of their condition ²¹⁷

Marked Improvement in the affairs of the State

Ludlow performed his functions admirably well and succeeded to a great extent in effecting far-reaching changes and great improvement in the administration of Jodhpur. The difficult task of the restoration of the sequestered jagirs from the chiefs was also achieved with exemplary promptness and impartiality. The territorial claims were settled after a laborious investigation by the Council or the *Panchayat*.²¹⁸ Besides building up an efficient system of administration he improved the system of the procedure of receipts and disbursements. The watch and ward arrangements for the city were put on a better footing.²¹⁹ The judicial system was reformed without affecting traditional usages. Sutherland reported to the Government on 3rd January 1841 that "punishments for acts of violence had hitherto been unknown, in one or two instances men guilty of murderous attacks had been banished, their estates confiscated and they themselves and their descendants declared incapable of serving the *Darbar* to the second generation".²²⁰ One of these men had taken sanctuary with a relation of the Maharaja, but the latter was compelled to expel him. The wave of reform reached the armed forces also which were reconstituted and surplus troops were discharged. The pecuniary demands of the British Government were fully met in conformity with the engagement of 29th December 1839. The payments of the tribute as well as the *Fauj Kharch* were completed by the end of 1840.²²¹ The untiring efforts of Ludlow rescued Jodhpur

217 Ibid

218 Sutherland to Davidson, Secretary Government dt 18 February 1840, Cons 23 March 1840, No 55, F & P

219 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 26 November 1840, Cons 15 March 1841, Nos 35-36, F & P

220 Sutherland to Maddock dt 3 January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, No 35, F & P

221 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 26 November 1840, Cons 15 March 1841, No 35-36, F & P

from a state of complete maladministration and put it well on the road to peace and comparative prosperity. When Ludlow took over the office of the Political Agent, Jodhpur's economy was in a state of jeopardy, but his measures saved the state from a financial crisis and regenerated its economy. Ludlow received much deserved appreciation from Sutherland.²²²

Nath Bid to Regain Ascendency

Naths had not reconciled to the changed state of affairs and were still hopeful of re-establishing their place of power and domination in the administration of Jodhpur. While the task of building up an efficient system of administration was making progress Jasroop, the *Karbar* of Laxmi Nath, came to Jodhpur on 13th June 1840, three days after the death of his mother.²²³ However, Ludlow's strong remonstrance and firm attitude had compelled Jasroop to quit Jodhpur.²²⁴ Laxmi Nath attended by his *karbar* Jasroop had come to the village Tiwri, about six miles from Jodhpur, on December 16, 1840 and held clandestine communication with thakur Ranjit Singh of Kuchaman in person and also with Man Singh through one Anar Singh Bhati.²²⁵ Strongly worded remonstrance was sent to Man Singh by Ludlow.²²⁶ He reported the event to Sutherland and added that the object of the Nath was to remove Rao Raja Riddh Mal, the agency vakil.²²⁷ Sutherland instructed Ludlow to tell the Maharaja that Jasroop's banishment from Marwar had become necessary and he would be forbidden to return to Jodhpur under the penalty of being seized and confined within the British territory as a state prisoner.²²⁸ If Laxmi Nath did not abstain from further

222 Sutherland to Ludlow dt 3 January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, No 35, F & P

223 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 16 June 1840, Cons 13 July 1840, No 40 F & P

224 Ibid

225 R. A. O. Historical Records 228, File No 14 A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No VII, p 1, 9, 15

226 Ibid, pp 9-14. Kharitas from Ludlow to Man Singh dated 26 December 1840,

227 Ibid, pp 1-7, Letter from Ludlow to Sutherland dated 1 January 1841

228 R. A. O. Historical Records 228, File No 14A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No VII, pp 1-7

meddliog with state affairs, the Maharaja must be asked to select some other *Guru* who promises to do so. However, it was reported that Laxmi Nath and Jasroop had left the village and gone away from Jodhpur.²²⁹

Meanwhile in an attempt to isolate Laxmi Nath from Jasroop an invitation was sent to his brother Prag Nath to come to Jodhpur.²³⁰ Getting the intelligence of the invitation Laxmi Nath rushed towards Jodhpur. Consequently the heads of the two rival factions of Naths²³¹ reached Jodhpur on the morning of 2nd January 1841.²³² The news of the arrival of the Naths had a paralysing influence on the administration and almost a hypnotic effect on the Maharaja. He was greatly excited and was surrounded by the creatures of Laxmi Nath who deputed free access to him.²³³ Sutherland received the reports of these developments and instructed Ludlow that, if other measures failed, he should call Major Downing to march the Jodhpur Legion, and adopt such measures as may be necessary to restore matters to even and satisfactory course in which they were proceeding before the violation of engagements by the chief of Kuchaman, by the Naths and even "by the infuriated Maharaja."²³⁴

Finding his measures ineffectual Ludlow requested Major Dowdall to march to Jodhpur with the available force.²³⁵ Maos Singh made an attempt to invite Sutherland to Jodhpur, but having failed to do so, he himself proceeded to meet the Agent and reached up to Bunnar.²³⁶ The arrival of the Jodhpur Legion in the capital and

229 Ibid, p 16, Translation of the statement of the report of the Jodhpur News writer

230 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 5 January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, No 38, F & P

231 Laxmi Nath of Mahamandir and Prag Nath of Odeymandir

232 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 5 January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, No 38, F & P

233 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 7 January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, No 40, F & P

234 Sutherland to Ludlow dt 8 January 1841, R A O Historical Records, File No 14A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No VII, p 85

235 Ibid, p 114, Ludlow to Major Downing, Commanding Jodhpur Legion, Erinpura dt 10 January 1841

236 Sutherland to Maddock dt 30 January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, No 39, F & P

Ludlow's strong warning to Man Singh only compelled him to return to Jodhpur.²³⁷ Thirteen persons who were notoriously leagued with the "Mahamandir Party", and who had been the stumbling block in the way of the administration were removed from the presence of the Maharaja.²³⁸ A document, pledging himself not to interfere or suffer his followers to interfere, directly or indirectly in the affairs of the state, was obtained from Laxmi Nath. In addition to this a security bond for the future good conduct of the Nath was also furnished. The thakurs of Pokurn and Sheo Nath Singh, the uncle of the thakur of Nimaj stood sureties for him.²³⁹ The Thakur of Pokurn was appointed as *Pradhan* and Zorawar Mal Seth as treasurer by the Maharaja with the concurrence of the Political Agent.²⁴⁰ Meanwhile an unsuccessful attempt was made by a detachment of the Legion, to seize Jasrup who was reported to be inside Marwar territory. But he escaped to Bikaner, his place of banishment.²⁴¹ Finding that the main objects contemplated by Ludlow had been achieved one half of the force of the Jodhpur Legion was allowed to return to Erinpura.²⁴²

Sutherland visited Jodhpur in September 1840. The conduct of the Kuchaman thakur had long been a cause of annoyance to Ludlow and the Agent. He was the principal supporter of the Nath faction in the Council and had adopted an obstructionist attitude. In addition to the charge of his having clandestine communications with Laxmi Nath and Jasrup at Tiwri, he was considered to be one

237 Translation of a Kharita from Ludlow to Man Singh dt 18 January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, No 40, F & P. Ludlow warned that, "should you (Maharaja) not return to Jodhpur during the course of tomorrow and act upon my suggestion, it will remain for you to nominate some one to office of Gooroo in the room of Lukhmee Nath who will be dealt with according to the course which has been indicated in the letter from the A G G." Jodhpur Records, Kharita Bahi No 13, p 423.

238 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 27 January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, No 40, F & P. Enclosed with this letter were the copy of document signed by Laxmi Nath and the copy of the bond signed by the sureties.

239 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 27 January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, No 40, F & P.

240 Ibid.

241 Ibid.

242 Ibid. Enclosure No V Ludlow to Major Downiog dt 20 January 1841.

of the chief advisers of the Maharaja in influencing his departure for Bunar in the month of January 1841. Consequently Sutherland procured from Man Singh Kuchaman thakur's dismissal from his Jagir²⁴³. After settling other minor issues and paving the way for the smooth running of the administration he left for Ajmer on 16th September 1841²⁴⁴.

Ludlow undertook a tour in the autumn and winter of 1841, through the state and the neighbouring territories of Jaisalmer, Bikaner and Hissar and returned to Jodhpur on 1st January 1842²⁴⁵. Soon he left for Godwar and returned on 10th January 1842²⁴⁶. On his return to the capital, Ludlow found that Naths had indulged in serious acts of interference during his absence. They had not only established their complete hold over the Maharaja and the ministers but had also usurped several villages²⁴⁷. The Maharaja had gone to the extent of offering "the state jewels in Bazar, to answer their demands for money". The worst part of their conduct was that they had encouraged the Maharaja to live in tents and demand from the Political Agent, the recall of Jasrup and his restoration to his former power and position, failing which he would not go to the palace. The matter was reported to Sutherland²⁴⁸ who referred it to the Supreme Government suggesting that two alternatives appeared possible. The first was to go on expelling the Naths as often as they misbehaved and the second was to encourage Man Singh's often broached idea of abdicating²⁴⁹. The Governor-General, however, rejected the idea, directing that he would not by any means encourage

243 Sutherland to Maddock dt 2 October 1841, Cons 8 November 1841, No 121 F & P

244 R. A. O. Historical Records 228, File No 14A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No VII, p 300

245 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 15 January 1842, Cons 28 February 1842, No 22, F & P

246 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 18 January 1842, Cons 28 February 1842 No 22, F & P

247 Ibid

248 Ibid

249 Sutherland to Maddock dt 28 January 1842, Cons 28 February 1842, No 22, F & P

the abdication of the Maharaja ²⁵⁰ Meanwhile Ludlow had already been authorised by Sutherland to expel the guilty Nath faction and to fine them to the extent of the security they had furnished for their agreement, calling the Jodhpur Legion if it was necessary ²⁵¹

Meanwhile hectic negotiations were conducted by the Political Agent with the Maharaja, in which Man Singh threatened to abdicate. A *kharita* addressed to the Governor-General to this effect was also handed over to the Political Agent, but the same was returned because the seals of authority were not fixed. Finding that the threat had failed to have any influence on Ludlow, it was not pressed further ²⁵² However, the Maharaja showed no inclination to take any step for the expulsion of the Naths, and Ludlow was firm to execute the instructions received from the Agent to the Governor-General ²⁵³ Consequently the Jodhpur Legion was again called and the expulsion of the principal Naths was accomplished. Laxmi Nath and his followers went to Panchu, a village in Bikaner, while Pragnath and Raghunath went to Sirohi ²⁵⁴ As a precaution against the return of the Naths, the Political Agent obtained a written engagement from the Maharaja in March 1842 ²⁵⁵ According to this the Maharaja engaged not to allow the return of the expelled Naths without the sanction of the British authorities. Their lands yielding 4,50,000, except a few villages held by the copper-plate grants in perpetuity, were resumed ²⁵⁶ These villages were also made over to *sahukars*, who were to deposit the total yield into the treasury, from where the perpetual grantees were to receive their share. A fixed amount of three lakhs of rupees per annum was assigned for the

250 Maddock to Sutherland dt 28 February 1842, Cons 28 February 1842, Nos 22-23, F & P. Despatches to the Court of Directors, No 27, dt 10 August 1842, paras 16-17

251 Sutherland to Ludlow, Cons 28 February 1842, Nos 22-23, F & P.

252 Ibid

253 Ibid

254 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 26 March 1842, Cons 7 September 1842, No 29, F & P

255 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 26 March 1842, Cons 7 September 1842, No 29, F & P. The engagement was signed after great hesitation and following a threat from the Political Agent to dismiss the Agency vakil

256 Ibid

maintenance of the Naths, out of which one lakh was set aside for the expenses of the temples. The amount was to be paid direct from the treasury. Besides this Ludlow allowed only a limited number of the Naths required for performance of *Puja* to stay at Jodhpur,²⁵⁷ To guarantee the observance of these stipulations, a wing of the Jodhpur Legion was retained at the capital.²⁵⁸

Ludlow reported to Sutherland that the success had been as complete as circumstances would permit. The Political Agent expressed his satisfaction that people of the capital had welcomed it and the expression was common in the capital that "a cure has at length been found for the '*Jullundur Rog*'²⁵⁹ of Marwar"²⁶⁰ The Governor-General entirely approved Ludlow's action and desired that the prohibition to "the return of the Naths to power may be strictly enforced"²⁶¹

The British measures had caused a great blow to the Naths, still they were hopeful of retrieving the lost ground. In August 1842, Laxmi Nath was reported to have attempted to enter the Jodhpur territory and Prag Nath's horsemen had collected money from a Nath village.²⁶² Nath's chiefly of comparatively humble position, numbering about 600, had retraced their steps, before finally quitting Marwar.²⁶³ Ludlow threatened to stop the allowance of the whole sect and impressed upon the Maharaja to dismiss the remainder of the fraternity. But he could not be persuaded to make a single Nath leave the capital, notwithstanding repeated entreaties by the thakurs and ministers, and the huge sum of money advanced to the Naths by way of road expenses.²⁶⁴

²⁵⁷ Ibid

²⁵⁸ Ibid

²⁵⁹ Ludlow to Sutherland dt 26 March 1842, Cons 7 September 1842, No 29, F & P. In the footnote Ludlow explained that it is a "current criticism at Jodhpur associating the name of the Nath saint or founder of the sect with the disease called Jullundur or Dropsy"

²⁶⁰ Ibid

²⁶¹ Secretary Government of India to Sutherland dt 28 October 1842, Cons 23 November 1842, No 30, F & P

²⁶² Sutherland to Maddock dt 14 August 1842, Cons 14 September 1842, Nos 17-19, F & P.

²⁶³ Ludlow to Sutherland dt 16 August 1842, Cons 12 October 1842, No 34, F & P

Man Singh's previous threats of abdicating had now assumed the form of statements that he would move into the Mahamandir and will take no interest in the state concerns causing to paralyse the state machinery. All this time he lived in a 'wretched' *shamiana* in the garden of a small house in the city surrounded by his Naths.²⁶⁵ This self denial by Man Singh was a part of his policy of passive resistance through which he hoped to make the British Government yield and leave him "uncontrolled in his Government, and place the Naths in a place which they formerly enjoyed"²⁶⁶ He even declined an invitation to visit Delhi and discuss the matters with the Governor-General and pretended diplomatic sickness.²⁶⁷

Thereupon the Governor-General wrote a *khurita* to Man Singh observing that "Your Highness must feel that I cannot permit any prince to break his word with the British Government, to direct to other purposes funds appropriated to the discharge of national obligation and expose all Marwar to a recurrence of the calamities from which it has rescued"²⁶⁸ At the same time Sutherland was authorised to effect, by force if necessary, the entire expulsion of the Naths and to check the misappropriation of the revenue of Jodhpur.²⁶⁹

In order to execute these instructions Ludlow had a long series of representations and negotiations. Finding his diplomatic measures bearing no fruit he deputed parties of the Jodhpur Legion and the jagirdar horse to effect seizure of the especially troublesome members of the Nath fraternity and to despatch them to Ajmer. A warning to all Naths to quit Jodhpur on penalty of seizure was also given.²⁷⁰ Sita Nath and Mihir Nath, alongwith *Kandars* of some

265 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 16 August 1842, Cons 12 October 1842, No 38, F & P

266 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 24 December 1842, Cons 14 June 1843, No 74, F & P

267 A Kharita from Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General to Maharaja Man Singh dt 26 February 1843, Cons 14 June 1843 No 82, F & P.

268 Thomson Offg Secretary Government to Sutherland dt 26 February 1843, Cons 14 June 1843, No 81, F & P

269 Ibid

270 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 3 May 1843, Cons 14 June 1843, No 94, F & P.

others were seized and despatched to Ajmer²⁷¹ Man Singh was extremely agitated and reacted sharply to these developments, he "threw dust upon his head, rolled on the bare earth and tore his beard" When his repeated demands to release the arrested Nathi proved fruitless, more self inflicted austerities by Man Singh followed, culminating in his walking bare-footed, bare-headed and covered with ashes to an open place which was only sheltered by *Kanats*²⁷² Hoping to bring the administration to a deadlock he refused to look into or even listen to any business representations²⁷³

Man Singh continued this attitude For about six weeks he indicated his intention of abdicating and nominating to the succession 'a child of the Ahmadnagar²⁷⁴ family The Governor-General demanded a report on the claim of Idar and Ahmadnagar²⁷⁵ Consequently Ludlow sent the desired report alongwith the geneological 'tree of the Marwar family, with the recommendation that the rightful claimant would be the chief of Idar²⁷⁶

In the meantime Man Singh had moved to a spot called *Vyas-ki-Sarai*,²⁷⁷ where were a few trees and a *Baolee* (reservoir) of water but no habitation Ludlow found Man Singh sitting in a palanquin under a tree A charity steel cap which was much too large for him²⁷⁸ covered his head and the matted grey hair appeared in front his face disfigured by dirt, and a thin cloth enveloped his person, having one 'arm bare from the shoulder Ludlow observed that the Maharaja would have passed anywhere for a "religious mendicant" Ludlow's remonstrance for his behaviour and persuasion to return to the capital failed completely²⁷⁸ Thereupon the Governor-General concluded that insanity alone could be the cause of the Maharaja's

271 Ibid

272 Ibid (*Kanats* means temporary partition work of caovas)

273 Ibid

274 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 14 May 1843, R. A. O Historical Records 237, old, File No 52, Jodhpur 1843, pp 3-4

275 Ibid

276 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 14 May 1843, R. A. O Historical Records 237, old, File No 52, Jodhpur 1843, pp 11-12,

Ludlow to Sutherland dt 12 June 1843

277 About six miles from Jodhpur

278 Cons, 19 August 1843, Nos 156-158, F & P

strange conduct, and expressed the hope that the thakurs would at once proceed on that supposition and place the rightful heir upon the *gaddi* of Marwar ²⁷⁹

The intelligence of the Governor-General's conclusion regarding the succession prompted Man Singh to return to the capital on 2nd July 1843, after an absence of twenty-three days ²⁸⁰ Nevertheless he continued to persist in his refusal to enter the palace or to walk and dress in a manner befitting his station Guided by his evil Nath advisers he refused to listen to the Councils of the thakurs who being disappointed dispersed to their estates

Man Singh again left the capital and went to Mandor (Six miles away from Jodhpur) on 29th July 1843 His self-imposed denial of luxuries and the sufferings of hard life, that he had lived for the last several days, had caused a serious strain on his health On 30th August he had an attack of the seasonal fever, then prevalent in Marwar and finally as a result of an acute attack of diarrhoea he expired at 3-30 A M on 5th September 1843 ²⁸¹ Thus ended the life of a "great man, in the estimation of the Rajput world" ²⁸² In fact it was the supreme sacrifice by the sovereign that "he might be said to have died in the cause of the Naths, as he had said, he would always glory in doing" ²⁸³

Estimation of Man Singh as a Ruler of Marwar

Man Singh was born in a memorable epoch in the history of Rajputana and undoubtedly played a dominant role through most of his eventful life Being a gifted poet himself he extended his patronage to poets, musicians, intellectuals and artists He left a rich heritage in the form of collections of paintings and manuscripts of great works ²⁸⁴

279 Ludlow to Sutherland Cons 16 September 1843, Nos 99-101, F & P

280 Cons 23 September 1843, Nos 64-67, F & P

281 Express letter from Ludlow to Sutherland written at 11 A M dt 5 September 1843, Cons 23 September 1843, No 61, F & P

282 Sutherland to Ludlow dt 7 September 1843, Cons 23 September 1843, No 62, F & P

283 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 6 September 1843, Cons 30 September 1843, No 62, F & P

284 These are preserved in the 'Pushtak Prakash', lodged in the Umed Palace (Chhatrar Palace) at Jodhpur Some of the paintings are placed in the Government Museum at Jodhpur also, See Chapter V and the illustrated photo-prints

As a ruler he was no doubt a man of unusual abilities. To Munshi Barkat Ali he explained that "on every subject and more particularly on the arrangement of the state, prudence is necessary". In dealing with the Government officials he pointed out four ways which drew his particular attention. First to enlighten the foolish by sending confidential people to them to dispel their doubts, second, to win them over by offering them kindness or by applying to their avarice, third, by sowing discord amongst some and employing others, fourth, was the threat or punishment.²⁸⁵ These points no doubt reflect his deep sense of understanding regarding the state affair.

The British officers who paid official visits to the state also formed favourable impressions about him. Captain James Tod, for example, observed that "the biography of Man Singh would afford a remarkable picture of human patience, fortitude and constancy, never surpassed in any age or country."²⁸⁶ Similarly Wilder reported on 13th March 1824, that he found the Raja (Man Singh) far from being so inattentive or indifferent to the concerns of his Government as had been represented. He perceived no signs of mismanagement or misconduct on the part of his ministers.²⁸⁷

Sutherland had an ample opportunity to have a close study of Man Singh's character. Being impressed, he reported to the Government, "I believe that no act of a really unfriendly nature towards us can be traced to him (Man Singh)". He further added that "I am persuaded that there is no sovereign prince in India on whose fidelity we may more rely than that of the Maharaja. I have never met a native of this country in whom I would so much trust or who, I believe, would more implicitly trust us than Man Singh."²⁸⁸


In a *kharita* addressed to Man Singh on 26th February 1843, Lord Ellenborough, the Governor-General expressed that, "I was

285. Munshi Barkat Ali's Report to Ochterlony dt 15 November 1818, Cons 26 December 1818, Nos 55-56, F & P

286. Tod, Vol I, P 561

287. Wilder to George Swinton dt 13 March 1824, Cons 30 April 1824, No 25, F & P

288. Sutherland to Secretary Government, Cons 24 February 1840, Nos 37-38, F & P.



MAN SINGH IN HIS HAREM—P. P. J

anxious to become personally acquainted with a sovereign so distinguished amongst princes, not more by his illustrious descent than by the respect with which his abilities and his virtues had hitherto inspired the people of *Rajmada*" 289

Though the period of Man Singh's reign in Marwar was marked by maladministration and conflict between the sovereign and the nobles, chiefly due to the Nath ascendancy, yet Man Singh was held in high esteem by all. His lofty sense of devotion and spirit of sacrifice could be judged from his statement to Ludlow that, it was assuredly no trifle to yield up supreme power to which only a few are born and for all possessing it entertain a jealous regard, but that for himself, he 'only desired to retain his *gaddi* while religion, his honour and friendship of the British were unassailed'.²⁹⁰

Yet there were some like Cavendish and Lockett who formed a different opinion about him. Cavendish observed that Man Singh appeared to be most ignorant of the state of his affairs, "he holds *Durbar* only five times a year on the Dusshera, Holt, Diwali, Akhatij and his birthday, and even then no business is transacted or petition taken. On the *jogees* he depends entirely for the safety to his person and Government. He calls his principalities their *urpan* (nazar)".²⁹¹ Similarly A. Lockett pointed out that, "Man Singh is now entirely indolent and given up to pleasure"²⁹² Lockett's successor N. Alves characterised Man Singh as a person of singular temper and habits and impracticable disposition.²⁹³

That he was a great patron of learning there can be no doubt. Himself a man of letters he patronised scholars like Bankidas, a writer of excellent prose in Rajasthani. In other respects too he showed

289 Kharita from Lord Ellenborough to Man Singh dt 26 February 1843, Coos 14 June 1843, No 82, F & P

290 Ludlow to Sutherland dt 26 March 1842, Coos 18 June 1842, Nos 18-19, F & P

291 Cavendish to Colebrook dt 27 June 1828, Cons 29 July 1828, No 24, F & P

292 A. Lockett to Macknaghten dt 28 September 1832, Cons 26 November 1832, No 14/14 A, F & P

293 N. Alves to Secretary Government dt 4 June 1834, Coos 26 June 1834, No 59, F & P

himself far above the ordinary run of princes of his times. He built library at Jodhpur, which was a radiating point of Sanskrit, Rajasthan and art studies. But in following a vacillating policy towards his contemporaries, specially the fellow princes of Rajasthan, he did little or nothing to secure the position of his successors. His pretensions to friendship towards the Company cost Man Singh the fidelity of many of his British appreciators. More shameful was his treatment towards his nobles who had saved his life at the time of the Jalore invasion. The varied character of Man Singh's life, and different views expressed by his contemporaries would suggest that he is the *Mona-Lisa*²⁹⁴ of Marwar history.



²⁹⁴ The painting of *Leonardo da Vinci*, famous for the numerous interpretations given to the critics and people.

CHAPTER III

MAHARAJA TAKHT SINGH (1843-1857) AND THE EAST INDIA COMPANY

Maharaja Min Singh died without leaving any male issue to succeed to the *gathi* of Jodhpur. However, at various times he had pointed out three families in which the right of succession rested. First was that of Maharaja Gay Singh, the second and third that of Idar and Ahmednagar respectively.¹ But when it came to take a decision on the matter, Sutherland and Ludlow believed that the claim of Idar superseded that of others. Nevertheless, Sutherland instructed the Political Agent at Jodhpur that the less interest or interference the British evinced, in the discussion on adjustment of questions of this kind, the better. If the widows, the chiefs and other officials failed in the settlement of such questions causing a threat of the breach of peace or if both parties sought British mediation, then he should interfere.²

However, on receiving a completely favourable report from a deputation of confidential servants sent to Ahmednagar,³ Takht Singh was unanimously adopted and elected to the throne of Jodhpur by the *Majis*, *Sardars Mutsudis* and *Khwas-Pasbans* on 14th October 1843.⁴ Letters of invitation, intimating the decision of adoption, were sent to Takht Singh under the Signatures of the *Majis*⁵ followed by the *arzi* from the *Sardars*, *Mutsudis* and *Khwas Pasbans*.⁶ The Political

1 Sutherland to Ludlow dated 7th September 1843, Cons. 23 September 1843, No. 62, F & P

2 Ibid

3 R. A. O. Historical Record 237 old file No. 52, Jodhpur 1843, p. 66

4 Ibid, pp. 104-113

5 Ibid, p. 107

6 Ibid, p. 109.

Agent at Jodhpur also wrote a letter on 14th October recommending him to come to Jodhpur and intimating that the recognition by the Governor-General of his adoption as the successor of Maharaja Man Singh would be obtained.⁷ Accordingly, Takht Singh arrived at Jodhpur on 29th October⁸ and the inauguration ceremony took place on 1st December 1843.⁹ Ludlow was quite impressed by Takht Singh and reported to Sutherland that, "he appears intelligent and, in so far as I have yet had an opportunity of judging, well disposed to act part of just and consistent ruler"¹⁰ He advised the Maharaja to act for himself and confide in his administrators and nobles whom he might call to his councils, and to encourage union among them. To the thakurs, Ludlow recommended that they should look up to their sovereign as their master and friend by consulting whose interests they would best advance their own.¹¹

Meanwhile, Dhokal Singh was endeavouring to press his claim. He applied to Sutherland on 14th September 1843 that, the barrier to his cause being removed by the demise of Raja Man Singh, without a legitimate male issue, he hoped and trusted that the British Government would favourably consider his claim to the sovereignty of Jodhpur.¹² To press his claim Dhokal Singh left Jhajar, where he had been residing and proceeded towards Ajmer to seek an interview with the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana.¹³ The Government, however, instructed Sutherland to use whole of the Shekhawati

7 Ibid, p 113

8 Ludlow to Major Thoresby Letter No 393, dt 29 October 1843, R A O Historical Record 237, *loc cit*, p 138

9 Ludlow to Major Thoresby Letter No 441 dt 2 December 1843, R A O Historical Record 237, *loc cit*, p 149

10 Ludlow to Major Thoresby Letter No 402 dt 5 November 1843, R A O Historical Record 237, *loc cit*, pp 147-148

11 Ludlow to Major Thoresby, Letter No 402 dt 5 November 1843, R A O Historical Record 237, *loc cit*, pp 147-148

12. Dhokal Singh to Sutherland dated 14 September 1843, R A O Historical Record 236, File No 45, Jodhpur (old) 1843-52, pp 1-5

13 Major Thoresby, Political Agent at Jaipur to Sutherland, Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana No 133 dt 25 September, 1843, R A O Historical Record, 236, *loc cit*, p 17

Brigade and other troops and drive Dhokal Singh to Jhajar. He was advised to take no risk for the tranquillity of Marwar.¹⁴

The Governor-General recommended that some maintenance allowance to Dhokal Singh should be granted from Marwar state funds.¹⁵ Takht Singh considered that Dhokal Singh possessed no claim to any support from Marwar and that to grant him any allowance from Marwar state fund would be to revive aspirations which had been allayed.¹⁶ A compromise was suggested by Captain French, the Political Agent at Jodhpur, that an allowance should be paid to Dhokal Singh by the British Government and an equivalent amount added to the tribute or *Sana Kharch* of Jodhpur, during the life time of Dhokal Singh.¹⁷ This arrangement was accepted by the Maharaja and approved by the court of Directors.¹⁸ However, on 15th December 1851, Dhokal Singh paid the last debt of nature, thus ending the dramatic chapter of a long drawn controversy and struggle.¹⁹

Takht Singh's Claim for Ahmadnagar

Maharaja Takht Singh's accession to the throne of Marwar led to the problem of the disposal of the Ahmadnagar chiefship. The state of the Idar put forward its claim to Ahmadnagar and requested the British Government that the two principalities should be reunited. On the other hand Takht Singh wished Ahmadnagar to be retained with his son. The argument given by him was that he was only the Regent to his son who was the chief of Ahmadnagar and, therefore, his election to the *gaddi* of Marwar did not cause any vacancy at the *gaddi*.

14 T Thomson to Sutherland No 183, dt 14 October 1843, R A O Historical Record, 236, *loc cit*, p 41

15 Thoresby to Ludlow No 11 dt 4 January 1844, R A O Historical Record 236, *loc cit*, p 70

16 Ludlow to Thoresby No 30, dt 18 January 1844, R A O Historical Record 236, *loc cit*, p 72

17 French to Thoresby No 208 dt 20 April 1844, R A O Historical Record 236, *loc cit*, p 93

18 Despatch from the Court of Directors dated 19 March, No 9 of 1845 para 17

19 Sir Theo Metcalfe, Agent to the Lt Governor N W P, Delhi No 83, dt 20 December 1851, R A O Historical Records, 236, File No 45 (Jodhpur) old, 1843-52, p 113

of Ahmadnagar A voluminous correspondence between the Supreme Government, the political Agent at Mahi Canta and Sutherland, Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana was carried on The opinion of the chiefs of states of Rajputana taken on the issue revealed their wish that the two principalities of Idar and Ahmadnagar should remain separate and that the latter should pass on to the infant son of Takht Singh,²⁰ under an adoption made by the widow of his elder brother Prithvi Singh²¹ Sutherland also supported Takht Singh claim But it was argued by Idar and supported by Captain Lang, Political Agent, Mahi Canta, that Takht Singh having been summoned to Jodhpur, alongwith his son and having accepted the sovereignty of that state, could not have any claim to Ahmadnagar either in his name or in that of his son Ahmadnagar was characterised as a house without any heir which should, therefore, revert to Idar²² Thus the Governor-General-in-Council decided that Ahmadnagar and its dependencies should revert to Idar and that these two principalities should, as they did previous to A D 1784, again form one state under the Raja of Idar, and that Maharaja Takht Singh should be required to remove his eldest son, Jaswant Singh and the other members of his family, now at Admadnagar, to Jodhpur²³

Maharaja Takht Singh was extremely disappointed with the decision and an attempt was also made to resist it The Political Agent at Mahi Canta informed Malcolm, the Political Agent at Jodhpur on 18th June 1848, that Sheryi, a servant of Maharaja Takht Singh and his 40 Armed followers who had come from Jodhpur were arrested The remainder of the Jodhpur force that happened to be in Ahmadnagar laid down their arms on 17th June and the place

20 R A O Historical Records 239, File No 53 Jodhpur (old), Vol II, *loc cit*, pp 26-27

21 The adoption was made after Takht Singh's accession to Jodhpur

22 Despatch from the Court of Directors, para 16, dt 19 March, No 9 of 1845, R, A O Historical Records 239, File No 53, Jodhpur (Old), Vol II, pp 48-49 Minute by the Hon Mr Willoughby, Member of the Council at Bombay, 6 September 1847, Government of Bombay Selections from Records New Series, No 12, p 163

23 A Malet, Chief Secretary to Government of Bombay to J Sutherland, Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana dt 1 May 1848, R A O Historical Records 241, File No 53, Jodhpur (old), Vol IV, pp 52-53

was taken into the British possession²⁴ The Maharaja, however, explained to Malcolm that Sherji *Kotwal* had been deputed along with some persons to take care of and watch the *zenana palace*. He informed the Political Agent to be rest assured with the friendly intentions of the *Dubbar*²⁵

Approving the decision of the Government that Ahmadnagar must lapse to the state of Idar, the court of Directors communicated on 16th August 1848, that it was conclusively shown that neither by the usages of Rajputana nor of Gujrat, could the Raja of Ahmadnagar accept the throne of Marwar without rendering his former chiefship vacant. Takht Singh's assertion professing himself to be the Regent of Ahmadnagar was characterised as manifestly false, as he was acknowledged and treated by the British authorities as Raja of Ahmadnagar for two years during which the alleged adoption had never been heard of by them²⁶. Even if the adoption had taken place it was invalid, not only for want of sanction of the paramount power, but also because the widow had no longer the right to adopt, after the death of a son of her own, who had actually succeeded to chiefship. Takht Singh and his sons being excluded, the Raja of Idar was entitled to succeed both as the feudal superior and as the nearest collateral heir²⁷.

Takht Singh made a desperate attempt and sent a memorial to the Court of Directors through a firm of solicitors at Calcutta and deputed agents to England to present his claim²⁸. The Court of Directors instructed the Governor-General to apprise the Maharaja of Jodhpur that all the arguments in support of his claim were fully

24 Political Agent at Mahi Satta to Malcolm, Political Agent at Jodhpur dt 18 June 1848, R. A. O. Historical Records 241, File No 53, Jodhpur (old), *loc cit*, p 133

25 Kharita from Takht Singh to Malcolm dt 26 June 1848, R. A. O. Historical Records 241, File No 53, Jodhpur (Old) *loc cit*, p 133

26 Despatch from the Court of Directors, No 30 dt 16 August 1848, R. A. O. Historical Records 241, File No 53, Jodhpur (old), 1847-52, Vol IV, pp 231-234

27 Ibid

28 Despatch from the Court of Directors, No 41, dt 10 December 1851, R. A. O. Historical Records 241, File No 53, Jodhpur (old), 1847-52, Vol IV, pp 259-260

considered and that the decision passed was final and irreversible and that no advantage would be derived by him from the employment of Agents in England, a measure which would occasion only useless expenses and additional disappointment.²⁹ Thus Takht Singh's claim was finally rejected.

Power of Jagirdar's of Marwar and Takht Singh's Attitude towards them

The constitution of Marwar Government was such that it made the Jagirdars quite powerful. Some of these powerful feudatories such as Pokarn, Ahua and Asop and others had from time immemorial been at variance with their sovereign. Some of them had occasionally contested their right of exemption from any interference on the part of the Government. Whenever the Government had been strong they had to succumb, and when it was weak they again resumed their pretensions.

The two principal causes that led to the differences between Takht Singh and his feudatories were the illegal attachment of the villages of the minor chiefs and the arbitrary conduct of the local authorities.³⁰ The avaricious character of Takht Singh had led him to appoint *Hakims* and *Kotwals*, etc., with the understanding that they would realise and remit to the Raja many thousand rupees more than they could legitimately gain. This avarice had been the driving force behind his decision to confiscate, on various frivolous pretexts, the villages of the thakurs. As long as his action was limited to smaller chiefs little notice was taken, but by degrees the more powerful nobles became alarmed and a coalition was formed among them. The leaders were the thakurs of Pokarn, Ahua and Asop who repaired to the capital and laid before the Maharaja a list of grievances.³¹

29 Despatch from the Court of Directors, No 41 dt 10 December 1851, R A O Historical Records 241, File No 53, Jodhpur (old), 1847-52, Vol IV, pp 259-260.

30 Report on Jodhpur affairs for 1850 from Major D A Malcolm, Political Agent Jodhpur to Colonel J Lov, Agent to the Governor-General in Rujpurlana, dt January 1851, R A O Historical Record 250, File No 81, Jodhpur Vol I, 1851, p 6.

31 E I Hardcastle's report dt 1st November 1851, R A O Historical Records 250, File No 81, *loc cit*, pp 35-36.

On the advice of Major D A Malcolm and after a personal interview with the thakurs of Pokaurn, Asop and Ahua, the Maharaja agreed to remove from his council two or three individuals who were obnoxious to the chiefs, to put a stop to the execution of the *hakims* and to inquire into the circumstances under which the villages were attached and to restore such as appeared to have been taken without sufficient cause³²

The Maharaja fulfilled the first part of his agreement but adopted an evasive attitude towards the remaining points. The thakurs attempted to submit a written statement of their grievances to the Maharaja at the end of an interview in which the Maharaja again promised to redress them. However he declined to receive the written statement, but was evidently alarmed at the attitude adopted by the principal thakurs³³

The Maharaja as well as the thakurs tried to gain the Political Agent's support and interposition but Malcolm declined to do so, because he believed that if left to themselves the strength of the parties were sufficiently equally counterposed to make them eventually come to some compromise³⁴. However, Malcolm felt that in arbitrarily attaching villages restored through British agency to their rightful owners, and in allowing his local authorities to endanger the peace of the country by the oppression and illegal acts, the Maharaja had rendered himself answerable to the British Government as the conservators of the general peace of India. He, therefore, requested the Agent to the Governor-General to write a *Kharita* to Takht Singh to restore the villages attached arbitrarily and to put restrictions on his local authorities³⁵. As regards the attitude of the thakurs, Malcolm found it quite strange that they had raised a grievance against the payment

32 Report on Jodhpur Affairs for 1850 from Major D A Malcolm, Political Agent Jodhpur to Col J Low, Agent to the Governor-General in Rajasthan, dt January 1851, R A O Historical Records, 250, File No 81, Jodhpur, 1851, Vol I, p 7

33 Report on Jodhpur Affairs for 1850 from Major D A Malcolm, Political Agent Jodhpur to Col J Low, Agent to the Governor-General in Rajasthan, dt January 1851, R A O Historical Records, 250, File No 81, Jodhpur, 1851, Vol I, pp 8-10

34 Ibid, pp 10-11

35 Ibid., pp 13-14

to Government of 80 Rupees per 1000 of the 'Rekh', to which they had put their seals of agreement only in the previous year³⁶

As a result of this, a *Kharita* was addressed to Takht Singh on 29th August 1851, by Lord the A G G, demanding immediate settlement of the lawful demands of the chiefs, failing which the British Government would be compelled to interfere. The Political Agent³⁷ was instructed to present the *Kharita* to the Maharaja in person and was authorised to insist on the restoration of those village made over by Sutherland in 1839, and confirmed by the British Government, and subsequently confiscated by Takht Singh³⁸

Having impressed upon the Maharaja the urgency to make the settlement himself, Hardcastle sent for the thakurs and informed them that Marwar was equally the Maharaja's home and their own, that both his happiness and their happiness depended on her prosperity. It was impossible for this prosperity and happiness to exist while there were dissensions between the Maharaja and his nobles³⁹. Hardcastle was convinced that if pressure was put on any party, the reconciliation thus accomplished would not be permanent or satisfactory. On the other hand, the Maharaja and the thakurs were anxious to come to an amicable agreement and if things were allowed to take their own course and quickly work their own way, a reconciliation would be real and lasting. However, to expedite the business, the Political Agent refused to see Bijay Singh, the vakil, until he was able to report that some progress had been made⁴⁰

The attitude of the Political Agent had a dramatic effect and the differences between the Maharaja and his thakurs were settled on the very next day in a lengthy meeting lasting over seven hours. The Maharaja heard and gave answers to every grievance which they put forward and promised them to furnish

36 Ibid, p 14

37 Captain F I Hard Castle had taken over the temporary charge of Jodhpur Political Agency on 20th August 1851. Cons. 26 December 1851, No. 354, F & P

38 Report from Offg. Political Agent Jodhpur dt. 1 November 1851, R A O Historical Records 250, File No. 81 Jodhpur, Vol I, p. 35

39 Ibid, pp 35-35

40 Report from Offg. Political Agent Jodhpur dated 1st November 1851 R A O Historical Records 250, File No. 81, Jodhpur 1851, Vol I, pp 37-38

written copies of these answers. The promise was fulfilled within two days when the written documents were received by the thakurs without objection and the meeting ended in a cordial atmosphere, when they spent the rest of the time in drinking together.⁴¹

Although the differences were settled for the time being yet there was a persistent danger of their appearance in future mainly because Takht Singh placed his confidence and treated with especial marks of his favour, the men who accompanied him from Ahmadnagar to the injury of his subjects of Marwar. These men from Ahmadnagar had become personally obnoxious to the thakurs. There were about eight or ten *Gujaratis* who were the confidential advisers of the Maharaja and the thakurs felt that their expulsion from Jodhpur was absolutely necessary for the preservation of a good understanding between them and the sovereign.⁴²

The Political Agent endorsed the sentiments of the thakurs and observed that in no age had any foreign prince, who even by right of conquest had acquired possession of a new kingdom been able to advance his own countrymen and favourites to the injury of the original inhabitants of the country without creating violent opposition and ill-feeling. In the case of Takht Singh the ill-feeling must be even greater, since he was elected by the united votes of the thakurs of Marwar to the throne and they had welcomed him with great affection.⁴³ But the thakurs were utterly disappointed when they found themselves excluded from any share in the management of the country. Their advice was never asked nor their presence sought by the Raja. For Takht Singh the advice of his foreign favourites only mattered.⁴⁴

Although the differences between the principal thakurs and the Maharaja were settled yet some of them who were still discontented sent a representation to the Agent to the Governor-General. The

41. Ibid., pp. 38-39.

42. Report from Offg. Political Agent Jodhpur dated 1st November 1851 R. A. O. Historical Records 250, File No. 81, Jodhpur 1851, Vol. I, pp. 40-41.

43. Ibid., p. 42.

44. Ibid., p. 42.

thakurs of Asop and Bhadrajun were the only important persons who had signed it. Reporting on the matter, the Political Agent at Jodhpur commented that the representations were based on personal reasons rather than sound grievances. The Asop thakur had hardly arrived at years of discretion and was instigated by his *Kamdar* because he had failed to get a village restored to himself.⁴⁵ The thakur of Bhadrajun was angry with the Maharaja because he had failed to give orders for the punishment of the *Charan* who made an attempt on his life.⁴⁶ The cause of the delay as explained by Takht Singh was that some of the chiefs wished him to order the imprisonment for life whereas the Maharaja considered the period of seven or eight years to be sufficient. In reality it made no difference for the *Charan* was an old man and was not likely to survive long. But the Maharaja thought that justice should be the same for all, whether rich or poor. He did not wish, by giving an order for imprisonment for life, to establish a precedent which would oblige him to punish with equal severity, every man who raised his hand against another.⁴⁷

The Political Agent appreciated the sense of justice observed by the Maharaja and informed the Governor-General's Agent that other thakurs, i.e. Pokaurn, Ahua, Ras Raipur and Kuchaman were satisfied. Their only complaint was against the influence of the foreign element on the Maharaja.⁴⁸

Coercive Measures against Bagri Thakur

The relations between Takht Singh and the thakur of Bagri had also become quite strained with the result that coercive measures were prepared against him in 1846. The immediate cause then was his refusal to send a contingent of Bagri Horse for service in Mallani, as was being done by other chiefs. Divergent views were then expressed by Sutherland, the Agent to the Governor-General and Greathead, the Political Agent at Jodhpur, on the attitude of the thakur.

45 Letter from Political Agent Jodhpur to the Agent to the Governor-General dated 6th November 1851, R. A. O. Historical Records 250, File No. 81, Jodhpur 1851, Vol. I

46 Ibid

47 Ibid

48 Ibid

Sutherland expressed doubts as to the feudal chiefs of Marwar being obliged to send troops to quarters where the Maharaja himself was not present, or on duties regarding which they had not been consulted ⁴⁹ Greathead completely endorsed the stand taken by the Maharaja on his right to demand the service of the troops from his chiefs. However, the thakur, getting the intelligence of the contemplated coercive measures by the Maharaja, submitted to the demand and despatched the desired troops to serve in Mallani in the year 1846 ⁵⁰

The aversion of the crisis was a temporary phase. It ultimately culminated in more serious differences in the year 1854. The Maharaja complained of the insolent attitude of the thakur of Bagri and his recusancy in refusing to pay his '*Rekh*' for the last eight years. The Political Agent was informed on 18th September 1854, through Simrat Raj the *vakil*, of the contemplated move to despatch force against Bagri thakur in order to coerce him into submission ⁵¹

The Political Agent found it difficult to advise the Maharaja to desist from the move because he himself had been pressing the *Darbar* to pay up Rs 98,000/- which fell due to the British Government on 1st September 1854. It would have been the height of inconsistency, on his part to object to any measures which might be necessary to compel payment of the just demands of the *Darbar* on the thakurs ⁵²

The force was to be assembled at Sojat under the command of Kushal Raj for operations against the thakur of Bagri. It was to consist of about 2000 infantry and 1500 horse and eight guns. In addition to this two swivels (guns) were also to be with the force ⁵³

The Political Agent reported that the contemplated force would be ample and Kushal Raj, the man selected to command it, was

49 Sutherland to Greathead, dt 21 May 1846, Cons 26 December 1846, No 359, F & P

50 Greathead to Sutherland, dt 14 May 1846, Cons 26 December 1846, No 358, F & P

51 Shakespeare to Lawrence dt 18 September 1854, Cons 10 November 1854, No 82, F & P

52 Ibid

53 Shakespeare to Lawrence, Letter No 60, dt 22 September 1854, Cons 10 November 1854, No 84, F & P

decidedly the very best person Bagri was ten miles south of Sojat and there was no fortification except a wall round some parts of the village. The thakur of Bagri was said to have no guns, but some *Jingals* (muskets) and about 650 persons to support him.

The Agent to the Governor-General communicated to the Political Agent at Jodhpur through a despatch dated 25 September 1854 that, "the less we have to say in the matter the better". However, he was advised that if communication becomes necessary with the thakur, then he was to commend his unqualified submission and to tell him clearly that he need expect no British support and warn him that if he fought he would probably lose his jagir and possibly his life⁵⁴. The right of the Maharaja to punish the thakur severely was admitted by Lawrence, yet he instructed that if the Political Agent was consulted by the Maharaja in the matter, then he was to advise a treatment of mercy, as long as there was no fighting. In that case sequestration of the estate until the expenses incurred and all arrears with interest at 12 per cent was thought to be the adequate punishment. But if the bloody hostilities were commenced, then the Agent to the Governor-General recommended non-interference by the Political Agent against the confiscation of the estate and a small provision being made for the family of the thakur⁵⁵.

As planned Kushal Raj, the commander of the Maharaja's force, advanced and occupied Bagri on 27th September 1854. The thakur had moved out with his females before the arrival of the force leaving behind his son and a few defenders. At the appearance of the *Durbar* troops, the villagers ran away and the defenders took a position in the thakur's house. A rush was made on them and they were taken prisoners and disarmed without a shot being fired and a sword cut being struck⁵⁶.

On getting the information that Bagri was occupied without bloodshed, the Agent to the Governor-General for the states of

54 Lawrence to Shakespeare, Letter No 668, dt 25 September 1854, Cons 10 November 1854, No 85, F & P.

55 Ibid.

56 Shakespeare to Lawrence dt 28 September 1854, Cons 10 November 1854, No 91, F & P.

Rajputana expressed his pleasure and desired the Political Agent "to observe strict non-interference as long as the Maharaja's acts do not go beyond confiscation and simple imprisonment" 57

Takht Singh's Attempt to Coerce the Thakur of Kantalia

Encouraged by the success of his coercive measures against the thakur of Bagri, Maharaja Takht Singh thought of despatching a force against the thakur of Kantalia also with whom his relations were strained. It was charged that the thakur had been guilty of the grossest oppression to a *Mahajan*, whom he had beaten and robbed 58. The Political Agent was led by the Maharaja to believe that the thakur of Kantalia was a rebel who would neither pay '*Rekh*' nor do '*Chakri*' 59.

Apprehending the advance of the Maharaja's force the thakur of Kantalia communicated with the Political Agent at Jodhpur through one of his relations named Swarup Singh. An enquiry into the matter by the Political Agent revealed that the thakur had paid the '*Rekh*' regularly and if any amount was found outstanding he was willing to clear it without delay. Furthermore, his *Sawars* were then actually serving in Mallani, 60 and a village of Kantalia was occupied by a darbar *zubtee* for the last five months. Swarup Singh explained that the reason for the Maharaja's anger was a boundary dispute he had with a *Khalsa* village and that the case of torturing the *Mahajan* had been trumped up and that the individual was induced through money payment, to complain against the thakur 61.

Thereupon Shakespeare informed Swarup Singh and wrote to the Kantalia thakur that if '*Rekh*' had been paid and service performed, he did not think any force was coming up against him and that for all the matters he must give his account to the *Darbar* according to

57 Lawrence to Shakespeare dt 7 October 1854, Cons 10 November 1854, No 92, F & P

58 Shakespeare to Lawrence dt 21 September 1854, Cons 10 November 1854, No 88, F & P,

59 Ibid.

60 Shakespeare to Lawrence dt 21 September 1854, Cons 10 November 1854, No 88, F & P

61. Ibid

the old established customs in such cases. At the same time he distinctly explained to the Maharaja's *lakhl* that since the thakur's contingent was employed in *Darbar*'s service no force should move against Kantalia. Instructions were accordingly sent by the Maharaja to Kushal Raj, the commander of his force.⁶²

The Agent to the Governor-General approved Shakespeare's proceedings and observed, "In this affair the Maharaja appears to be wrong as in the Bagri one he was right, I hope he will understand that while we gladly and cordially support his authority when he is right, we are equally bound to protect against attempts at tyranny, especially where they involve the movements of troops and possible blood-shed."⁶³

Conquest of Sindh by the British in 1843 and its influence on Marwar

While things were taking the shape of disturbance in Marwar, in 1839, the territory of the Amirs of Sindh had been brought within the pale of the British Political control by Lord Auckland. The port of Karachi had been seized and the river thrown open to British commerce. Taking advantage of the delay in the payment of tribute, Sir Charles Napier pressed the Sindh rulers to sign a new treaty framed on the basis of exchanging tribute for territory. The Amirs signed it but mustered their troops and attacked the British Residency at their capital. Sir Charles Napier retaliated by marching the British forces and achieved a decisive victory at Miani, in February 1843. The result was the deposition of the Sindh Amirs and the transfer of their territory to the British dominion.⁶⁴

After achieving the conquest of the Sindh, the aim of British policy was to strengthen the friendship with the powers situated on the borders of that state, so as to deprive the Amirs of any sympathy or a place of sanctuary. Consequently, the Governor-General desired Sir Charles Napier, the Governor of Sindh, to promise a sum

62. Ibid.

63. Lawrence to Shakespeare dt 29 September 1854, Cons. 10 November 1854, No. 49, F & P.

64. L 1, 311, Sir Alfred. *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India*, pp. 320-321.

of Rs 50,000/- to Bikaner, payable yearly by the Amir of Mirpur in Sindh. It was proposed to give to Jodhpur and Jaisalmer some portions of the territory of the desert adjoining theirs.⁶⁵ In this context a proposal for the restoration of Umarkot to Jodhpur was also made. Jodhpur's claim was based on its possession of Umarkot from Maharaja Vijay Singh's time to the year 1813, when it was lost to the chiefs of Sindh due to the treacherous conduct of certain officers of the state.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the British Government was quite reluctant towards the restoration of Umarkot to Jodhpur mainly due to its strategic situation commanding the passage of the desert between Hyderabad (Sindh) and Barmer in Jodhpur. Furthermore, the British authorities were doubtful about Jodhpur's capability of exercising effective control and supervision over Umarkot, considering the great distance at which it was situated from Jodhpur.⁶⁷ British failure to restore Umarkot caused considerable disappointment to Jodhpur. At last in the year 1847, the British Government finally made up its mind to retain Umarkot and to satisfy the Jodhpur claim by offering a compensation for the same. It was offered in the form of a reduction of Rs.10,000/- yearly in the British claim of *Sawar Kharch* from Jodhpur. The offer was not palatable to the Maharaja because it would have benefitted the thakurs who were committed to pay the amount of *Sawar Kharch*. Takht Singh suggested that the amount be reduced from the tribute payable by Jodhpur.⁶⁸ The suggestion was accepted by the Government and the annual tribute payable by Jodhpur was reduced from Rs 1,08,000/- to Rs 98,000/- from the year 1847.⁶⁹

The conquest of Sind by the British in the year 1843 proved to be of a great significance to Marwar. Its border with Sindh had been disturbed and disputed for a long time causing a great strain on the

65 Governor-General to Sir Charles Napier dt 15 March 1843, Cons 7 October 1843, No 16, F & P

66 This matter was raised by Vyas Bishnu Ram before Sir Charles Metcalfe while negotiating the Treaty of 1818. See Chapter I

67 P. French, Political Agent, Jodhpur to Thoresby, dt 4 October 1844, Cons 6 March 1847, No 32, F & P

68 Secretary, Government to Agent to the Governor-General, Ajmer dt 17 June 1847, Cons 26 June 1847, No 65, F & P

69 Ibid

relations between the two states. The conquest of Sindh by the British established peace and orderly state of affairs on the borders of Marwar and the demarcation of the common boundary between Jodhpur and Sindh received a serious consideration of the British Government.⁷⁰ In 1846 the Jodhpur Government protested against the Mirpur authorities for laying boundary marks at wrong places and consequently depriving Marwar of six villages and four hamlets in the pargana of Sheo.⁷¹ Consequently, the British Government decided to appoint a boundary commission to go into the whole issue of the demarcation of the boundary between Jodhpur and Sindh. Lt J R Becher and Captain C F Cunningham were appointed as boundary commissioners in the year 1849.⁷² The commission adopted a broad and liberal approach avoiding the strictly legal and narrow line. Showing a great generosity to Jodhpur, all the places, that were either under its possession at no distant period or had made yearly payment to her, were included on her side. The difficult task of demarcating the boundary was achieved with admirable success and to the entire satisfaction of the Jodhpur state. The Government approved the decisions of the boundary commission in January 1851.⁷³

The Rising of Doong Singh and Jawahar Singh and Marwar's attitude towards it

In the reign of Takht Singh the marauding activities of Doong Singh and Jawahar Singh were not free from significance. Doong Singh and Jawahar Singh were the Shekhawat chiefs of the robbers gang that plundered not only the rich capitalists but also ravaged the British territories, attempted daring raids on British military establishments and plundered the Government treasuries. Although they were bandit chiefs engaged in robberies and plunder, yet they

70 G 1 Brown Secretary Sindh Government to Captain Jackson, Political Superintendent Barmer dt 27 March 1844, Cons 25 May 1844, No 60, F & Sec.

71 Greathed to Sutherland dt 18 April 1848, Cons 6 June 1848, No 290, F & P.

72 Secretary Government to Col J Low Agent to the Governor-General dt 16 January 1851, Cons 31 January 1851, No 177, F & P.

73 Ibid.

had earned a great popularity among the masses chiefly due to the fact that the British establishments and rich capitalists were their targets. Influenced by the anti-British feeling, people hailed their attacks on the British and even extended their support and protection to Doong Singh and Jawahar Singh. Their activities were not strictly speaking, a part of any national uprising, and yet they had become almost legendary figures.

On 5th February 1846, Doong Singh and Jawahar Singh were sentenced by the Court of Vakils of Rajputana, presided over by Major Thoresby, the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General, to suffer imprisonment with the banishment for life, for having been concerned in the plunder of property of three lakhs of rupees, belonging to a merchant of Fatehpur.⁷⁴ They were lodged in the Jail At Agra. But they were released by a band of their followers coming from Sikar, numbering about thirty. The night of 28th December 1846, being the day of *Mohurium*, on which occasion the '*Taj'as*' were taken out accompanied by the noise of drummers and fire arms, that being the most opportune time the Jail was attacked and the prisoners were liberated. Their escape from the strongly guarded place was hailed by people evincing anti-British attitude.⁷⁵ Their dramatic escape was followed by the sensational attack and plunder of the Pay Office Treasury at the British cantonment of Nasirabad on 18th June 1847 by Doongji. About four or five hundred of their followers took part in this attack, killing six of the guards and wounding many and setting fire to the Guard House.⁷⁶

It was a terrible blow to the British prestige and most strenuous efforts were then made to capture them. All the states of Rajputana were urged to extend their help and co-operation to the British in their attempt to capture the bandit chiefs.

74 Lt Col C G DIXON, Superintendent Ajmer to Sutherland, Agent to the Governor-General, dt 1st May 1848, Enclosure No 2, Cons 26 August 1848, No 101, F & P

75 *Ibid*

76 Lt Col C G DIXON, Superintendent Ajmer to Sutherland, Agent to the Governor-General, dt, 1st May 1848, Enclosure No 2, Cons 26 August 1848, No 101, F & P

Jawahar Singh moved towards Bikaner⁷⁷ and Doong Singh towards Marwar. On 9th August 1847,⁷⁸ intelligence having furnished by killedar Anar Singh, about the presence of 'Doongji' near Didwana, Lt Monk Masson supported by Jodhpur horsemen attempted in vain a hot pursuit.⁷⁹ Masson suspected that the son of the thakur of Kuchaman was in collusion with the robber chief and helped in his escape.⁸⁰

Doong Singh was apprehended on 28th December 1847⁸¹ at the village of Pattowda in Jaipur by Lt Edmond J Harcastle, Assistant Agent to the Governor-General, supported by a party of thakurs and horsemen from Jodhpur. When the party reached near the room where Doongji was, they found him with his drawn knife and sword in his hands, declaring that he would never be taken alive, but stab himself, should anyone advance a step to seize him. He had actually given a wound to himself. After a conference of nearly an hour, Doongji consented to lay down his arms on the promise of his being taken to Jodhpur.⁸² This promise was given by the chiefs of Marwar and Harcastle.⁸³ On this he laid his arms and then he was arrested.

His arrest was followed by a good deal of correspondence between Sutherland and Mr Greathead, Political Agent at Jodhpur, as well as with Lt Harcastle, on the subject of Doong Singh's removal to Jodhpur for trial.⁸⁴ However, the Governor-General's

77 Jawahar Singh was apprehended to Bikaner on 9th July 1847 by Lt Showers and a party of the horsemen of that State.

78 Monk Masson, Assistant Agent to the Governor-General to Sutherland, Agent to the Governor-General, dt 17 August 1847, Cons 31 December 1847, No 269, F & P.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Lt Col C G Dixoo, Superintendent Ajmer to Sutherland, Agent to the Governor-General, dt 1st May 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 101, F & P.

82 E J Harcastle to Sutherland dt 20 June 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 103, F & P.

83 Ibid, Sutherland to I Thornton Secretary Government of N W P dt 15 May 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 101, F & P.

84 Sutherland to I Thornton, Secretary, Government of N W P dt 15 May 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 101, F & P.

instructions desiring Doong Singh to be sent to Ajmer for trial settled the matter. Maharaja Takht Singh objected to Doong Singh being carried to Ajmer via Jodhpur. Thereupon he was carried straight from Nagaur to Ajmer, escorted by Lt Hardcastle, the chiefs and troops of Jodhpur state who had captured him.⁸⁵

The capture and removal of Doongji to Ajmer generated a wave of popular feeling in his favour. Excited inhabitants of every town that he passed, thronged the streets and housetops to have a glimpse of Doongji. The people in general and the inhabitants of Ajmer in particular showered their expression of hatred and dislike on the Marwar troops who aided in his capture. They were hooted and even stones pelted at them whenever they appeared during their two day's stay at Ajmer.⁸⁶

After his trial at Ajmer, the judgement that 'Doong Singh suffer death being hanged by the neck until he be dead' was recommended by C G Dixon, Superintendent Ajmer on 1st May 1848, for sanction by the Superior authorities.⁸⁷

The decision caused a wave of popular resentment not only against the British Government but also against the rulers of Jodhpur and Jaipur.⁸⁸ Maharaja Takht Singh represented to Sutherland and requested that the British promise to hand over Doong Singh to Jodhpur, should be fulfilled. Sutherland had recommended the acceptance of the Jodhpur Maharaja's request but the Government turned down the proposal and characterised Sutherland's proceedings as objectionable.⁸⁹

Sutherland was completely convinced about the correctness of his views and he, therefore, made frantic efforts to make the Government revise its stand. He explained that the ruling princes and people in general shared the sentiments of the Jodhpur chief. When the

⁸⁵ Ibid

⁸⁶ Lt Hardcastle to Sutherland dt 13 January 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 101, F & P

⁸⁷ C G Dixon to Sutherland dt 1 May 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 101, F & P

⁸⁸ Jodhpur Maharaja had aided and it was Jaipur territory where Doong Singh was captured

⁸⁹ Sutherland to Secretary, Government of India, dt 11 April 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 99, F & P.

matter was discussed at a public *Darbar* at Bikaner, at which Sutherland was present, great anxiety was expressed about the honour of the young Maharaja of Jodhpur, for the surrender of a person for punishment to another state, involved a point of very delicate nature in the estimation of the Rajput world ⁹⁰

Reporting the expression of similar sentiments at the court of Alwar *Darbar*, Sutherland again wrote to the Government that Maharao Raja Bheem Singh of Alwar and others all entertained the hope that out of consideration for the honour of both Jodhpur and Jaipur, the Governor-General would consent to Doong Singh's being surrendered for life imprisonment in the fortress of Jodhpur. Earnestly requesting for the acceptance of the request, Sutherland assured that Doong Singh would be in safe keeping at Jodhpur or that if he escaped, he would be apprehended within twenty-four hours.⁹¹

Sutherland pleaded to the Government of the N W P. that Doong Singh at the time of his surrender was given promise, both by Hardecastle and Marwar chiefs that he would be carried to Jodhpur. The Maharaja, the chiefs and Hardecastle felt sensibly that their promise to Doong Singh had been violated ⁹² On taking leave of Hardecastle Doong Singh reproached him bitterly for his breach of promise. Sutherland appealed that the British could not in the estimation of the people of this country, afford to have the promise of a British officer forfeited, under almost any circumstances ⁹³ He suggested that the only remedy left was that Doong Singh after trial and sentence at Ajmer should be surrendered to Maharaja Takht Singh for life imprisonment in the fortress of Jodhpur ⁹⁴

90 Sutherland to Secretary, Government of India, dt 11 April 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 99, F & P

91 Sutherland to Secretary, Government of India, dt 15 May 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 100 F & P

92 Sutherland to Secretary, Government of India dt 15 May 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 101 F & P

93 Sutherland to Secretary, Government of N W P dt 15 May 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 101, F & P

94 Ibid

The case of Doong Singh, in the context of Sutherland's recommendation pointing out the promise of Harcastle was reconsidered by the Governor-General in Council in July 1848.⁹⁵ Lord Dalhousie observed that, "now, when the princes of Jodhpur and Jeypore so interpret our promise, when our Resident informs that the promise of Harcastle was undoubtedly considered by people as assuring Doong Singh's life, I cannot satisfy myself of anything but that we ought to remit the sentence of death, and deliver him to the Raja of Jodhpur for Imprisonment"⁹⁶ Consequently the Governor-General in Council took the decision to remit the sentence of death on Doong Singh.⁹⁷

Accordingly, the Agent to the Governor-General was directed by the Governor-General, to inform the Maharaja of Jodhpur that although he did not so understand the promise given to Doong Singh, yet the British being ever studious of observing its pledged words to the latter would in observance of the pledge, deliver Doong Singh to the Maharaja's keeping for imprisonment for life at Jodhpur, but with a distinct intimation that the Government would hold the Maharaja responsible for his safe custody.⁹⁸ Consequently, Doong Singh was removed to Jodhpur in August 1848 where he was kept unchained under surveillance in the fort of Jodhpur.

The history of Doong Singh and Jawahar Singh, their acts, their exploits their escape and recapture, leave no doubt that they were chiefs of the robbers yet it was strangely true that their popularity among the people and even princes was also well established. Strong manifestations of public feeling had been exhibited against Maharaja Takht Singh in consequence of his having aided the British in the capture of 'Doongji'.⁹⁹ Takht Singh's subsequent efforts

95 Minute by Lord Dalhousie, dt 31st July 1848 on 'Doongar Singh a noted free booter', Cons 26 August 1848, No 107, I & P

96 Ibid

97 Ibid

98 Secretary Government to H C Showers, Assistant Agent to the Governor-General Rajputana incharge, dt 5 August 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 108, I & P

99 Minute by Lord Dalhousie, dt 31 July 1848 on 'Doongar Singh, a noted free booter', Cons 26 August 1848, No 107, I & P

and the spontaneous support given to him by other *Darbars* of Rajputana, for the removal of Doong Singh to Jodhpur compelled Sutherland to write to the Supreme Government that the "question belongs to Political rather than the civil department"¹⁰⁰ The revision of his previous orders and the remission of the death sentence to life imprisonment and agreeing to his removal to Jodhpur by the Governor-General, was such an extraordinary decision that it points again to the fact that Doong Singh's popularity and the involvement of political issues did exercise a great influence¹⁰¹

Significance and Importance of Takht Singh's Tour Through Rajputana

Having felt himself free from some of the domestic affairs Takht Singh felt like visiting places of pilgrimage and on 20th February 1855 he set out on an extensive tour through Rajputana and Northern India. He was accompanied by his *Ranis* and *Maharaj-Kumars* and a large train of followers and attendants. A grand reception was accorded to him on his arrival at Jaipur on 20th March 1855 by Maharaja Ram Singh. Having spent twenty-four days at Jaipur he reached Haridwar via Delhi. On his return journey he visited Mathura, Deeg and Pushkar and reached Jodhpur in June 1855¹⁰²

Takht Singh's tour through Rajputana and Northern India was a significant event in the history of Marwar. The fact that the Maharaja could embark upon such an ambitious pilgrimage, causing his absence from the state for about four months, shows the confidence of the sovereign and the sense of security and stability he enjoyed. Takht Singh and the state officers who accompanied him had a rare opportunity of meeting and exchanging views with various Indian princes and British Officers. It resulted into an enlarged atmosphere of cordiality, and familiarity enhancing the position and prestige

100 Sutherland to Secretary, Government of India, dt 15 May 1848, Cons 26 August 1848, No 99, F & P

101 The reason given for the change in the decision of the Government was the promise given by Hardcastle to Doong Singh

102 Ren, V N, *Marwar Ka Itihas*, Vol II, p 447. When Takht Singh reached Jaipur about 28,000 persons were accompanying him

of Marwar. The tour brought the Maharaja and a large number of his subjects into contact with new ideas and different types of people. The result was that their outlook was changed and the progressive views were adopted in Marwar without much difficulty, paving the way for the development of a progressive state. The tour was estimated to have cost more than ten lakhs of rupees, which showed the economic progress and prosperity of Marwar.

Reappearance of the Differences Between the Maharaja and his Nobles

But all this was a show of patching up of difference between the Maharaja and his nobles that had developed into a serious dispute by the beginning of 1857. A petition signed by the thakurs of Gular, Asop, Alnawas, Marot, Borawar, Bagri, Sojat and Budsoo was sent to the Government complaining of Maharaja's violation of the engagements entered into by him, his retention of the foreign favourites, his unjust exactions and sequestrations of hereditary jagirs.¹⁰³

The Political Agent at Jodhpur had also reported the disputes to the Agent to the Governor-General in February 1857. He pointed out that the thakurs of Gular, Asop and Alnawas were the ring leaders and had combined to resist the demands of the Maharaja. About these demands Shakespeare observed that only one was unjust and unwarranted. It was the payment of Rs 70,000/- demanded as *Hukam-namah* or succession duty from the thakur of Marot, for two successions that took place within a short period of five years. The Political Agent thought that *Hukam-namah* should be realised only once in ten years and that the amount should not exceed 3/4th of the 'Rekh'. According to this calculation the amount payable by the thakur of Marot came to Rs 28,000/- instead of Rs 70,000/-.¹⁰⁴

The jagirs of the remaining thakurs had been sequestrated due to their refusal to pay either *Hukam-namah* or 'Rekh'. When the state forces proceeded to occupy villages to enforce the payment of the arrears of 'Rekh' for four and a half years, the Gular thakur offered an armed resistance.

¹⁰³ Cons 22 May 1857, No 82, F & P

¹⁰⁴ Cons 12 June 1857, Nos 201-204, F & P

Being summoned by the Political Agent to Jodhpur, all the rebellious thakurs came in a body. Thereupon the Agent advised them to separate and to tender their submission to the Maharaja and attend severely, when called upon by the *Darbar* for the adjustments of their claims.¹⁰⁵ The thakurs refused to break off their combination. Meanwhile intelligence was received of the encounter of Marwar troops with the retainers of Gular who were aided by men from Ajmer, Mewar and Jaipur.¹⁰⁶ Colonel Lawrence issued instructions to the Political Agents to take necessary action to check the outside interference in the internal matters of Marwar.¹⁰⁷ No heed was paid to the solicitations of the thakurs for British interposition. The British attitude made it clear to the thakurs that the British moral support was on the side of the Maharaja. The proceedings of Colonel Lawrence and the Political Agent at Jodhpur were approved by the Government.¹⁰⁸

Meanwhile the list of thakurs in revolt had swollen and included some powerful chiefs also. The thakurs who were instrumental in electing and inviting Takht Singh to occupy the throne of Jodhpur in 1843 had gradually assumed rebellious conduct. The strained relations between them and their sovereign had reached its climax by the year 1857, when Takht Singh had assembled a strong force to reduce them to submission. However, the Maharaja's efforts to suppress the rebellious nobility were hindered due to the out-break of general violence against the British¹⁰⁹ throughout the country, and the consequent demand on the Maharaja to put his forces at the disposal of the British.¹¹⁰

105 Lawrence to Edmonstone dt 12 June 1857, Cons 12 June 1857, No 204, F & P

106 Memorial of Mertha thakurs of Marwar to Edmonstone, Secretary Government dt 1 May 1857, Cons 12 June 1857, No 203, F & P

107 Cons 12 June 1857, No 204, F & P

108 Edmonstone to Lawrence dt 12 June 1857, Cons 12 June 1857, No 209, F & P

109 Mutiny of 1857

110 A Letter from Masson to Takht Singh dt 22 May, 1857, R. A. O. Historical Records, 38, File No I, Mutiny Vol I, P Branch, pp 112-113

CHAPTER IV

MARWAR AND THE MUTINY

The Shadow of Mutiny in Rajputana and the British Preparations

The intelligence of the out-break of mutiny at Meerut was first received by Colonel George St Patric Lawrence, Officiating Agent to the Governor-General, for the states of Rajputana,¹ at Mount Abu on 19th May 1857. He was naturally alarmed to find the grave situation in which he was placed. The regular troops quartered in Rajputana, at that time, belonged principally to the Bengal Army whose loyalty was most doubtful and there was no European soldier except a few sick and invalid ones at the Mount Abu Sanatorium.² The nearest British troops were at Deesa, at a distance of one hundred

1 George St P. Lawrence, *Reminiscences of Forty Three Years in India*, p. 278, Colonel George St. Patric Lawrence had reached Mount Abu in April 1857, after his appointment as the Offg. Agent to the Governor-General.

2 Lawrence to E. Immonstone, Secretary, Government of India, Foreign Department with the G. G. No. 107A-784A dt 27 July 1858, R. A. O. Historical records 53, File No. 10, Mutiny, Vol. II, p. 87, paras 2 & 3, Report of the Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of the Staff, Army Head Quarters, pp. 50-51. According to this report the placement of the garrisons in Rajputana were —

Nasrabad—No. 6 Native Infantry Battery, 15th and 30th Bengal Native Infantry, 1st Bombay Cavalry (Lancers)

Neemuch—4th Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Native Horse Artillery; a wing, 1st Bengal Cavalry, 72nd Bengal Native Infantry, 7th Infantry, Gwalier Contingent

Deoli—The Kotah Contingent

Beawar—The Mhairwara Battalion

Erinpura—The Jodhpur Legion

Khetwara—The Mewar Bhil Corps and a troop, 1st Bengal Cavalry

and thirty miles from Nasirabad³ Lawrence, immediately sent an urgent requisition to the Brigade at Dhesa for a Light Field Force, to proceed with all expedition to Nasirabad⁴ The security of Ajmer Magazine was itself a big problem. The walls of the fort were old and rotten. It was situated close to the large and thickly populated city of Ajmer and was commanded by the heights outside the town, and contained an arsenal large enough to supply the troops in the whole of Rajputana, capable of furnishing a siege train of great strength, guns, ammunition besides an immense quantity of treasure⁵ However, Colonel Dixon, the Commissioner of Ajmer, had taken prompt measure to relieve the two companies of the Bengal Native Infantry (who subsequently mutinied) and replaced it with that of the Mers, who proved utmost loyal. The surprise action was performed due to the forced march of thirty seven miles by Lt. Carnell, with two companies of Mers from Beawar to Ajmer⁶ The Agent to the Governor-General himself moved to Ajmer from where he directed the proceedings in an exemplary manner that spontaneously inspired confidence in others. At Ajmer he never allowed the routine of his civil duties to be interrupted, "but he held open courts, almost daily visiting the city, where, in spite of the fierce and sullen looks of the disaffected, he was always regarded with respect"⁷

Takht Singh and his Co-operation with the British Authority

Another important precautionary step taken by Lawrence was that he issued a proclamation on 23rd May to the chiefs of the states of Rajputana calling on them to preserve peace within their territories, to intercept rebel fugitives and to collect their troops on the frontiers of their respective states, so as to be available, if required, to assist

3 Lawrence to Edmonstone, No 107A-784A, dt 27 July 1858, R A O Historical Records 53, File No 10, Mutiny, Vol II, p 78, paras 2 & 3 Report of the Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of the Staff, Army Head Quarters, p 51

4 Ibid, p 51

5 Ibid, George Lawrence, *Reminiscences of Forty Three Years in India*, p 279

6 Report of the Intelligence Branch, p 52 *loc cit*, Colonel Traver, G H A Chapter of the Indian Mutiny, pp 4-5

7 Colonel Malleon *Indian Mutiny*, Vol IV, p 386 (1889)

the Paramount Power.⁸ The response from the chiefs of Rajaputana was prompt and favourable. The Maharaja of Jodhpur came forward with most friendly assurances and professions of aid. Takht Singh knew it well that the continuance of his authority, prestige and power in Marwar depended upon the British support. Consequently soon after the receipt of the tidings of the mutiny at Meerut and Delhi, the offer of aid was made of his own accord and without any hesitation to Monk Masson, Political Agent at Jodhpur on 21st May, even before the proclamation was issued.⁹ Takht Singh observed, "I hasten to assure you that this state is heart and soul ready to give you assistance you will command me, remembering that our interests are identical".¹⁰

The next day a requisition was made on the Maharaja of Jodhpur by Monk Masson as desired by the Agent to the Governor-General.¹¹ It required that a mounted post be established by the Maharaja between Beawar and Pali and a force, consisting of cavalry and infantry, be posted at some place on the frontier of Marwar, as near as possible, to Ajmer, to act in case of an emergency. Besides this a force composed of quotas furnished by the thakurs or other troops be stationed on the frontier near Beawar.¹² Monk Masson, accordingly, suggested that two or four *sawars* should be stationed every ten miles between Beawar and Pali, with instructions to convey to Pali any letters, or carry out any orders that they may receive from the authorities at Beawar, Ajmer or Nasirabad and vice versa; and also to protect if necessary, the Europeans who might travel by that

8 Enclosed with a letter from George St P. Lawrence to Secretary to the Government of Bombay dt 21 May 1857, R A O Historical Records 38, File No 1, Mutiny Vol I, P Branch, pp 39-48, Cons 26 June 1857, No 115, F & Sec

9 Masson to George St P. Lawrence No 231 dt 22 May 1857, R A O. Historical Records 38, File No 1, Mutiny Vol I, P Branch, p 57

10 Translation of a kharita from Takht Singh to Lawrence received by Political Agent Jodhpur on 22 May 1857 R A O Historical Records 38, File No 1, *loc cit* pp 110-111

11 M. Masson to Takht Singh dt 22 May 1857 in reply to His Highness letter of the same date offering aid to the British R A O Historical Records 38, File No 1, *loc cit*, pp 112-113

12 Ibid

route Similarly a Jodhpur force consisting of artillery, cavalry and infantry then stationed at Gular, was suggested by the Political Agent to be posted at Alniwas and Ladpura Masson ended his letter with the advice that the largest possible force with the minimum loss of time should be assembled at the border and its commander Kushal Raj Singhvi be ordered by the Maharaja to follow the instructions issued by the Commissioner, Ajmer, and the Brigadier Commanding at Nasirabad¹³

Reporting the immediate compliance of the requisition to the Political Agent on May 25, Maharaja Takht Singh conveyed his sentiments that since the tidings of the mutiny reached him 'his heart had been full of anxiety and trepidation' and expressed his confidence that such out-breaks were always short-lived and that the rebels would soon be punished¹⁴ Orders were sent by the Maharaja to Kushal Raj Singhvi, who commanded a Field Force of 5000 horse and foot, with 20 guns, to encamp at Alniwas with 2000 horse and foot and six guns and to obey all orders received from the Commissioner Ajmer, leaving 2800 horse and foot with 12 guns to coerce the rebellious chiefs who had joined and assisted the thakur of Gular¹⁵ A force of 200 horse and two guns was detached to Burr a village on the frontier of Merwara. The Maharaja promised to reinforce the detachment at Burr by sending 500 horse and foot more Further more in case of emergency the officers of the remaining force at Gular were ordered to act on the requisition of the Commissioner Ajmer, without reference to Jodhpur¹⁶

On May 28, the Maharaja readily agreed to the desire of the Agent to the Governor-General, and issued orders for the extension

13 M Masson to Takht Singh dt 22 May 1857 in reply to His Highness' letter of the same date offering aid to the British R A O Historical Records 38, File No 1, Mutiny Vol I, P Branch, pp 112-113

14 Translation of a Khrita from Maharaja Takht Singh to Masson dt 25 May 1857, R A O Historical Records 38, File No 1, Mutiny Vol I, P Branch, pp 128-130

15 Ibid, Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bhai No 18, p 366

16 Translation of a Khrita from Maharaja Takht Singh to Masson dt 25 May 1857, R A O Historical Records 38, File No 1, Mutiny Vol I, P Branch, pp 128-130

of the mounted post between Pali and Beawar to Ajmer and Nasirabad.¹⁷ Masson notified to the Maharaja that the British looked to him for the protection of the whole line between Sirohi and Ajmer and Merwara districts. The responsibility was willingly accepted by Takht Singh. Later on more important lines of communications were established with the result that Jodhpur became the centre of communication between some of the most important parts of the British empire. I. T. Prichard, who was entrusted with the charge of Jodhpur Post Office, wrote that, "at one time letters and despatches from Calcutta to Mccrutt had to be sent across the country to Bombay, thence to Jodhpur, thence to Lahore via Bhiawalpore and from Lahore down to Mccrutt". For a very long time the only communication with the army before Delhi was through this round about route.¹⁸ Furthermore, elephants, camels, carts and ponies for the Europeans proceeding from Deesa towards Ajmer were supplied by him.¹⁹

In accordance with the directions of Lawrence a contingent of Jodhpur horse was sent under Kushal Raj Singhvi, for the protection of the magazine and treasury at Ajmer.²⁰ The Government expressed its gratitude to the Maharaja of Jodhpur for the useful aid afforded and appreciated the services of the Jodhpur force under Kushal Raj Singhvi at Ajmer.²¹ However, another party of Jodhpur force sent by the Maharaja to Ajmer behaved in a completely different manner. This body was commanded by a Mohammadn. On their arrival at

17 Masson to Lawrence dt 29 May 1857, R A O Historical Records 38, File No I, Mutiny Vol I, P Branch, pp 171-172, Cons 27 November 1857, No 324, F & Sec

18 Prichard, I T, *The Mutinies in Rajputana, a Personal Narrative*, (1860), pp 192-194

19 Prichard, I T, *The Mutinies in Rajputana, a personal narrative*, pp 192-194, Masson to the officer commanding the Infantry division of the force marching from Deesa to Ajmer dt 28 May 1857, Cons 27 November 1857, No 323, F & Sec

20 Monk Masson to Lt Carnell, on special duty at Ajmer dt 27 May 1857, R A O Historical Records 38, File No I, Mutiny Vol I, loc cit, p 184.

21 C B Thornhill, Offg Secretary to the Government N.W.P. to G. Lawrence, Offg Agent to the Governor-General dt 3 June 1857, R A O Historical Records 38, File No I, Mutiny Vol I, loc cit, pp 212-213

Ajmer they encamped near the Anasagar Lake and indulged in demonstrations that could by no means be indicative of respect. A part of their demonstration included throwing stones at a monument erected in memory of Sutherland, the former Agent to the Governor-General.²² Being disgusted with such doubtful allies, Lt. Carnell served them an ultimatum to move from Ajmer before the evening and return to Jodhpur, failing which he threatened to turn them out. An excuse that their movement was prevented due to the non-availability of carriages was set aside by sending carts procured by himself and before nightfall they were sent out of the premises of Ajmer.²³

Nasirabad and Neemuch Mutineers Pursued by Jodhpur Troops

Having mutinied at 4 P. M. on 28th May and destroyed the Cantonment, the Nasirabad mutineers marched towards Delhi.²⁴ They were pursued by Lt. Walter, Assistant Commissioner, Ajmer, Lt. Heathcote, Assistant Quarter-master General, accompanied by one thousand Marwar troops commanded by Kushal Raj Singhvi.²⁵ Captain Hard Castle, Assistant to the Governor-General's Agent was sent to overtake Lieutenant Walter's force and to take charge of the operations against the mutineers. Having a long association with the Rajputs, Hard Castle was considered better suited to influence and inspire the Jodhpur troops,²⁶ who avoided a fight with the mutineers being afraid of them and their guns.²⁷ Moreover they made no secret of the fact that their sympathies were with the rebels and were

22. Colonel G. H. Trever, Agent to the Governor-General Rajputana, *A Chapter of the Indian Mutiny*, pp. 6-7.

23. Colonel G. H. Trever, *A Chapter of the Indian Mutiny*, pp. 6-7.

24. Brigadier Macan to Col. Lawrence dt. 29 May 1857, R. A. O. Historical Records 38, File No. 1, Mutiny Vol. I, P. Branch, p. 164, Lawrence to Edmonstone dt. 1 June 1857, Cons. 27 November 1857, No. 320, F & Sec.

25. From A. J. Midway, Assistant Agent to Governor-General to Secretary to the Government, N. W. P. dt. 9 June 1857, *Ibid.*, pp. 270-273, Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No. 18, p. 366.

26. Hard Castle to Lawrence dt. 3 August 1857, R. A. O. Historical Records 39, File No. 1, Mutiny Vol. II, p. 113.

27. Lawrence to Edmonstone 27 July 1858, R. A. O. Historical Records 53, File No. 10, Mutiny Vol. II, p. 78 (para 17).

convinced about the righteousness of their cause²⁸ Still they went along with the British officers keeping just behind the rebel columns It was surprising that they found no stragglers throughout their long march.²⁹

Jodhpur force under Kushal Raj Singhvi was sent in pursuit of the Neemuch mutineers³⁰ also, again under the command of Captain Hardeastle On their way, Hardeastle managed to get a nominal aid of Jaipur troops after great deal of hesitation. The small party consisting of Jaipur *saidars* and a handful of men accompanied Hardeastle upto Lalsot and encamped three miles away from the camp of Hardeastle On being called by Hardeastle, first they made excuses and then they plainly said that they had no leisure (*'Fursat Naheen he'*). They refused to move further and remained encamped there until the return of the pursuing force³¹

The attitude of the Jaipur troops influenced the Jodhpur force also However, they were induced to move up to *Suhur* Hardeastle had planned to intercept the mutineers at Hindaun, but no inducement could make the Jodhpur force to move further.³² It was only after they had allowed the mutineers to go ahead of them that they consented to march to Hindaun On 27th August there was an uprising among the Jaipur troops stationed there and the intelligence came that the rebels were returning Finding the place unsafe and the situation to be growing dangerous, Hardeastle decided to give up the pursuit and returned along with the Jodhpur force³³

Commenting on the attitude and behaviour of the Jodhpur force, Hardeastle observed that it was not at all surprising if the circumstances of the case were taken into consideration. The force was a portion of the army raised by Maharaja Takht Singh for service in his own principality and was composed of thirty or more

28. Prichard I T, *The Mutinies in Rajputana*, p 60

29. *Ibid*, p 90

30. Mutiny broke out at Neemuch on 3rd June at 9 A M Report of the intelligence Branch, Army Head Quarters, *loc cit*, p 54

31. Hardeastle to Lawrence dt 3 August 1857, R. A. O. Historical Records 39, File No I, Mutiny Vol II, pp 118-119

32. *Ibid*, pp 119-120

33. Hardeastle to Lawrence dt 3 August 1857, R. A. O. Historical Records, 39, File No I, Mutiny Vol II, pp 120-21

petty thakurs, all having conflicting interests and personal jealousies. Some of them were averse to the idea of leaving their own country,³⁴ while others, the thakurs of Knehaman and Ladnu, were anxious to show their zeal in the service of the British Government and their loyalty to Maharaja Takht Singh and were willing to advance and meet the mutineers provided there was any prospect of success. But having been deserted by the Jaipur contingent and disappointed in their hopes of co-operation with Bharatpur, they were unwilling to risk the honour of their Maharaja and their state by utter defeat and almost certain destruction, in a contest with an enemy four times their superior in numbers, composed of artillery, infantry and cavalry, the last of which alone was superior to their combined force.³⁵

Mutiny by the Jodhpur Legion

The Jodhpur Legion was a force consisting of artillery, cavalry and infantry, under Captain Hall, with head quarters at Erinpur.³⁶ There were three troops in the cavalry and it was famous for the excellence of the horses and its equipment.³⁷ The infantry consisted of eight companies of *Poorbias* and three companies of *Bhils*. The Jodhpur Legion enjoyed an equal status with that of Gwalior and Kota contingents and was financed from the *Samar Khurch* paid by Jodhpur Government to the paramount power.³⁸

On 18th August a company of the Jodhpur Legion arrived at Anadra³⁹ for the purpose of holding in check the rebellious Thakur of Rowa.⁴⁰ Captain Hall, the commander of the Legion, had come down from Mount Abu on 19th to see the troops and give them

34 Ibid, pp 121-122

35 Ibid

36. Situated on the Jodhpur territory bordering close to Sirohi and about fifty miles north of Abu

37. The report of the Intelligence Branch Division of the Chief of the Staff, Army Head Quarters, p 59, Prichard, *loc cit*, pp, 208-209 Cons, 5 December 1836, Nos 33-34, F & P

38 Ibid

39 A village two miles from the foot of the mountain pass leading to Abu,

40 Captain Hall, Commanding officer, Jodhpur Legion to General Lawrence Agent to the Governor-General, dt 28 August 1857, R A O Historical Records 39, File No I, Mutiny Vol II, p 272

orders for their further movement to *Jerawal* ⁴¹ He found the native officers, Ram Prasad Subedar and Ram Bux Jamadar together with all the men, in good spirits and apparently willing and contented There was no sign of misbehaviour, much less of mutiny Having given the necessary instructions Captain Hall returned to Mount Abu ⁴² On his way back he met Havaladar Gozan Singh from the Abu guards, drawn from the Jodhpur Legion who explained that he was going to see some of his friends in the contingent at Anadra It was afterwards discovered that he was the man who had managed the subsequent proceedings at Mount Abu with the full concurrence of Suhedar Mehrban Singh and Jamadar Adju Dev, commander of the detachment stationed there ⁴³

Mount Abu being the highest peak in the Aravali chain of hills was chosen as the site of a sanatorium for the Europeans in 1847 ⁴⁴ It was the favourite summer residences of the families of the European officers serving in Rajaputana and other neighbouring places. In August 1857, besides a garrison of sixty native soldiers of the Jodhpur Legion, there were about thirty or thirty-five sick and convalescent European soldiers of His Majesty's 83rd Regiment, four men and a corporal of this regiment were posted at the school on guard duty and the remaining were in the barracks ⁴⁵

At about 3 a m on the 21st August this party of forty or fifty persons from Anadra climbed the hill and crept unobserved up to the barracks of the European soldiers ⁴⁶ The morning was thick and hazy and people residing at Abu, under the influence of the murky atmosphere, kept their beds late The dense fog prevented objects being seen

41. A village near Anadra

42 Captain Hall to General Lawrence dt 28 August 1857, R A O Historical Records 39, File No I, Mutiny Vol II, p 272

43 Captain Hall to General Lawrence dt 28 August 1857, R A O Historical Report 39, File No I, Mutiny Vol II, p 272

44 Prichard, I T, *op cit*, p 211

45 The Report of the Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of Staff, Army Head Quarters, p 58

46 Captain Hall's report to General Lawrence dt 28 August 1857, R A O Historical Record 39, File No I, Mutiny Vol II, p 272, Captain Hall to the Brigadier Major, Deesa dt 21 August 1857, R A O Historical Record 39, File No I, Mutiny Vol II, p 298

ten paces distant. The mutineers opened a volley of fire on the barracks. The Soldiers immediately turned out and returned the fire driving away their assailants who left one wounded man behind. Neither the sounding of the alarm nor the firing was heard by the guards at the school, because of the high wind and the long distance.⁴⁷ There was no casualty on the side of the Europeans in the Barracks and the Sargent Major led a party of fourteen men to the school by the shortest route.⁴⁸

Captain Hall's house was simultaneously attacked by another party of the mutineers but he along with his family managed to escape from the back door and took shelter in the school building which had been fortified as a place of refuge. The only European wounded in the whole incident was A. Lawrence son of the Agent to the Governor-General. He received a flash wound in the thigh from which he soon recovered. Leaving his family there, Captain Hall and Dr Young took a party of eight men of the 83rd Regiment in the direction of the Sepoy's lines and after some skirmishes drove the mutineers down the hill to Anadra, which place they left at 11 a.m., in the direction of Sirohi taking all the bullock carts they could lay hands on.⁴⁹ The mutineers received spontaneous support from the troops stationed at all the outposts who joined them except the *Bhils* who left them as soon as they could. On hearing that the Rao Shiv Singh of Sirohi had posted two guns in readiness for action the rebels avoided that place on their march to Erinpura, the headquarters of the Jodhpur Legion.⁵⁰

The flames of mutiny and the news of the out-break at Abu had preceded the rebels to Erinpura and had already enveloped the whole of the cantonment before their arrival. The only European inhabitants present there were Lieutenant Conolly, the adjutant of

47 Captain Hall's report to General Lawrence dt 28 August 1857, R. A. O. Historical Records 39, File No. I, Mutiny Vol. II, p. 272, Captain Hall to the Brigadier Major Deesa dt 21 August 1857, R. A. O. Historical Records 39, File No. I, Mutiny Vol. II, p. 298.

48 Captain Hall's report to General Lawrence dt 28 August 1857, *loc cit*, pp. 272-273.

49 Ibid., p. 273, George Lawrence, *Reminiscences*, *op cit*, p. 291.

50 Captain Hall's report dt 28 August 1857, *loc cit*, p. 274.

the Jodhpur Legion and the sergeants attached to the Legion and their families. Lt Conolly received the first intelligence of the storm that was brewing in the Legion by one of his orderly Makdun Bux at 4 A. M., on 22nd August, who had received a letter from one of the Abu mutineers giving highly exaggerated and false version of the exploits of the party⁵¹. Their bretheren at Erinpura were requested that the guns should be seized and after mutinying the whole force would march to Delhi. Conolly immediately communicated the intelligence to Monk Masson and sought his assistance⁵².

Early in the morning, as soon as there was light enough to see, Conolly rode down to the parade ground. The first thing he saw was that the gunners were running to the guns. On seeing Conolly galloping towards them they warned him to keep off. A glance at the cavalry revealed that the spirit of mutiny had infected them also. Only the Bhils remained loyal, but they were also unwilling to march against the guns and muskets of their more numerous comrades who were mad with excitement⁵³. Having completely failed in his appeal to the infantry he again rode towards the gunners, this time accompanied by the *Woordee major* of the cavalry. The gunners threatened him by pointing the muzzles of the gun at him and holding the proffires ready. Thereupon a desperate attempt made by him, to reach the guns by changing his direction was frustrated by some troopers and three infantrymen who pointed their carbines and muskets at Conolly⁵⁴. However, a few troopers, responding to the call of Conolly, came to his side. *Risaldar* Abbas Ali showed exceptional courage and loyalty to his officer when, taking off his turban in a solemn manner and putting it at the feet of the more infuriated rebels, he declared that any one offering violence to the adjutant would have to pass over his body. Abbas Ali's move saved

51 It Corolly's report on the mutiny of the Jodhpur Legion communicated to General Lawrence dt 29 August 1857, R A O Historical Records 39, File No 1, Mutiny Vol II, p 286

52 Ibid, p 286

53 Lt Conolly's report on the mutiny of the Jodhpur Legion communicated to General Lawrence dt 29 August 1857, R A O Historical Records 39, File No 1, Mutiny Vol II, pp 286-287

54, Ibid

Conolly's life and few more horsemen followed suit and joined him ⁵⁵

A peculiar feature of the mutineers of the Jodhpur Legion was a strange inconsistency in their conduct. Only two months back the *sawars* of the Legion had submitted a written petition, signed by the officers and men praying that they might be allowed to evince and prove their zeal in the service of the state, by being led against any mutinous troops or other "enemies" that might be causing the British Government any trouble ⁵⁶. But to the utter dismay of their officers just after two months they themselves became mutinous. Even after the outbreak some faithful troopers were determined to sacrifice their lives in order to protect that of Conolly. Yet they refused to ride off with him and other Europeans to a safer place like Sirohi. Later on they offered Conolly to ride away and showed willingness to care for the security of the children, however, expressing that it was impossible to save the lives of the parents ⁵⁷.

Meanwhile the rebels had compelled the cavalry to live under the guns and the Europeans were directed to stay in a small tent in the centre of the parade ground,⁵⁸ where they passed a sleepless night.

The mutineers from Abu arrived at Erinpura next morning and were greeted with a salute. This party was bent on violence to the Europeans but the loyal troopers kept a zealous watch and did not allow them to do any harm. On the morning of 24th the rebels allowed the sergeants, their wives and children to go and Conolly saw them being handed over to the *Kamdar* of Shivganj, who conveyed them safely to Sirohi ⁵⁹.

On the same day Mehrban Singh, the architect of the mutiny, was promoted to the rank of General. The force was accordingly

55 Ibid., pp. 286-287

56 Translation of a petition signed by the officers and *Sawars* of the Jodhpur Legion enclosed with a letter from Lawrence to Edmonstone dt. 29 May 1857, *HR A O Historical Records* 39, File No. 1, Mutiny Vol. I, pp. 149-150.

57 *Pichard op cit* p. 219

58 Lt. Conolly's report dt. 29 August 1857 *loc cit*, pp. 287-288

59 Lt. Conolly's report dt. 29 August 1857, *loc cit*, pp. 287-288

ordered by him to march and Conolly to accompany them on this horse-back being vigilantly guarded. Conolly had cast aside all hopes of life. But Abbas Ali and his men were ever watchful. They defeated all moves to harm him.⁶⁰ Conolly had observed that "Abbas Ali and his men surrounded my *charpoy* all night, we none of us slept".⁶¹ Influenced by the resolute determination of these men the rebels allowed Conolly to ride away on 27th August. The three *sawars*, Nasiruddin, Elahi Bux and Mohin Khan who had remained stuck to Conolly throughout the dark days when his life seemed to hang by a thin thread, escorted him safely to Erinpura.⁶²

On the advice of Conolly Abbas Ali communicated with Monk Masson offering to desert the rebels with a substantial force of cavalry and the guns and come to Jodhpur provided he was assured that he and his comrades would be pardoned and reinstated in the service of the British Government. The offer could not be accepted by the Political Agent for he could not violate the strict orders of the Supreme Government under which no offer was to be accepted on any pretext whatsoever, as long as the mutineers had arms in their hands.⁶³

Soon after the receipt of the intelligence of the mutiny at Abu and Erinpura, the contingents of the Jodhpur Legion stationed at Nasirabad were disarmed. The men, however, continued to perform their duty at the station for six months and behaved in the best possible manner. Consequently their arms were restored to them.

60 Report of the Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of the Staff, Army Head Quarters, p. 61

61 Letter from Conolly to Captain Black quoted by Prichard, pp. 221-223, *loc cit*, Kaye's and Malletson's *History of the Indian Mutiny*, pp. 410-412, Appendix C

62 *Ibid*

63 Abbas Ali left the mutineers soon after they marched from Ahua and remained in concealment in Bikaner until he was pardoned. Report of the Intelligence Branch Division of the Chief of Staff, Army Head Quarters, p. 62

64 Lawrence to Edmonstone dt. 27 July 1858, R. A. O. Historical Records, File No. 10, Mutiny Vol II, p. 78 (para 58)

in March 1858, and were drafted into the newly raised corps⁶⁴ Similar precautionary action was taken at Jodhpur also⁶⁵

Ahwa and the Mutineers

The Jodhpur Legion continued their rapid march from Erin-pura up the road towards Pali⁶⁶ Meanwhile Maharaja Takht Singh had sent *Kiledar* Anar Singh⁶⁷ to act in concert with the other officers and troops and intercept the mutineers, before they could reach Pali. Anar Singh had with him about 700 horse, foot, camel-men and two small guns. Getting the intelligence that the mutineers were in a far greater strength, Anar Singh preferred to take a strong defensive position at Pali⁶⁸ The mutineers, thereupon, changed their course about sixteen miles south of Pali and advanced towards Ahua and encamped near the walls of the fort⁶⁹

The Ahua thakur Kushal Singh was then in direct rebellion against the government of Marwar and had been making military preparations for some time past. He was the chief of the Champawat Rajputs and the second noble of Marwar in rank. His family and ancestors had always been among the most turbulent and refractory of the feudatories of Jodhpur. The origin of the dispute between Kushal Singh and the Maharaja was the adoption of a son by the thakur of Bithora with the consent of the Maharaja. It was opposed by the powerful chief of Ahua who arrested the adopted son,⁷⁰ and released him only on the promised payment of ten thousand rupees. In April 1857, the same person was treacherously murdered by Ahua thakur's men while proceeding to Ahua under the solemn promise

65 Masson to Lawrence No 524 dt 5 September 1857, R A O Historical Records 40, File No 1, Mutiny Vol III, 1857, pp 15-16

66 Report of the Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of the Staff, Army Head Quarters, p 62

67 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 18, p 384

68 Official Memorandum prepared by Monk Masson, Political Agent Jodhpur dt 10 September 1857, R A O Historical Records 260, File No 84, Jodhpur (Old) Collection No. I, p 12,

69 Ibid, p 13

70 At this stage the father had died and the adopted son had become the thakur of that place

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of safe conduct conveyed through a *Charan* ⁷¹ The Maharaja of Jodhpur tried to punish the thakur for the offence by attacking the village of Bithora but the Ahua chief at once ejected the attacking party. The Maharaja's forces were at this time requisitioned by the British Government to Ajmer with the result that he could not take any action against the contumacious thakur ⁷²

On 31st August 1857, the thakur of Ahua communicated to the Political Agent at Jodhpur that he had induced the mutineers, who were encamped near the wall of his fort, to surrender their arms, ammunition and all other Government property and to throw themselves to his mercy. The thakur, however, wanted an assurance for their pardon ⁷³ Being restrained by the Government orders to accept such offers, Masson could not accept the proposal and replied that he was extremely surprised that the thakur, who had always been held to be loyal and prudent by the officers of the British Government, should propose to him that he should mercifully treat the persons whom he considered traitors, who had perfidiously mutined against the British Government ⁷⁴ The reply paved the way for the thakur of Ahua to make a common cause with the mutineers, who thereupon determined to stand or fall together ⁷⁵ Shivrath Singh,

⁷¹ A promise conveyed through the agency of a *charan* was considered highly sacred

⁷² From Monk Masson to Takht Singh dt 22 May 1857, RAO Historical Records 38, File No 1, Mutiny Vol I, P Branch, pp 112-113

⁷³ Letter from Koshal Singh, thakur of Ahua to Monk Masson, Political Agent Jodhpur dt 31 August 1857, RAO Historical Records 260, File No 84, Jodhpur (Old) Collection No I, pp 6-7

⁷⁴ Letter from Monk Masson to Koshal Singh dt 2 September 1857, RAO Historical Records 260, File No 84, Jodhpur (Old) Collection No I, pp 8-9

⁷⁵ The thakur had another ground also for his annoyance. He had opposed the interference in his traditional feudal right that no resident of his jagir could leave his territory without his permission. But this claim was not accepted by the British Government in case of two money-lenders who left the thakur's territory without his permission. The thakur's demand for their return was also rejected. When he failed to get the support of his Maharaja also, he threw off his allegiance, refused to pay 'Rekh' and entered on a course of open rebellion. Pritchard, I T, op. cit., pp 227

Bishan Singh and Ajit Singh, the thakurs of Asop, Gular and Aluniā was respectively joined them along with their troops ⁷⁶

Meanwhile Anar Singh was reinforced by the force of Kushal Raj Singhvi and was encamped at Bithora within a few miles from Ahua,⁷⁷ where he waited for further reinforcements and instructions. General Lawrence became impatient at the attitude of the Jodhpur forces that had not attacked the mutineers so far and wrote a letter couched in strong language to the Maharaja of Jodhpur and a copy of the same was sent to Anar Singh in which "he upbraided the king with lukewarmness in his alliance, and taunted the army with their cowardice for not having effected anything, saying they were dancing attendants on the rebels like orderlies" ⁷⁸ The letter wounded the feelings of Anar Singh who determined not to survive the disgrace if he failed to accomplish complete victory and destruction of the rebels. Consequently on 7th September, he cannonaded the mutineers who had taken up a position under the walls of Ahua behind a ravine and had entrenched themselves ⁷⁹ The skirmish continued for about three hours and there were ten casualties on his side including the death of the son of Mithri thakur ⁸⁰ Anar Singh's cavalry was paralysed on account of the ravine and entrenchments.

Just when the brave *Kiledar* was preparing for a second attack on September 8, Lt Heathcote, the Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General of the Rajputana Field Force, arrived in his camp. He was sent by Lawrence to advise Anar Singh ⁸¹ The first thing that struck to the British officer was the close proximity of the rival camps and therefore, he recommended the posting of pickets in front of the camp, so that an alarm could be given in case of a sudden

76 Jodhpur State Records, Sanad Bahi No 126, p 546, Ibid, No 127, p 592.

77 Jodhpur State Records, Sanad Bahi No 126, p 725

78 Pritchard, *op cit*, p 236

79 Official Memorandum prepared by Monk Masson dt 10 September 1857, R A O Historical Records 260 File No 84 Jodhpur (Old) Collection No 1, p. 14

80 Ibid, Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 18, pp 384 & 409

81 Official Memorandum prepared by Monk Masson dt 10 September 1857, *loc cit*

attack and retard the advance of the rebels till the force got armed and ready to fight. The important suggestion was either not implemented or the pickets, if posted, were guilty of betrayal. The negligence proved very serious, and to none more so than to Anar Singh himself.⁸²

The planned attack was carried out in the afternoon on the day of Heathcote's arrival with the help of five hundred horse, but proved a complete failure due to the reluctance of the force to advance against the guns of the rebels.⁸³ Next day early in the morning the whole of the Jodhpur camp was thrown into utter confusion by the surprise attack of the rebels. At this critical hour Anar Singh was abandoned by Kushal Raj Singhvi⁸⁴ and the majority of the Raja's force fled away after a show of resistance. Lt. Heathcote also followed suit and galloped away from the field. However, Anar Singh undaunted by the odds against him and attended by a few gallant soldiers displayed extraordinary heroism and gave a bitter fight and defended the guns to the last, until all of them were slain.⁸⁵ The camp equipage, military store and guns fell into the hands of the rebels.⁸⁶

Guided by the consideration that the event would have an injurious effect on the country, if the British would remain quiescent and allow that nucleus of rebellion to continue on the road between Deesa and Nasirabad, Lawrence took a quick decision to collect a force at Beawar and to march with it personally to Ahua.⁸⁷ Out of the limited number of European soldiers, on whom full reliance could be placed, only few could be spared for the offensive operations. The small force that he had assembled was quite insufficient

82 Report of the Intelligence Branch, Army Head Quarters, *loc cit* p 62

83 Heathcote's report of the proceedings against the mutineers of Jodhpur Legion dt 13 September 1857, R A O Historical Records 40, List No 1, File No 1, Mutiny Vol III, pp 65-74

84 Ibid

85 Ibid

86 Ibid

87 Lawrence to Edmonstone dt 27 July 1858 R A O Historical Records 53, File No 10, Mutiny Vol II, p 78, para 61

short distance on foot Lawrence's force was then engaged with the enemy and artillery firing was going on. It appeared he enquired, of some one he had met, the direction in which the Brigadier General was to be found, and went off towards the spot indicated. Before he had gone a few yards he was fired at from behind the bushes and was wounded and almost immediately a charge was made of a large body of the rebel horse upon the wounded officer, who was immediately cut down and killed.⁹³

As the parties of rebels on the night were threatening his Baggage, Lawrence was compelled to retreat to Chulawas, a village three and a half miles away from Abua and remained encamped there for three days, hoping to induce the rebels to attack them in the field.⁹⁴ Seeing no chance of his hope being fulfilled and getting the intelligence that the rebels were busy in strengthening their defences, he retreated back to Ajmer alongwith the Field Force leaving the rebels triumphant.⁹⁵

The Governor-General took a serious view of the proceedings of Lawrence and issued instructions to avoid as much as possible detaching small force for isolated operations, especially considering the paucity of European troops and advised his Agent to gain time and not to precipitate collision, even when he might fancy that success would be easy.⁹⁶ The Governor-General observed that the expedition of Lawrence was not desirable and was a failure, that the guns of the rebels were not silenced and on the contrary their fire was reported to have kept up heavily and that one of the British guns was disabled and Lawrence was compelled to retreat. The rebels had neither secured any check nor any discouragement.⁹⁷

Ittardus Thomas Prichard, who was then lodged at the Political Agency Building at Jodhpur, had defended the proceedings of Brigadier

93 Prichard, I T, *Mutiny in Rajpootana a personal narrative*, pp 240-241

94 Edmonstone to Lawrence dt 20 January 1858, R A O Historical Records 260, File No 84, Jodhpur (Old) Collection No I, pp, 72-73

95 Ibid

96 Edmonstone, Secretary, Government of India to Brigadier General Lawrence dt 20 November 1857, R A O Historical Records, 260, File No 84, Jodhpur (Old) Collection No I, pp 46-47

97 Edmonstone to Lawrence dt 20 January 1858, R A O Historical Records, 260 File No 84, Jodhpur (Old) Collection No I, pp 72-73

General Lawrence He explained that "history was full of instance where British troops had gained victory over places much stronger than Ahua and against greater odds than those which Lawrence had to contend with" The main difficulty with Lawrence was that except a few white soldiers there was none in his force in whom he could place reliance His position was extremely difficult. His remaining quiescent might have had disastrous consequences and if he chose to take the front, he had to advance against a powerful fortress and a powerful garrison with a handful of reliable troops Another consideration in his mind was that the few European soldiers he had with him were almost that was available for the protection of the whole of Rajputana and he could not afford to sacrifice them at Ahua and endanger the security of the British dominion here Prichard observed that, "few men have been placed in such an awkward position, and none ever made a retrograde movement in presence of an enemy more unwillingly than Brigadier General Lawrence" ⁹⁸

Nevertheless, the withdrawal of Brigadier General Lawrence struck a terrible blow to the prestige of the British and had the news of the fall of Delhi⁹⁹ not reached just at that moment, the fate of Maharaja Takht Singh might have been sealed¹⁰⁰ But for that news the victorious Jodhpur Legion would have marched triumphantly into the capital of Marwar and the Maharaja's dynasty and the European families would have been left to their mercy However, the fall of Delhi caused a dramatic revolution of feeling and provided a severe check to the rebellious spirit and inspired a new sense of confidence in the Maharaja ¹⁰¹

98 Prichard, I, T, *op cit*, pp 245-246

99 The first success was achieved by the British in Delhi on 14th September 1857, Proclamation issued by the Offg Agent to the Governor-General for Rajputana States dt 21 October 1857, R A O Historical Records 39, File No 1, Mutiny Vol II, p 49

100 The defeat and slaughter of Anar Singh and his few attendants and the capture of his guns, whilst not a man of the thakurs associated with him was injured, reduced Maharaja Takht Singh to a state of perilous helplessness

101 Maharaja Takht Singh celebrated the news of the fall of Delhi by firing a 21 gun salute

The recapture of Delhi between 14th and 20th September, 1857, was followed by a proclamation by the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana on 21st October 1857. The people of Rajputana states were warned against harbouring any of the mutinous sepoys or other proclaimed enemies of the state or any one else who had 'opposed British troops, as in the case of the thakur of Ahua' ¹⁰². It was further clarified that no pretext of '*Surma* or sanctuary' would be allowed ¹⁰³.

The capture of Delhi unexpectedly frustrated the projects of ambition of the thakur of Ahua and ultimately resulted into the separation of the mutineers of the Jodhpur Legion and thakur Kushal Singh. The rebellious thakurs at Ahua concocted a plan to overthrow Maharaja Takht Singh and place a son of the late Dhokal Singh on the throne of Marwar. Accordingly a party was sent to Diggi, where he was residing, to induce him to accept the offer ¹⁰⁴. The thakurs of Asop, Gular and Alaniawas accompanied the mutineers of the Jodhpur Legion, who marched towards Delhi on 10th October for the purpose of securing military assistance from that quarter ¹⁰⁵. The mutineers marched through Marwar towards Delhi ¹⁰⁶ and occupied Rewari. A force under Brigadier Gerrard was sent against them from Delhi who, on 16th November, found them strongly entrenched at Narnaul. After a sharp engagement in which Brigadier Gerrard was killed, they were completely defeated and annihilated ¹⁰⁷.

The sudden and total defeat of the Jodhpur Legion made a deep impression throughout Marwar. The Legion had been a terror and

102 The proclamation dt 21 October 1857, *loc cit*

103 Ibid

104 Translation of a letter from Mokhon Singh to Mehla Bhai Singh dt 17 September 1857, Cons 27 November 1857, No 347, F & Sec

105 Translation of a letter from Sawant Singh, Madho Singh and Radha Krishan from Ahua dt 9 October 1857, Cons 18 December 1857, No 215, F & Sec. Kaye and Malleison had written that the thakur of Ahua and his rebel allies quarrelled. Instead of coming to the blows, however, they sensibly agreed to separate. Kaye and Malleison *op cit*, p 387

106 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 18 pp 387-409

107, Morrison to George Lawrence dt 5 December 1857. Cons 29 January 1858, No 292, F & Sec. Lawrence to Emonstone dt 27 July 1858 *loc cit*, para 65, Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 18, p 403

was considered invincible in its neighbourhood. The complete annihilation of that mighty force compelled the people to at once acknowledge the hopelessness of resistance to any European force ¹⁰⁸

The thakur of Ahua was also affected by the feeling of despair. Nevertheless, he continued to give encouragement to his followers and improve the fortification of his town by the construction of a mud wall, which later on proved to be the most formidable portion of his defences ¹⁰⁹

In January 1858 reinforcements arrived from Bombay and operations against Ahua were immediately commenced under the command of Lt Col Holmes ¹¹⁰. The force consisted of 700 cavalry and 1100 infantry, artillery and engineers ¹¹¹. The place was invested on 19th January 1858. After a reconnaissance of the place, decision for the siege operations was taken and a complete blockade was established by the cavalry pickets and batteries ¹¹²

The sudden advent of the British force startled the thakur of Ahua who along with his family was sent in precipitate flight deep into the hilly tracks of Mewar, while his town and his place were left to be defended by mercenaries and his followers. The garrison consisted of about 700 defenders ¹¹³

The siege operations continued for five days during which there was incessant firing on both sides. The arrangements for the assault on the morning of 24th January were complete and the engineers reported that a breach could be made by 9 A M ¹¹⁴. The escape of the besieged appeared beyond the bounds of possibility. But a storm of unusual violence and duration passed over the country during the night of 23rd, which rendered it impossible to distinguish any object

108 Major R Morrison, Offg Political Agent Jodhpur to Brigadier General Lawrence dt 14 February 1858, R. A O Historical Records, File No 84, Jodhpur (Old) Collection No I, p 101.

109. *Ibid.*, p, 100

110 Lawrence to Edmonstone dt 27 July 1858, *loc cit*, para 66

111 Intelligence Branch Report, Army Head Quarters, *loc cit* p 200

112 Lawrence to Secretary Government dt 6 February 1858, R A O Historical Records 260, File No 84, *loc cit*, pp 82-83

113 Morrison to Lawrence dt, 14 February 1858, *loc cit*, Cons 28 May 1858, No 333, F & Sec

114 Lawrence to Secretary Government dt 6 February 1858, *loc cit*, pp 82-83.

except during the splashes of lightning. Sheltered in this darkness the entire garrison, which chose to brave the elements rather than the assault, passed safely through the lines of Pickets, unchallenged except at one point. The escape appeared almost providential.¹¹⁵

When the news of the flight of the entire garrison reached the British company, a party of the 2nd Sindh Horse was immediately detached to pursue the fugitives, who were reported to have taken the direction of Deoghar. When the pursuing party reached Sherniawas, that guards the entrance to the pass, gates were closed and all admittance refused till midnight. This caused a delay and gave valuable time to the fugitives to get away. The pursuing party seized the thakur of that village and brought him to the camp.¹¹⁶ His conduct was considered suspicious and consequently he was handed over to the Maharaja and his village was attached. However, 124 persons were brought back as prisoners by the pursuing parties. Out of them 24 were mutineers from the British service, principally of the Jodhpur Legion. They were tried by drumhead court-martial and the sentence of death was immediately executed by shooting them dead.¹¹⁷ The remaining prisoners were Rajputs and were handed over to Major Morrison, for disposal by the Government of Jodhpur.¹¹⁸

The British engineers were quite impressed when they inspected the fort of Ahwa with its complete double line of defence, (earthen outside and masonry inside) with a 'strong keep' in which was located his residence. Six brass guns and seven iron were found in position.¹¹⁹ In addition there was three tons of gun powder and 300 rounds of gun ammunition. The brass guns were sent to the arsenal at Ajmer and their carriages were destroyed. The gun powder was used in demolishing the thakur's residence and principal defences.¹²⁰

115 Morrison to Lawrence dt 14 February 1858, *loc cit*, Cons 28 May 1858, No 233, F & Sec

116 Morrison to Lawrence dt 14 February 1858, *loc cit*, pp 109-110

117 Lawrence to Edmonstone dt 6 February 1858, *loc cit*, p 84

118 *Ibid*

119 *Ibid*, pp 84-85, Morrison to Lawrence dt 14 February 1858, *loc cit*, p 105

120 Lawrence to Edmonstone dt 6 February 1858, *loc cit*, pp 84-85, A telegraphic message dt 19 February 1858 from the Governor-General to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors—"Rajpootana—the fort of Ahwa had been demolished by the force under Colonel Holmes".

Punishment Inflicted on Rebellious Thakurs

As desired by Lawrence the fortifications of the three principal thakurs,¹²¹ who had evinced anti-British attitude and rendered assistance to the thakur of Ahua were also destroyed,¹²² but their villages were spared. These thakurs, namely Shivanthi Singh of Asop, Bishan Singh of Gular and Ajit Singh of Alamiawas had been close associates of the thakur of Ahua. They had been the leaders of the defeated thakurs of Marwar long before the commencement of the mutiny.¹²³ They had accompanied the mutineers upto Narnaul. After their return from Narnaul two of them were residing in the territory of Sikar.¹²⁴ After his return from Narnaul thakur Shivanthi Singh had allowed the occupation of Asop by the Maharaja's troops unopposed,¹²⁵ but offered a stiff resistance at the small village named Bursoo, where he surrendered unconditionally after a siege of five weeks. He was brought to Jodhpur and was lodged as a state prisoner in the fort.¹²⁶ His jagir was attached.

The thakur of Bagri was summoned by Major Morrison and reminded of his offensive conduct in shutting the gates of his town and refusing supplies to Brigadier General on his return from Ahua in September 1857. The defences erected by the thakur were levelled by the troops of Colonel Holmes and the ditch round the town was also filled.¹²⁷ Morrison sent the thakur and his four sons (the fifth was unwell) to Jodhpur and addressed a *Kharita* to Maharaja Takht Singh detailing their offences and desiring that they should be detained at the capital until the clearance of all their arrears to the Government of Marwar.¹²⁸

121 The thakurs of Asop, Gular and Alamiawas.

122 Lawrence to Edmeston dt 6 February 1858, *loc cit*, pp 84-85.

123 Major Morrison to Brig Gen Lawrence dt 14 February 1858, Cons 28 May 1858, No 333, F & Sec.

124 Ibid,

125 No opposition was offered to Raj troops, for a family legend or superstition forbade the thakur to offer resistance to the sovereign at Asop.

126 Morrison to Lawrence dt 14 February 1857, Cons 28 May 1858, No 333, F & Sec.

127 Ibid

128 Ibid

The Suppression of the Mutiny and the Changes in the British Attitude

By the end of 1858 the flames of the mutiny that blazed across the country had been extinguished and things were settling back to normalcy. The mutiny had shaken the British Indian Empire to its very foundation and had let loose the forces of violence and hatred. The British were stunned and shocked to see the complaisant Indian Sepoy suddenly turned into a rapacious murderer. The outbreak opened the floodgates of racial antagonism, bitterness and hatred. A wild and unprincipled spirit of vengeance overtook the British during the summer of 1857.¹²⁹ In Punjab John Nicholson had proposed a bill for "the faying alive, impalement or burning of the murderers of the women and children at Delhi", and said that the idea of "simply hanging the perpetrators of such atrocities is maddening"¹³⁰ The same spirit of vengeance was revealed by Major Morrison, Political Agent Jodhpur when he wrote that, "it is difficult to restrain the hope that when the thakur (of Ahua) shall himself fall in our hands the opportunity will not be lost of making a spectacle of him of his own carcass"¹³¹

Lord Canning had taken a particular note of this dangerous attitude of vindictiveness of his countrymen and reported to the Queen that "the vast majority of the European community would hear with pleasure and approval that every Hindoo and Mohammedan had been proscribed, and that none would be admitted to serve the Government except in a menial capacity"¹³² England was no exception to it and the same feeling had spread all over the country when the first intelligence of the mutiny in 1857 had spontaneously resulted into a bloodthirsty cry of revenge. However, with the arrival of news of the subduing of mutiny, the excitement had subsided and in

129 For example, James Neill, told Major Renaud at Allahabad that "all Sepoys from mutinous regiments who could not give a good account of themselves, were to be hanged, while rebellious villages along the line of march were to be destroyed and all male inhabitants killed" Quoted in Kaye, *Sepoy War*, Vol II, pp 274-275

130 Kaye, *Sepoy War*, Vol II, p 401,

131 Morrison to Lawrence dt 14 February 1858, Cons 28 May 1858, No 333, F & Sec

132 Lord Canning to Queen Victoria dt. 25 September 1857, in Arthur C. Benson, ed, *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, Vol III, p 319.

the year 1858 the Press as well as the Parliament had impressed upon the Government of India to exercise forbearance and deal out justice mixed with merey

Nevertheless, the mutiny left and indelible an abiding mark on Indian society and the nature of the British rule. The India Act of 1858 was passed on 2nd August 1858, ending the rule of the East India Company and brought India under the direct Government of the British Crown and the Parliament. The change did not make any radical difference for the Indian people, but the princes felt a sense of gratification in finding the name of the Queen with the British Empire in India.¹³³ The transfer of power from the Court of Directors to the Crown took place on 1st September 1858. A proclamation in the name of Queen Victoria was accordingly drafted and despatched to Lord Canning who received it in October 1858. The Governor-General was now designated as the Viceroy.

The proclamation was read by Lord Canning at a grand *Darbar* held at Allahabad on 1st November 1858. A *Darbar* of the Agency vakils was held on 2nd December 1858 at Mount Abu in which the Queen's proclamation was read by George Lawrence with great ceremony and splendour.¹³⁴ The proclamation confirmed the treaties and engagements of the East India Company with the Indian Princes, promised to respect the rights, dignity and honour of the native princes and to pay due regard to their ancient rights, usages and customs of India.

In keeping with the policy of prudence and forbearance expressed in Parliament, the Proclamation granted a general amnesty to all excepting those who had been or should be convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects. It assured a policy of justice, benevolence and religious toleration and equal opportunity in the recruitment to Government service. The proclamation added that "we shall respect the rights, dignity and honour of the native princes as our own, and we desire that they as well as

133 Lawrence to Edmonstone dt. 21 December 1858, Cons. 25 February 1859, Nos. 617-629, F & P.

134 George Lawrence to Edmonstone dt. 5 November 1858, Cons. 31 December 1858, Nos. 1190-1196, F & P.

our own subjects should enjoy that prosperity, and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government",¹³⁵

The chiefs of Rajputana, without exception, displayed their loyalty throughout the period of rebellion and rendered all possible help to the Paramount Power in the hour of need. The moral drawn from these demonstrations of fidelity, by the British Government, was that if these expression of loyalty of the princes were suitably reciprocated, they would become the pillars of strength to the Empire. Consequently the importance of rewarding the chiefs was a dominant consideration in the British mind. Vernon Smith declared in the House of commons that it would be "expedient not only from the motives of gratitude, but in order to secure the future well-being and tranquillity of India, that some token of our approbation that some reward should be given to these men"¹³⁶ (Indian Princes). The British Government took great care to conciliate the princes and assure them of favourable treatment during the Post-mutiny era. In 1859 Lord Canning suggested the creation of a royal order of knighthood as an instrument of enhancing the loyalty of the princes and rewarding them.¹³⁷ The Suggestion was accepted and the order finally emerged in the shape of the Star of India. It became a great source of attraction right from its inception and continued to be eagerly sought after up to the very end of the British rule in India.

Another step taken by Canning to conciliate the princes and win their support went a long way to achieve its aim. In April 1860 he urged the British Government to promptly and unreservedly, concede the right of adoption by the princes, for he was convinced that the act would certainly be acclaimed universally by the princes.¹³⁸

135 Ibid

136 Speech of Vernon Smith in the House of Commons, 11 February 1859, Hansard, CLII, p. 274

137 Despatch of 24 December 1859, from India Foreign Department Despatch No. 27 of 1859

138 Despatch of 30 April 1860 from India Foreign Department No. 43-A of 1860.

On 26th July 1860, Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State authorised the issue of adoption *Sanads* to all sovereign chiefs under British protection¹³⁹ Accordingly the *Sanads* were granted to one hundred and sixty of the more important chiefs, ruling their own states, by Canning Takht Singh, the Maharaja of Jodhpur was granted the sanad on 11th March 1862,¹⁴⁰ that gave British assurance that "On failure of natural heirs, the adoption by himself and future rulers of his state of a successor according to Hindu Law and to the customs of his race, would be recognised and confirmed"¹⁴¹ However, a condition was imposed that, "nothing shall disturb the engagements thus made to you so long as your house is loyal to the Crown and faithful to the conditions of the treaties grants or engagements which records its obligations to the British Government"¹⁴²

The persons other than the rulers who had displayed conspicuous loyalty and had extended invaluable help to the Britishers, in their hour of need, were remembered and suitably rewarded In recognition of the services rendered to the British by Kesri Singh and Sawant Singh, the thakurs of Kuchaman and Kherva, during mutiny, a strong recommendation for reward was made by Major Eden, Officiating Agent to the Governor-General¹⁴³ The Government promptly accepted the suggestion and authorised him to present each of the thakurs a revolver and a sword in recognition of their loyal conduct during the mutiny¹⁴⁴

Effects of the Mutiny on Marwar

Maharaja Takht's loyalty was conspicuous from the very beginning of the outbreak of 1857 He had voluntarily and enthusiastically

139 Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood to Lord Canning Despatch of 26 July 1860 Political Despatch No 57 of 1860

140 Antchison, Vol III, p 117, and Part I, VIII, p 36

141 Ibid

142 Ibid

143 Major Eden to Cecil Beadon, Secretary to the Government of India dt 8 December 1859 R A O Historical Records 52, File No 10, Mutiny 1859-5), Reward, pp 143-144

144, C U Antchison, Under Secretary, Government of India to Major Eden dt 24 December 1859, R A O Historical Records 52, *loc cit*, pp 145-146

extended aid to the British in the best possible manner¹⁴⁵ The post-mutiny era, therefore, resulted in cementing of the British relations with the state of Jodhpur. It had resulted into the realisation that the interests of the British and that of the Maharaja were identical.

The Mutiny proved to be a blessing in disguise for Maharaja Takht Singh. He not only earned the gratitude and sincere friendship of the British but also got rid of some of the most contumacious thakurs, who had been a constant source of trouble to him. These thakurs were completely subdued. Some of them were thrown in exile, while others had received punishment. Not only their jagirs were attached but their fortifications were also destroyed thus removing any possibility of their rebellion and armed resistance in near future.¹⁴⁶ It had substantially increased the state revenue and enhanced the power of the Maharaja. The fate of these doomed thakurs served as a warning to all who had evinced any contumacy towards the Maharaja.

The events of 1857 had convinced the British that the Indian people in general and the Rayputs in particular were inherently conservative and were zealous in guarding their deep-rooted customs and traditions. The result was that the mutiny proved a great retarding force on the British fervour to introduce religious and social reforms. As Kaye observed that the state "had done all that it prudently could do in the present state of the Hindoo mind, to

145 In addition to his putting the *Darbar* forces at the disposal of the British he had done an invaluable service in maintaining the lines of communication between Dairibud and Pali. His loyal disposition had attracted European refugees from different parts of the interior and the Agency Building at Surghar had become a centre of British refugees who lived in comfort and security while the flames of rebellion blazed in every part of the country.

[illegible]

divest, by authoritative interference Hindooism of its most revolting attributes. More at some future period may be done"¹⁴⁷ Similar feelings were expressed by Sir Henry Maine who wrote that, "a nervous fear of altering native customs has, ever since the terrible events of 1857, taken possession of Indian administrators"¹⁴⁸ In the post-mutiny era the emphasis on social and religious regeneration through legislation was replaced by the insistence on education. It was hoped that where legislation proved failure the corrosive power of the western educating might achieve the goal, and mitigate, if not destroy the superstitious customs and revolting beliefs and would increase loyalty towards the British. Consequently the plan for the rapid development of the western education received a great encouragement. The post-mutiny era was, therefore, a period of educational development in Marwar also.

Nevertheless, there were English people who refused to believe that the education of Indians could impart any strength to the British Empire in India. I. T. Prichard, the chronicler of the Mutinies in Rajputana, observed that "it may suit the purposes of certain parties in England to dwell upon the Utopian scheme of holding a great part of Asia by moral influence—the force of education, the willing subjection of many millions of aliens, are high sounding phrases, but history will teach us that no country and no people in the world, least of all in Asiatic continent, were ever held in subjection by such means"¹⁴⁹ He pleaded the retention of Empire by an overwhelming superiority of physical force. Indeed the mutiny had revealed the importance of the military power and the reorganisation of the system. Consequently the ratio of the European and Indian soldiers in the armed forces was altered.¹⁵⁰ Priority in recruitment was now given to the martial races that had proved loyal during the mutiny. All important cantonments and other installations were garrisoned with a combined force of British as well as European.

147 Kaye, *Christened in India*, p. 497

148 Henry S. Cunningham, *Earl Canning* (1899), p. 10

149 Prichard, *op cit*, p. 300

150 Year	No of Indian soldiers	No of European soldiers
1857	2,38,000	45,000
1868	1,14,000	65,000

soldiers. Saving a few mountain batteries the artillery was entrusted to the charge of English Personnel only. The Maharaja of Jodhpur was also helped and advised by the British in the reorganisation of his armed forces on a better footing.¹⁵¹

The Nature of the Mutiny in Marwar

The events of 1857 have been viewed with very different feelings by historians. Sir H. S. Cunningham, Charles Ball, Shur John William Kaye and most of the western historians considered it a mutiny, whereas V. D. Savarkar and Pandit Sundaralal had found it to be a war of independence. Benjamin Disraeli and J. B. Norton thought that it was a rebellion or a partial revolt. But without entering into this controversy it can be safely and convincingly said that, so far as Marwar was concerned, it was nothing else but a mutiny. The mutinous sepoys of the Jodhpur Legion were dreaded by people of Marwar and never hailed anywhere as national heroes fighting a war of liberation. Soon after their march from Erinpura¹⁵² instead of planning to attack the British arsenal, treasury, or the Agency office at Ajmer, they fixed the rich inhabitants of Pali, their own brethren, to be the first target of their plundering raid.¹⁵³ Their plan being foiled they turned towards Ahwa and immediately opened negotiations with Monk Masson, the Political Agent, through the good offices of the thakur and offered to surrender their arms and were willing to put themselves at the mercy of the British officers.¹⁵⁴ The fact that within nine days of their mutiny at Erinpura, they had offered to surrender themselves, shows that they had no moral strength to resist.

The hesitation on the part of the Jodhpur troops, pursuing the mutineers, under Kushal Singh Ray Singhvi was purely influenced

151 D. O. from Lawrence to Edmonstone dt 23 November 1857, Cons 29 January 1858, No 289, F & Sec

152 Monk Masson's official memorandum dt 10 September 1857, *loc cit*

153 Pali was a rich trading mart of Marwar. The plan of the mutineers was foiled by the timely arrival of Anar Singh's forces at Pali. Monk Masson's official memorandum dt 10 September 1857, *loc cit*

154 Kushal Singh, Thakur of Ahwa's letter to Monk Masson dt 31 August 1857, R. A. O. Historical Records, 260, *loc cit*

by their fear of the well trained sepoys of the Legion and their powerful guns¹⁵⁵ Their lack of courage and not the sympathy for the rebels kept them at a safe distance from the range of their guns¹⁵⁶ In fact they were the worst traitors, who neither joined hands with the mutineers nor were sincere to their masters Had they evinced anti-British attitude, the least they could do was to refuse boldly to pursue the mutineers

It was an irony of history that the thakur of Ahua had to form alliance with the mutineers Only on 31st August 1857, when the Legion Sepoys were encamped near the walls of Ahua, he had written to Monk Masson that, "the British Government had always been kind to me and I am its faithful well-wisher Therefore, considering that it would be advantageous to me if I could render some service to the British Government (sic)"¹⁵⁷ The letter proves that he did not evince anti-British attitude and in no case had he any intention of being an active partner in any national uprising His sole aim was to offer resistance to Maharaja Takht Singh, with whom he had fallen in open rebellion even before the commencement of the mutiny His alliance with the mutineers was solely guided by the same aim His plot to overthrow Maharaja Takht Singh and put a son of Dhokal Singh on the throne of Jodhpur,¹⁵⁸ furnished a conclusive evidence of his limited and well directed aim For him the mutineers were nothing more than mercenaries employed to execute his own plan Briefly speaking it was an affair between the Maharaja and his contumacious thakur, the British intervention being forced only because of the involvement of the mutineers Above all the thakur was cleared of the charge of anti-British activities by the Court of Inquiry held at Ajmer in 1860¹⁵⁹

155 Lawrence to Edmonstone dt 27 July 1857, R A O Historical Records, 53, File No 10, *loc cit*

156 *Ibid*

157 Letter From Kushal Singh to Monk Masson dt 31 August 1857, R A O Historical Records 260, *loc cit*

158 Translation of a letter from Mehta Mokham Singh to Mehta Bijay Singh dt 17 September 1858, Cons 27 November 1857, No, 347, F & Sec

159 Deputy Secretary to Government to the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General Rajputana dt 16 November 1860, R A O Historical Records, List No 1, p 27, File No 84, Vol II The thakur of Ahua received unconditional pardon by the Court

The mutiny of the Jodhpur Legion was nowhere supported or followed by any popular uprising in Marwar. The normal life had remained undisturbed, the trade and agriculture had continued as usual, the government dues were collected and the transaction of all public business continued uninterrupted.¹⁶⁰ The capital also remained completely peaceful and the European refugees lodged in the Agency building not only remained unmolested but on the contrary enjoyed a happy life. I T Prichard, an officer from the cantonment of Nasirabad, where mutiny had taken place, sought refuge at Jodhpur where his family along with many other European refugees was already lodged. "On reaching Jodhpur", Prichard observed, "after the wandering, beggarlike hand to mouth way in which I had been roughing it, found myself, something like the victim of magician's wiles in the Arabian Nights, suddenly transformed in a gentleman again, and surrounded, as if by the touch of a fairy's wand with all the pleasing concomitants of civilized life". It seemed to him that he had come to a new world which was far removed from the troubles and turmoils and places exposed to the danger of attacks from rebels and wandering hordes of mutineers. Prichard wrote that, "it was a happy family circle, and to hear the merry laugh, and music and singing, and the chattering of children's tongues, you would have supposed—as was indeed the case—that at last you had reached a spot where mutiny and rebellion had not interfered with the easy flow of domestic life".¹⁶² Prichard's comment as well as the facts analysed above lead us to conclude that the outbreak of 1857 in Marwar was not an outbreak growing out of a national revolt, or forming part of it but a minor rising in certain areas headed by a few chiefs of Marwar aided by the Mutinous Sepoys of the Jodhpur Legion.

160 Foreign Department, Secret Proceedings, No. 242, dt 29 January 1858

161 I T Prichard, *The Mutinies in Rajpootana a personal narrative*, p 189

162 Prichard, *op cit*, p 190

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITION OF MARWAR DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW

Social Structure

The traditional pattern relating to the professions to be followed by the four *Varnas*¹ was not scrupulously adhered to, in Marwar, during the period under review. *Brahmans*, for example, did not keep themselves strictly confined to the traditional priestly function, pursuits of learning and teaching etc., but were also engaged in agriculture, cattle-rearing, trade,² administrative and diplomatic functions³ and even active participation in the battlefields⁴. The *Vaisyas* also did not invariably confine their activity to trade and commerce or agriculture but also entered the armed forces as warriors and some of them, for example, Singhvi Indraj and Kushal Raj turned out to be great generals⁵. Nevertheless, the social structure of Marwar was broadly built round the traditional pattern. A net work of castes and sub-castes had replaced the former system of *Varnas*. Though the primary unit of the society was the family yet the caste division was the dominant factor that determined and decided most of the social relations.

Brahmans

In the social hierarchy the *Brahmans* stood at the top. They formed nearly ten percent of the population, and were divided into

1. *Jaina Inscriptions* I, v. 9, pp. 192-194, Nadadai Inscription, V S 1200 (1143 A D), *Satrunjaya Inscription*, V S 1587 (1530 A D), v. 3.

2. G. N. Sharma *Social Life in Medieval Rajasthan*, pp. 80-81.

3. Vyas Anup Ram was deputed in 1818 as Vakil of Jodhpur to conduct the treaty negotiations with Sir Charles Metcalfe. *Jodhpur State Records*, *Haqiqat Bahi* No. 10, p. 330.

4. *Marwar Khvat* Vol. II, pp. 145-146.

5. *Jodhpur State Records*, *Haqiqat Bahi* No. 6, p. 611, *Haqiqat Bahi* No. 10, p. 84, *Haqiqat Bahi* No. 17, pp. 382-384.

groups. The principal divisions were the *Shrimals*, the *Sanchoras*, the *Pushkarnas*, the *Nandwana Bohras*, the *Chenniyats*, the *Purohits* and the *Paliwals* ⁶ These names were generally taken from the places of their origin, for example, Shrimals from Shrimal, Sanchoras from Sanchor, Pushkarnas from Pushkar, Paliwals from Pali ⁷ In the Census of Marwar their number was shown as follows, —

	Males	Females	Total
1 Chenniyat	25,384	24,611	49,995
2 Pushkarna	8,771	9,174	17,945
3 Shrimali	8,318	8,316	16,634
4 Purohit	31,081	24,580	55,661
5 Dakot	2,646	2,547	5,193
6. Joshi	1,393	1,345	2,738
7 Acharya	566	649	1,215
8. Others	32,322	29,693	62,015
Total	1,10,481	1,00,915	2,11,396

The superiority and importance of the *Brahmans* in the society could be well judged by the observation of Mr Ibbetson, that “no child is born, named, betrothed or married, nobody dies or is burnt, no journey is undertaken or auspicious day selected, no house is built, no agricultural operation of importance begun, or harvest gathered in, without the *Brahmans* being feed and fed a portion of all the produce of the field is set for their use, they are consulted in sickness and in health, they are feasted in sorrow and joy” ⁸

Rajputs

Rajputs formed the chief military and dominant class in Marwar. They occupied this important position either because of being the ruling class or being the defenders of the land. They had been a ruling race of India, from time immemorial, and therefore, termed

6 Sherring, *Hindu Tribes and Castes*, pp 19-21 (Pub 1881)

7 *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol III-A pp 84-85

8 Report on the Census of Marwar, 1891, Vol II, p 56

9. Report on the of Census of Marwar, 1891, Vol II, p 57

as *Rajputs* or the sons of *Rajas* Erskine had described *Rajputs* as the "fighting, landowning and ruling caste, of Indo-Aryan origin-fine brave men, proud of their war-like reputation and their ancestry and very punctilious on points of etiquette"¹⁰

According to the prevalent theories the *Rajputs* had been divided into three broad divisions viz, the *Suraj-vanshi*, or solar race, the *Chandravanshi*¹¹ or lunar race, and the *Agnikulas* or fire tribes.¹² Later on these were sub-divided into thirty-six clans¹³ In solar group were the Rathors, the Kachhawahas and the Sisodias, and in the lunar were the Bhatias The *Agnikulas* consisted of the Chauhans, the Panwars, the Parihars and the Solankis The Rathors were further divided into several sects, the chief of which were Champawat, Martia, Jodha, Udawat, Kumpawat, Karnot, Jetawat, Karamsot etc¹⁴

Three things, viz, the possession of land, the *parda* system of females and a good '*sagpan*' were most dear to the Rajput honour For these every Rajput could risk everything including his life The same spirit is revealed in a popular old saying of Marwar

"Dhan jatan, Dhara Palat tan, Tirva Paruntan Tao-
Teen Divus yeh marunra, Kiya Raja Kiya Rao"

(i.e., when either property or land or a wife is in danger of being lost, these are the three occasions for a Rajput to die, whether he be a Raja or a Rao)¹⁵

The Rajputs of Marwar had been classified in the following categories on the basis of the possession of land and the rate of rent —

- (1) *Tenants* i.e., those who paid rent to the *Raj* or *Jagirdar*, at the rate paid by common cultivators
- (2) *Mukata payers*—those paying rent in one fixed sum which was generally less than the fixed rate

¹⁰ Erskine, *op. cit.*, p. 86

¹¹ Dasharatha Sharma, *Early Chauhan Dynasties* pp. 5-7.

¹² Dasharatha Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-4

¹³ G. N. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 84

¹⁴ *Rajpatana Gazetteer*, Vol. III-A, p. 86

¹⁵ Marwar Cens. t., 1891, Vol. II, p. 18

- (3) *Dumba payers*—who paid very small amount of rent by way of *Istamrar*
- (4) *Bhomias* or those who did not pay any rent for their land.
- (5) *Juna Jagirdars*—who enjoyed some fields in turn of a certain *jagir* previously held
- (6) *Jagirdars or Sirdars*—holding *jagirs* in perpetuity¹⁶

The Rajputs of Marwar were fine looking, tall and strongly constituted men, simple and affable in their manners, and were kind and obliging. Their deeds of chivalrous gallantry and the acts of resolute heroism, form the most glorious part of the annals of India. The use of strong drink was very common among them. It was more common in the eastern part of Marwar and in the western *parganas* opium was chiefly used. It was resorted to on every occasion both of joy and sorrow. Polygamy was not prohibited among Rajputs, who could marry in any clan excepting their own¹⁷

Jats

The *Jat* was the most numerous caste in Marwar and formed about one-ninth of the entire population,¹⁸ and one-fourth of the agricultural population¹⁹. They were found in all the districts of the state, but were most numerous in Jodhpur, Merta, Nagaur and Parbatsar. They Jats of Marwar were tall, brave and physically strong persons. They were laborious and were regarded as the best cultivators of the country and had been famous as experts in agricultural improvement. *Jat* by nature was a good jester and a very out-spoken man. He was usually styled as *Chaudhri*.

The *Jats* of Marwar, Ajmer and Kishangarh worshipped *Tejaji*²⁰. A large fair used to be held, previously at Kishangarh and later on at Parbatsar known as *Tejaji ka Mela*. The *Jats* firmly believed that

16 Marwar Census Reprt, 1891, Vol II, p 18

17 *Ibid*, pp 19-20

18 Rajputana Gazetter, Vol III A, p 83

19 Marwar Census Report, 1891, Vol II, p 34

20 It was believed that *Tejaji* had once sacrificed his life when he rescued the cattle of the Jats from the clutches of Mers. After being wounded in the strife *Tejaji* died of a snake-bite and his wife immolated herself with his remains. Since then he had been worshipped by the Jats.

"If a man bitten by snake tie a cord (known as *Tanti*) round his right foot, and repeat the word *Tejaji*, he will recover. Most *Jats* wear round their necks an amulet of silver representing *Tejaji* on horse back, his sword drawn, and a snake in the act of biting his tongue"²¹

The Vaishyas

Mahajans or *Vaishyas* formed nearly nine percent of the population and were numerically strongest in the districts of Bali, Desuri, Jalor, Mallani, Nagaur, Sojat and Sambhar²² They were mostly traders and money-lenders. Some of them joined the government service and occupied very important posts including those of *Dewan*, *Bakshi* and *Hakims* etc²³

The Kayasthas

The *Kayasthas* were the chief class of writers, who claimed their descent from Chitrugupta, the son of *Brahma*. Sir John Malcolm observed that "their origin is coeval with the invention of letters, that they were created to be an intellectual and not a labouring class; and they in consequence deem themselves devoted to learning"²⁴ They used to hold offices of trust and performed *Dawat Piya* (worship of the ink-stand) twice in a year after *Diwali* and *Holi* festivals. They were known for their intellect and ready compliance of the wishes of their masters. They had created a reputation as revenue officers, expounders of law and keepers of registers²⁵

The Charans

The *Charans* in Marwar enjoyed the privilege of being the chroniclers of the cherished fame of Rajput chiefs. They were known as *barhats* also. They were regarded as trust-worthy persons, and acted as safeguards to travellers. They were, however, notorious for being extravagant in their demands which often resulted in the most

21 M A Sherring, *Hindu Tribes and Castes*

22 Erskine, *op cit*, pp 88-89

23 C T Metcalfe to J Adams dated 17th October 1815, Cons 10 November 1815, No 14, F & P, Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 10, p 88

24 Quoted from Marwar Census Report, 1891, Vol II, p 109

25 G N Sharma, *op cit*, p 93

evil consequences²⁶ To press their point they usually committed *chandi* or self-sacrifice by cutting and wounding their bodies with knives or swords and sacrificing the lives of the whole family, if one was considered insufficient²⁷ They also practised *dhiarna* or extortion by sitting for hours and days to enforce their payments Malcolm had observed that "these classes rank as the genealogists of proud and ignorant chiefs, and favoured individuals often combine with that office the station of counsellors, and establish an ascendancy over the minds of their superior which is stronger from being grounded upon a mysterious feeling of awe It is to them that the proudest Rajput looks for solace in adversity and for increased joy and exultation in prosperity"²⁸ Many *Charans* had offered supreme sacrifice in the cause of their motherland²⁹

The Bhats

The *Bhats* were the class of genealogists and were the hereditary family bards "These men" observed Walter, "are held in great awe, in the same way as *Charans* by all *Hindus*, they hold lands and sometimes villages rent free, they receive great largess at wedding, and if it is refused abuse the non-givers in song"³⁰

Other Castes and Their Occupations

Besides these, there were many other people belonging to different classes and following various types of occupations. Amongst these were the *Sonars* (goldsmiths), *Mulis*, (the market gardeners), *Darjis* (tailors), *Khatis* (Carpenters), *Silawats* (stone masons), *Ghanchis* (Milk sellers), *Kumhars* (Potters), *Nais* (Barbers), *Mochis* (Shoe makers), *Dholis* (singers and drum beaters), *Dhobis*³¹ (washermen), *Bharbhunyas* (who roasted grain), *Kharwal* (men employed in Salt works), *Nats* (Gypsies who performed acrobatic feats), the *Lohars* (Blacksmiths), *Kharadis* (turners),³² *Churigar*

26 Marwar Census Report, 1891, Vol II, pp 108-109

27 Tod, Vol II, p 128

28 John Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India*, Vol I, pp 517-518

29 Tawarikh Jodhpur, Basta No 75

30. Walter, *op. cit*, p 63

31. *Ibid*, pp 65-68

32 *Ibid*, pp 24-25

(makers of ivory bangles and toys), *Chumpa* (who practiced printing of cloth), *rangrez* (the dyer), *Patua* (braiders), *Julaha* (weaver) *Pinjaras* (cotton ginner), *Telis* (oil pressers), *Kalal* (sellers of spirits), *Chakars* (personal attendants), *Nazars* (Eunuchs who attended the royal zanana), *Rawats* (makers of plates and cups of leaves stitched together know as *Patal* and *Dunna*), *Tamboli* (sellers of *Pan* and betel nuts), *beldars* (persons employed in digging earth and quarrying stones), *ganchas* (basket makers), etc ³³

Position of Women

Though women had no independent legal status yet they occupied a respectful position in the society. The people in general continued to give importance to the ancient traditions that, "Where females are honoured, there duties are pleased, but where dishonoured, their all religious rites become useless that in whatever house a woman not duly honoured pronounces an imprecation, that house, with all that belongs to it, shall utterly perish" ³⁴. The highest respect was shown for the mother. She was not to be disobeyed in any condition. Rajputs had a special place for women in their life. They consulted them in almost every important transaction and from their ordinary actions they drew the omeo of success, and applied to her name the epithet of *Devi* or *Goddess* ³⁵. In other castes also she was treated as *ardhangini* or the better-half. She participated in almost all the religious and social ceremonies and festivals and even took share in the economic and other household responsibilities. However, the position of women had suffered a setback due to the development of social evils like the *Purda*, early marriage, prohibition of widow marriage, slavery, etc. In fact the position of women was not universally same throughout the society, it differed from caste to caste and region to region.

Marriage

Marriage had been one of the most important of the sixteen *Samskaras* or ceremonies prescribed by the *Shastras* ³⁶.

³³ Marwar Census Report, 1891, Vol II, The Castes of Marwar

³⁴ Colebrook, *Digest of Hindustan*, Vol II, p 209.

³⁵ Tod, Vol I, pp 485-486

³⁶ G N Sharma, *op, cit*, p 111

Normally it used to take place in the same caste but intercaste marriages were also prevalent. Inter-religious marriages were also not unknown. Polygamy was a normal feature of the society, particularly the upper classes consisting of the royal family, feudal chiefs, high government officers and other wealthy people. The age of marriage was not fixed either by law or by tradition and varied from 8 to 21 years.³⁷ Early marriages were common, but did not necessarily mean the commencement of conjugal relations, which took place after the ceremony of *mukhara*. It was performed when the age of puberty was achieved. Polyandry was unknown in Marwar during the period under review.

There were various ceremonies that were performed in connection with betrothals and marriages. These ceremonies were generally the same but differed in minor details in different classes and castes. Among Rajputs the betrothals were usually contracted by the parents of the bride and bride-groom through the agency of a *Charan* or *Bhat*, and after getting the approval of astrologers, who compared the horoscopes, it was verbally agreed upon. Then the father of the girl sent a *Tika* for the bridegroom, which consisted of some clothes, raw coconuts and in case of wealthier persons, of horses, silver and gold coins as well as clothes for the servants and *Kamdars*. The *Tika* presents depended on the status and capacity of the individuals.³⁸

The *Brahman* (Purohit) accompanying the *tika* party, marked *atila* on the forehead of the bridegroom, who sat on a ceremonial pedestal, and offered the coconuts and betel nuts to him and other articles of presents were displayed.³⁹ The father of the bridegroom distributed opium and raw sugar to his relatives and friends and entertained the *tika* party. At the end of the ceremony the *tika* party was given a send off with presents consisting of cash money and sweets.⁴⁰ It was not customary for the father of the bride to accompany the *tika*, though some of his relations might do so.

37 G. N. Sharma, *op cit*, p. 113.

38 Hawala Bahi V S 1911 (1854 A D), f. 55. An article by Dr. G. N. Sharma on "Rajasthan, Political and Social, etc. Journal of Research of the Universities of Uttar Pradesh, December 1960, pp. 93-104." Quoted from Sharma, *op cit*, p. 112.

39 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No. 1, V S 1833.

40 Dastri Records of the 7th of the dark-half of Magha, V S 1833, (11th February 1776 A D).

No limit of time was fixed for the performance of marriage after the completion of the *tika* ceremony. It depended on the option of the parties. However, the fixing of the date of the marriage by the family astrologer was known as *lagan*, which was sent to the father of the bridegroom, and then commenced the marriage ceremonies. *Kunkunpatris* or invitation letters on coloured papers were sent to friends and relations. The bride and bridegroom were given feasts by their respective relations and friends, turn by turn. It was known as *Budola Bethuna* ⁴¹

A few days before the marriage the ceremony of *telcharahna* was performed by a lady of the house of the bridegroom. Next the *kankandora* or a sacred coloured thread was tied on the right wrist and leg of the bridegroom. After that another ceremony was that of collecting *Neota*, under which the bridegroom took his seat on a *Chowki* amidst friends and relations, who paid the *Neota* in coins varying from one rupee to one hundred.

In the next ceremony the bridegroom was dressed richly and wore *Sehra* ⁴² and *Morh* ⁴³. These were the chief requisites of the occasion. He then rode on a well decorated horse, camel, or Tonga and in some cases an elephant, while his relations and friends accompanied him on foot. The marriage procession was preceded by musicians and dancing girls. A set of rich dress, and bangles and *Morh* were taken for the bride ⁴⁴.

At a short distance from the home of the bride the marriage procession was given reception which was known as *Parjun*, then both the parties sat and drank together and took opium. This custom was called *Samela*. The bridegroom then proceeded to touch the *torna*, ⁴⁵ with a spear or sword, which was hung on the door of the bride's house.

The bridegroom was then taken to the *Chanwri*, a place, chosen for the remaining and much important ceremonies. At this time the ceremony of *tel-charana* or applying oil to the bride was performed.

41 Marwar Census Report, 1891, Vol II, p 21

42 Wreath worn on the head at the time of marriage

43 It was the Nuptial Coronet, worn on the side of the turban

44 Dastur Komwar, II, pp 590

45 A wonden frame made decoratively

This precaution was taken because of the importance of the ceremony, for once it was performed there was no choice for the girl to go back. It could be performed once only in the life of a female. If there was any complication and marriage was not possible with the chosen bridegroom then the girl could not wait any longer and she had to be married to some other person, for according to the popular saying 'Tiriya tel Hanur hut, charlie na duji bar'

In the centre of the *chanwri* the holy fire was lit by the purohits who invoked the family dieties by repeating the sacred *mantras*, while the females sang the songs peculiar to the occasion. Then the most important ceremony of *pheras* was performed. The bridegroom and the bride walked together four times round the sacred fire.⁴⁶ For the first three times the bridegroom preceded the bride and on the fourth, followed her.⁴⁷ Then the bride followed her husband in a palanquin or *rath* to the *jan ka dera*⁴⁸ but returned back soon. Then followed the grand feast given to the bridegroom's party. On the next day *tyag* was distributed to *charans* and *bhats*, and *Dakshina* to *Brahmans* and then the party took leave and the bride accompanied them.⁴⁹

Divorce and Widow Marriage

Divorce was allowed by Mohammadan Law and among some other castes also but was not often resorted to.⁵⁰ In some castes, divorce was accepted as normal feature of social life. For example in Mers, writes Tod, "the facilities for separation are equally simple. If tempers do not assimilate or other causes prompt them to part, the husband tears a shred from his turban, which he gives to his wife, and with this simple bill of divorce, placing two jars filled with water on her head, she takes whatever path she pleases, and the first man who chooses to ease her load becomes her future lord"⁵¹. However, the Brahmins, Rajputs and Vaisyas continued to abide by the orthodox

46 Walter, p 32. The number of *Pheras* differed in some castes

47 Dastur Komwar, II, p 283

48 The halting place of the bridegroom and his party.

49 Marwar Census Report, Vol II, 1891 pp 21-23

50 Walter, p 32, Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, p 82

51 Views of Tod, quoted from Marwar Census Report, 1891, Vol. II, p 45

tradition that marriage was indissoluble and could not be annulled⁵² This kind of rigidity often created many social problems and sufferings However, the widows were given aid by the State⁵³

Widow marriage was permissible in many castes and known as *Nata* or *Karewa*.⁵⁴ According to the Marwar Census Report of 1891, saturday night was "generally fixed for the ceremony" The lowest amount of *Nata* fee was rupees sixteen only but in some cases it amounted upto rupees fifty-five It was paid by the prospective new husband⁵⁵

"The *Mers*", writes Tod, "following the customary law handed down from his rude ancestry and existing long before the written law of Manu, has no objection to a widow as a wife This contract is termed *Nata*, and his civilized master levies a fine or fee of a rupee and a quarter for the license, termed *Kogri* On such marriage the bridegroom must omit in the *Mor*, nuptial coronet, the graceful palmyra leaf, and substitute a small branch of the sacred *peepul* wreathed in his turban"⁵⁶

Similarly the *Bhil* widows could also contract *Nata* or *Karewa* On the death of an elder brother, the next took his widow, but an elder brother could not take a younger's widow She either returned to her parents or found another husband⁵⁷ In many other castes *Nata* was permitted, but was not considered a graceful act It was generally contracted at the night time, and the bride was taken by her new husband not through the main gate, by some other door temporarily made for the purpose⁵⁸

In most of the castes, particularly those belonging to the higher class, the widow marriage was almost considered a taboo How strong were the feelings could be judged from an instance that, Laxmi

52 R A O, H R 228, File No 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No VI, pp 188-189

53 Jodhpur State Records Hath Bahi No, 2, p 103

54 Marwar Census Report, 1891, Vol II, pp 42-48

55 *Ibid*

56 Tod's description quoted from Marwar Census Report, 1891, Vol II, p 45

57 Marwar Census Report, 1891, Vol II, p 52

58 *Ibid*, p 105

Nath⁵⁹ did not hesitate to perpetrate the most heinous crime, to frustrate the marriage plans of a widow, who was a distant relative of his.⁶⁰ Reporting the incident Rao Raja Riddh Mal, the Agency *Vakil* wrote on 22nd March 1841 that, 'about six days ago Lukhmee Nath on learning that Rutee Nath was proceeding from Jodhpur to Sewana to marry a distant connection (relative) of his own, (Luchmeenath) sent Khem Nath, attended by 10 sowars, with orders to kill the persons in question, should they have performed the ceremony of *Nata* and further, that the sowars slew Rutee Nath and the woman, together with her father and her brother"⁶¹

Laxmi Nath explained that the conduct of Rutee Nath was unprecedented. In his (Laxmi Nath's) family, where, widowed females remained at home,⁶² he termed the event as a dishonour to his family and declared that in the "tribes of *Mahajans*, *Brahmans*, and respected *Zamindars*, the act of which Rutee Nath has been guilty is not suffered, but should such take place, the offender meets his deserts"⁶³

Commenting on the incident and the practice of widow marriage Ludlow observed that, "prior to the time of Deo Nath, the privilege of a second marriage may have been usual among the widows of the family of *Nathis*, but since the family has risen to rank and influence the females have been '*purdah Nusheen*' and hence the imputed criminality of the second alliance"⁶⁴

Sati

*Sati*⁶⁵ or the practice of self-immolation of Hindu women⁶⁶ had obtained in India from quite an early date, but it was not very common.

59 The spiritual *Gita* of Maharaja Man Singh

60 Ludlow to Sutherland dated 22nd March 1841 R A O H R 228, File No 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No VII, pp 186-187

61 Translation of a Note from Rao Raja Riddh Mal, the Jodhpur Agency *Vakil* dated 22nd March 1841, R A O H R 228, File No 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No VII, pp 188-189

62 Ibid

63 Ibid

64 Ludlow to Sutherland dated 22nd March 1841, R A O H R, 228, File No 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No VII pp 186-187

65 The term *Sati* also meant a lady of perfect fidelity to her husband G N Sharma, *op cit*, p 127

66 Tavernier, *Travels in India*, p 169

The origin of this rite could be traced through Hindu mythology, where we find the precedent in the example of *Sati*,⁶⁷ who in order to avenge an insult to her lord, by her own father, consumed herself in the presence of the assembled gods. Her regeneration and re-union with her husband, as *Parvati*, furnished incentive to similar acts. Tod believed that the practice of female immolation "originated with the Sun-worshipping Saivas"⁶⁸ However, nothing definite is known about the first institution of this practice. The vedic literature is silent about it. Manu had written that, "a virtuous wife ascends to heaven, if, after the decease of her lord, she devotes herself to pious austerity, but a widow, who slights her deceased husband by marrying again, brings disgrace on herself here below, and shall be excluded from the seat of her lord"⁶⁹ The description of *Sati* has found a place in Mahabharata.⁷⁰ However, the practice was not very common, but in the medieval times, it became more common, which is amply clear from the numerous sati-slabs and sati-impressions at the gateways of forts, palaces and commoner's houses, "raised in commemoration of many faithful wives and devoted husbands who either died a natural death or fell in the battlefield"⁷¹ The practice was not always confined to widows, concubines had also frequently immolated themselves, and mothers had been known to burn on the death of their only sons.⁷² How wide spread *Sati* system was in Marwar can easily be judged by the fact that 84 females performed *Sati* with the dead body of Maharaja Ajit Singh, 29 with Bhim Singh and 6 with that of Maharaja Man Singh.⁷³

⁶⁷ Wife of Lord Shiva

⁶⁸ Tod, Vol. I, p. 503

⁶⁹ Manu, On Women, Chapter V, text 157, 160, 161. Quoted from Tod, Vol. I, pp. 503-504

⁷⁰ *Adiparva*, 95.

⁷¹ G. N. Sharma, *Social Life in Medieval Rajasthan*, p. 127, Sati impressions can be seen at Loha-Pal of Jodhpur fort

⁷² Report of the Political Administration of the Rajpootana States, 1865-66, and 1866-67, Part I, p. 16

⁷³ Annual Report for the year 1848 dated 4th September 1849, Major D. A. Malcolm, Political Agent Jodhpur to Col. Low, Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana

Originally performance of *Sati* was left completely to the option of the widow. In other words it was an entirely voluntary affair. They were impelled by various factors, for example, the pangs of separation, eagerness to accompany the husband to the next world, to protect her chastity from the hostile elements or to escape the domestic life of sorrow, servitude and insults. However, like many social evils the voluntary aspect of the practice was gradually given up and the higher classes made *Sati* a matter of prestige. The widow was induced to self-immolation to maintain a time honoured custom, so that the family of the deceased might be enabled to boast, "how honourably and faithfully the last rites were performed" ⁷⁴ To offer this desired effect every persuasion was used. The bards of the family sang to the wives the fame of former heroines, who had acquired immortality by perishing in the flames which consumed the bodies of their lords, and if this failed, woman was taunted with cruel accusations of disgracing the family she had entered. One or other of such methods generally prevailed, and "once she was induced to acquiesce, they took care to prevent her from drawing back by administering maddening and intoxicating drugs whereby she was brought to the scene of immolation, and from there retreat was not permitted" ⁷⁵

A crusade against the horrible practice launched by the progressive people of the country, led by Raja Ram Mohan Roy, resulted into the awakening of masses. On the initiative of Lord William Bentinck, practice of *Sati* was declared illegal, and a crime punishable in courts, in 1829. ⁷⁶ This act further declared that when compulsion or the use of drugs deprived the *Sati* of free will, the offence might be judged as murder and punished by death ⁷⁷ Nevertheless the Act had no influence in the Rajput states where the practice of *Sati* continued almost unchecked. In Jodhpur the practice could not be prohibited even after the direct British intervention in the administration in 1839 ⁷⁸ Explaining the failure to include the clause, in the 'Code of

74 Report on the Political Administration of Raypootana for the year 1865-66, Part I, p. 17

75 Ibid

76 Vide Section I of Regulation XVII of 1829

77 Thomson Edward *Suttee* 1929, Ch VI

78 Sutherland to Secretary Government, dated 1st June 1847, Cons. 7 August 1847, No. 845, F & P



showed that he was determined to enforce the orders he had issued on the subject ⁸⁵ However, this time-honoured practice was gradually broken through and the Governor-General's Agent in Rajputana observed in his Annual Report to the Government for the year 1865-66 that "we may confidently rest assured that in a very brief period *Suttee* will be numbered amongst the crimes of the past" ⁸⁶

Festivals

A glance at the history of the period under review shows that in Marwar several festivals were observed. Most of these festivals had been a chief characteristic of the people and generally continue to do so even now. These festivals were so arranged that life remained festive throughout the year and there was one festival or the other in almost every month to celebrate. A brief survey of the chief festivals of Marwar, from April to March, would suffice to explain their importance in social and religious life of the people.

The most important festival of the month of *Vaisakh* was *Akhateej* or *Aksayatritya* ⁸⁷ The contemporary evidence ⁸⁸ shows that the Darbar of *Akhateej* was held on the third day of the bright half of *Vaisakh* on Tuesday V S 1875. After the *tilak* ceremony a grand feast was held in which the Maharaja and the nobles participated. Common men of Marwar celebrated the festival by cooking *kheech* ⁸⁹ and *Galuan*, ⁹⁰ Opium Batasa, ⁹¹ Gurh and Kharka (dried dates) were offered to friends and relatives. Above all the importance of the festival was due to the fact that people tried to judge the omens on that day, which were supposed to forecast the shape of the coming events ⁹². Bore hunting was a most favourite royal sport in which the nobles also participated ⁹³.

85 Annual Report of Jodhpur Political Agency dated 24th September 1849, submitted by Major D. A. Malcolm to the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana.

86 Report of the Political Administration of the Rajputana States, 1865-66, Part I, p. 19.

87 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No. 10, p. 256.

88 Ibid., pp. 256, 301.

89 A kind of porridge prepared from wheat as well as millet.

90 A kind of sweet custard prepared from gur, wheat flour and ghee.

91 A kind of sweet prepared with sugar.

92 For example a successful hunting expedition and seeing certain birds and animals were good omens.

93 Fasting of Bore hunting expedition of the time of Maharaja Man Singh (PPJ).

The festival of *Rakhi* or *Raksha-Bandhan* was celebrated in *Sawan* (July-August), on *Poonam* or the day of full moon⁹⁴ Religious side of the festival was related to the worship of *Sharvan Kumar*⁹⁵ A figure of a man carrying his father and mother on a *Kamar*⁹⁶ on his shoulders was printed on the sides of the door ways and sweets and *Kumkum* were offered On the social side it was a festival that repeated and confirmed the solemn bonds between a brother and a sister or a Brahmn and his *Jayman*⁹⁷ The customary *Rakhi* or amulet was tied by the sister to the wrist's of the brother and received the assuring blessings as well as befitting presents⁹⁸ Special court was also held on this occasion⁹⁹

Teej was celebrated in the month of *Bhadon* (August-September) as the anniversary of the day on which *Parbati* was, after long austerities, reunited to Lord *Shiva*¹⁰⁰ It was a festival of ladies, who dressed themselves with colourful clothes and applied *mehndi* to the palms and feet¹⁰¹ The married women kept a fast for the whole day and broke it in the evening, only after seeing and worshipping the moon¹⁰²

A *Teej* fair was also held and attended in large number by enthusiastic men, women and children In addition to the usual fun and gaiety of a fair, horse races and camel races were also held¹⁰³ The official ceremony was marked by holding a grand *Darbar* in which rewards and other favours were confirmed¹⁰⁴

94 Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, p 97

95 According to Ramayana, he had been an extremely devoted and obedient son of the blind parents, and was killed accidentally by the arrow of Dasha-ratha, the father of Rama

96 A devise to carry water, consisting of a long beam of wood or bamboo and two containers hanging on both the ends

97 Meaning prtron

98 Rajputana Gazetteer Vol III-A, p 97, Dastur Komwar, Vol XXV, f 709

99 J S A, Haqiqat Bahi No 10, p 331

100 Tod, Vol I, p 461, Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, P 168

101 Chandra Kumar v varta, VV 189, ff 55-56

102 In case the moon was not seen due to clouds they went to bed without eating any thing

103 J S R Haqiqat Bahi No 2, V S 1823 (1766 A D)

104 J S R Haqiqat Bahi No 9, 9th day of the Bright half of V S 1862,

Dashehra was a festival of special significance to the heroic people of Rajasthan. It was preceded by *Navratri* (nine-days) festival, commencing with *Sthapana*, on the first on the month of *Asaj* (September-October). It was a day devoted to the worship of *Chamunda Devi* (the family deity of the Rathors) which was marked with a great *havan*, prayers and the worship of the arms. On this day the image of the Goddess was established with due ceremony of *Yagya* and sacrificial offerings. On the same day young harley *Jawara* were sown and worshipped. The prayers and religious ceremonies continued daily for seven days. On the eighth day known as *Honi-Ashtami*, nine virgin girls were worshipped as the representative of the Goddess. On the ninth day the ceremony concluded with prayers, offerings and feasting.¹⁰⁵

On the tenth day *Dashehra* was celebrated, just as it was done almost throughout India. The main feature of the festival was the ceremonial procession of Rama, which was taken in a Rath (chariot). The ceremony ended with the destruction of *Ravana* and the fire works. The festival represented Lord Rama's victory over *Ravana* or that of virtue over vice. The fair was very popular among all classes and all ages of people and was attended by a large number of them. Haqiqat Bahr¹⁰⁶ had recorded that the procession included the "*Purohit, Kotwal, musraf, mutsaddi, Khwas-paswan, Dodhidar and Nagaras, ashwi-shutari, nabat* placed on elephant, *turi, Haran-Singo-Hatni, ghora-ra-nishan, hathi, ghara, kotal* and an army of monkeys"¹⁰⁷

The court was held on *Dashehra* in the afternoon in front of *Bagh ki Rangshala* (a place opposite the gardeo). Tilak ceremony was performed and *nazars* and *nichrawals* were offered by the *Sardars, Mutsaddis, Khwas-paswans* etc.¹⁰⁸

Then the Maharaja accompanied by the principal *Sardars* were feasted in the *Rangshala* and others enjoyed outside. The court ended after the observance of the protocol *muzra* and *seekh*. Presents were

105 J S R Haqiqat Bahr 4th of the bright half of Bhadrapad, V S 1827 (27th August 1770 A D)

106 J S R Haqiqat Bahr No 11, p 188

107 Ibid

108 J S R Haqiqat Bahr No 9, 9th day of the bright half of *Asej*, V S 1862

as usual received from the *pataganas*.¹⁰⁹ The Haqiqat Bahi had also recorded that a buffalo was slaughtered by the kildar who was provided the personal sword of the Maharaja to perform this act.¹¹⁰

Diwali, the festival of lamps celebrated in *Kartik*, (October–November) is almost the same manner and with the same enthusiasm as it was done throughout the country. A grand *Darbar* held on Diwali was the high watermark of the official celebrations. It was attended by all the important persons of the state and the Maharaja accepted the *nazars* from the *sardars* and other officers. The treasures from the district headquarters were presented to the ruler in the court.¹¹¹ Haqiqat Bahi records that after the lighting of the palace and the fort, Maharaja Mao Singh went in a procession to his Guru Dev Nath to receive his blessings.¹¹² Important official orders including that of promotions and appointments were issued on this occasion.¹¹³

Birthday of the Maharaja

The birthday of Maharaja was not less important than any other festival in Marwar. It was marked by holiday and distribution of sweets and other articles. The contemporary record¹¹⁴ had described the celebration of the birth day of Man Singh. The celebrations commenced with the striking of the special *nobat* (*Varsh-ghant-ki Nobat*). A Private court was held in which the guests were entertained by the enchanting music of the *patariyan* and *bhagtanian* (dancing girls). Then the grand *Darbar* was held in the palace known as *Khwab gah*. The ceremony of *tilak* was performed. Thakur Aoar Singh¹¹⁵ first offered his *nazar* and was then followed by

109 J R, Haqiqat Bahi No 10, p 329


110 S R, Haqiqat Bahi No 9, pp 118–119

111 J S R, Haqiqat Bahi No 9, p 28, In V S 1862 Rs 11,127/- were received

112 Ibid

113 J S R Haqiqat Bahi V S 1822 (1765 A D), Haqiqat Bahi No 10, pp 268, 324, 363

114 J S R, Haqiqat Bahi No 9, 11th day of the bright half of Magh, V S 1862



others. Then saffron coloured water was sprinkled on all and *argaza*¹¹⁶ was applied. *Long, dada, jaisai* etc,¹¹⁷ were distributed. Treasure was received from the *paragmas* (districts) and was presented to the Maharaja. The details being rupees 200 from *garh Jodhpur ki kacheri* (District of Jodhpur), Rs 500/- from Nagaur, Rs. 801/- from Merta, Rs 300/- from Sojat, Rs 500/- from Parbatsar, Rs 150,00/- from Sambhar, Didwana and Nawa, Rs 51/- from Kohla and Rs 200/- from Siwana, totalling Rs 17 552/-¹¹⁸

Holi was the festival marked by merry making, mirth and melody. It was held in the month of *Falgun* (February-March). *Holi* was played in the traditional manner with *abkur, gulal* and coloured water by the common man as well as the members of the royal family.¹¹⁹ The famous Marwari *dandiya dance* (*Dandiya ki Ramar*) was performed. *Gehar* (group of singing persons) of different castes known as *Proorban ki Gehar* and *Sanyasi ki Gehar* etc. were taken out.¹²⁰ The *Holi darbar* was held with all its pomp and splendour and presents from the *parganas* were received.¹²¹

Sil-Satam or *Shitala Ashtami* was a festival of religious nature and was held in the honour of the *Shitala mata* the protectress of infants. It was marked by prayers, feasting and a fair.¹²²

Gangaur, was held in *Chaitra* (March-April) in honour of the sacred *Gauri* or *Parvati*, the goddess of abundance.¹²³ The peculiar brilliance and enthusiasm in its celebration, combined with the religious fervour attached to it, makes *Gangaur* the most spectacular and important festival of Marwar. The idol of *Gauri* known as *Gauran*¹²⁴ and *Ishar*,¹²⁵ were installed with ceremony and decorations. In

116 *Argaza* meaning perfume

117. Meaning-Clove, and other spices

118. Haqiqat Bahu No 9, 11th day of the bright half of *Magh*, A. S. 1862

119. Hol paintings of *Dholan ka Khothar* of the period of the Maharaja Man Singh (PPJ)

120. J. S. R., Haqiqat Bahu No 10, pp 249, 342

121. J. S. R., Haqiqat Bahu No 9 A. S. 1862

122. Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, p 67

123. Ibid, p 97

124. *Gangaur* was popularly known as *Gauran* or *Shitala* the protectress of *Parbat*

125. *Ishar* was the lord of *Gauran* and protectress of *Shitala*

addition to the prayers and offerings of sweets for 15 days, it was the remarkable part of the festival to take the *Gauran*, in an impressive procession befitting the honour of a goddess, near a source of water so as to quench their thirst. In Jodhpur the royal *Gauran* alongwith *Ishar*, her lord, were taken to *Jhalra*,¹²⁶ where their counterparts from the houses of commoners also assembled. The dancing girls performed the famous *Ghinnar* dance. The festival was so sacred and so attractive that it was always attended by large festive crowds. The grand finale of the festival was the retreat of the royal *Gauran* to the *Garh* (fort) and the others to their respective abodes. The *Haqiqat* of the third day of the bright half of chaitra V S 1876 records that the royal *Gauran* was attended by *Vyas*, *Purohit*, *Joshi*, *Baidhya*, *Nazur*, *Katwal*, *Mushrab*, etc., and was preceded by *Naggara*, *Hathi Par Nabat* (Nobat placed on elephant), *Sur nays*, *dhol* (drums), *Nishan* or (flags) placed on horses and elephants, and the dancing girls, known as *Patariyan* and *Bhagtania*.¹²⁷

Besides these, there were many other festivals that were celebrated in Marwar, chief among those were *Shivratri*, *Ganesh Chaturthi*, *Vasant Panchami*, *Makar*, *Shakranti*, *Nag-panchmi*, *Nath-Panchmi* and *Jai-Jhulan Ekadashi*.¹²⁸ Some Jain festivals like *Parvasana*, *Rath-yatra* and Muslim festivals of *Idul-Fitr*, *Idul-Zuha* and *Maharrum* were also celebrated by their followers, but other people also participated in some of them.¹²⁹

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Agriculture


Although the Jodhpur State consisted generally of a vast sandy, sterile and inhospitable land, yet agriculture was the most important occupation of the people. The western part of the country covered to a great extent the part of the famous *Thar* desert. However, a gradual improvement in the condition of land was definitely observed

126 A reservoir of water


127. J S R, *Haqiqat Bahi* No 10, pp 252-255, 299, 345

128 J S R, *Haqiqat Bahi* No 9, pp 130-131, *Haqiqat Bahi* No 9 pp 118-119

129 *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol III-A, p 97 (1907).



THE KING AND HIS COURTIER



CELEBRATION OF HOLI IN MAN SINGH'S HAREM

as one moved towards the east.¹³⁰ The eastern and the south-eastern parts of the country were constituted by comparatively fertile lands.¹³¹ Scenty rainfall throughout the country was almost a normal feature. The eastern parts receiving comparatively a better rainfall than the rest of the country. The prospects for the artificial irrigation were also not very encouraging chiefly due to the fact that underground water was found far below the surface.¹³² However, it had been a peculiar feature in the sandy parts of Marwar that the rain water sank into the soil and did not flow on the surface, so that a very small rainfall was sufficient for the crops. The most fertile districts of Marwar were Godwar, Sojat, Jetaran and Maroth. In these *parganas* wells were abundant and no scarcity of water for the crops was felt, and both spring and autumn crops were grown. Next to these districts were Merta, Jalore, Jodhpur, Sanchior and Nagaur.¹³³ In these districts crops were grown according to the availability of water. On the other extreme there were the *parganas* of Sheo, Shangkra, Shergar and Mallani where water was scarce, and wells were also very few and extremely deep. Here only the autumn crop was raised and that too depended on the rainfall.

Classification of the Soil

The soil in Marwar could be classified into four broad categories. The first amongst these was termed as *matiyali* which was a clayey loam of three kinds, viz, *kali* (black), *rafi* (red) and *pili* (yellow). The *matiyali* soil was estimated to have covered about eighteen per cent of the cultivated area. This soil needed no frequent manuring but required hard labour on the part of the farmer because of its stiffness. The soil was found mostly the *parganas* favoured by good rains and yielded excellent crops of wheat, gram, cotton, jowar and til. *Bhuri* (brown) soil formed the second category and covered almost eighty-five per cent of the cultivated area. It required only moderate rains and was eminently suitable for the production of *bajra* and *moth*. This soil required manuring and could be used for three

130 Erskine, *op cit*, p. 182

131 Tod, Vol II, p. 124

132 Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, W.R.S. Residency and Bikaner Agency, 1909, p. 99

133. Walter p. 17

or four years continuously when it had to be left fallow for a similar period. A peculiar feature of *matiyali* and *bhuri* soil was that when rainfall was plentiful, they produced wheat and gram without artificial irrigation.¹³¹ Such a crop when produced was termed as *Sewaj*. In the third category of soil was the *rati* (red). It was also called as *Baikal*¹³⁵ or *Baikhu*. It was fine grained and sandy, having little or no admixture of clay. It was generally used for the autumn crops and was never manured. With light and timely rains it produced *bajra*, *jauar*, *moth*, *moong*, *til*, *matira* and *ganar*.¹³⁶ This soil when found in depressions was called as *dehri*, and as it retained the drainage of the adjacent lands yielded good crops, when it was found on mounds or elevated places it was called as *dhora*, and was disadvantageous to farming. The fourth category was a hard soil called *sharra* or *magia* and contained pebbles and stones. It was generally spread over the slopes of the hills and occupied about four percent of the cultivated area.¹³⁷ Tod had, however, termed the four categories of the soils in Marwar as *Baikal*, *Chikni*, *Peela* and *Suffed*.¹³⁸

System of Cultivation

The system of cultivation adopted by the agricultural class of people was very simple. When new land was to be brought under the plough, the bushes and shrubs were cut down and either burnt on the spot to provide the manure to the soil, or used as *barr* or fences for the field. The ground was then roughly levelled. This was the first stage of the work and was called *surh*. With the first fall of sufficient rain the farmers commenced the ploughing of their fields. The number of ploughing depended on the stiffness of the soil, and was called as *Phar*,¹³⁹ *Chauk*¹⁴⁰ and *Byari*.¹⁴¹ Either a camel

134 Rajasthan Gazetteer, Vol III-A, W R S Agency and Bikaner Agency, 1902, p 92

135 Tod, Vol II, p 125

136 Ibid

137 Rajasthan Gazetteer, Vol III-A, W R S Agency and Bikaner Agency, 1902, p 99

138 Tod, Vol II, p 125

139 When a field is ploughed once it is called *phar*

140 When a field is ploughed two or three times it is called *chauk*

141 When ploughed third or fourth time and the process of sowing commenced it was called *Byari*

or a pair of hulloks was yoked to each plough. Sometimes donkeys and buffalos were also used. After harrowing the field the sowing of the seeds was done. The seeds were sometimes scattered broadcast, especially in the case of *til*, but generally by means of a hamhoo drill attached to a p'ough.

The cultivation of spring crops drew special attention of the farmers of Marwar. The land, for this crop, was ploughed five to seven times and was then harrowed and levelled. Considerable attention was paid to *Ninan*¹⁴². The thorn fences or hedges of *Thor*¹⁴³ were erected to protect the field from animals and scare-crows were set up to frighten away the birds. A careful watch was kept and persons engaged in this work were provided with *gofan*,¹⁴⁴ and a noisy instrument made of peacock feather¹⁴⁵.

The harvesting was called as *duchm* or *laom*. The stalks bearing ears were cut down with a sickle known locally as *danthi*,¹⁴⁶ while those bearing pods were uprooted. They were placed by the person reaping the harvest into a *jholi* (hag), worn on the body. The produce was then collected at the thrashing floor. The process of thrashing was called *gaita*, under which the stalks were placed in heaps and the grain was separated from the straw by the hoofs of the bullocks who were driven round a pole (*med*) set up in the middle of each heap. Next stage of the operation was winnowing known as *uphanna*.¹⁴⁷

Rabi and *Kharif*, the two crop growing seasons were called *Sawnu* and *Unalu* respectively. The sowing of the *Sawnu* (autumn) crop used to commence with the first rains usually in the middle of July, and the harvest was generally reaped between September and October. The *Unalu* (spring) crops were sown in the months of October and November and harvested in April and May. The chief *Sawnu* crops were *bajra*, *jaṁwar*, *til*, *moth* and maize and the principal *unalu* crops consisted of wheat, barley, gram and mustard.¹⁴⁸

142 Weeding of the unwanted growth

143 A thorny plant-cactus

144 A primitive devise to throw stones to long distances

145 Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, p 100

146 Panchatantra (Illustrated), f 34 (PPJ)

147 Arsa Ramayana (Illustrated), f 5, Panchatantra (Illustrated) f 34 (PPJ)

148 Jodhpur State Records, Hath Bahi No 1, pp 31-48

Bajra had been the staple food of the majority of the people of Marwar, and was most extensively grown. Sometimes it was grown along with *moth* and *moong*. *Jawar* was better produced in a stiffer soil and required more water than *bajra*. The stalks of *Jawar* called *karab* were used for cattle. In case of the failure of timely rains, when the crop failed to thrive well, the green stalks were cut and used for cattle. It was called *chipti* which fetched better price than *karab*.¹⁴⁹

Wheat was the chief *unali* crop, of which there were two varieties. The crop that was produced by irrigation from the wells or other sources was known as *Pinal*. If irrigated by sweet water it was called *mithania* and if by saline water then known as *kharachia*. The second variety of the crop was termed as *sewaj* and was produced on land flooded by the rains and was not irrigated.

Wheat was sown in the month of October and harvested in March. It required four or five waterings. The straw was called *Khakla* and was used as fodder for the cattle.

Barley was produced¹⁵⁰ in almost the same manner as the *pinal* wheat, but it did not require so rich a soil and so many waterings. Gram was sown separately as well as mixed with barley in the month of October and the crop got matured from February to April. It was either reaped with a blunt sickle or uprooted. Maize was another important crop which was grown in Marwar in July or August. It required no irrigation and could be harvested after two months.

Til or sesame and *sarson* or mustard were the principal oil seeds produced in Marwar.¹⁵¹ *Til* was an autumn crop, while *sarson* was the spring crop. *Sarson* required irrigation and was generally sown with wheat.¹⁵²

Cotton was cultivated in Bahi, Desuri, Bilara and Merta *parganas*. The poppy was produced on small scale in Sojat. However,

149 Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, pp 103-104

150 Jodhpur State Records, Hath Bahi No 1, pp 31-48

151 Jodhpur State Records, Hath Bahi No 1, pp 31-48.

152 Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, p 104

opium was produced from it ¹⁵³ The seeds were used for medicines and the capsules were soaked in water which was taken as an intoxicant

Matura, *singhara* and *anar* were the chief fruits produced in Marwar. In addition to these, mangoes, oranges, plantains and plums were also grown. The vegetable cultivation of Marwar consisted of carrot, cabbage, cauliflower, garlic, onion, radish, etc ¹⁵⁴

Irrigation

Three modes of irrigation prevalent in Marwar were known as *chahi* (from wells), *nahri* (hy canals), *sailabi* (by inundation). The first mode namely *chahi* was the most significant. There were wells containing sweet water as well as brackish water. Furthermore, some of the wells were *pukka*, ¹⁵⁵ while others were *kachha* ¹⁵⁶. The cost of a *pukka* well varied from Rs 250/- to Rs 1,000/- according to the size and depth of the well. As against this a *kachha* well could be got ready in about two or three hundred rupees. Water-lifts of various kinds were used in Marwar. The adoption of a water lift depended on the depth of water. When water was not deep it was lifted by means of an *odhi* or *bamboo basket*, covered with leather and having a rope attached to either side. When the depth was nine feet or more it was lifted by means of a wooden beam balanced on a vertical post to which a heavy weight was attached at one end, and a small leather bucket or earthen jar at the other end. This device was known as *dhenkli*. When the depth of water was about fifteen feet a contrivance called *pag pavti* was used. It was a kind of miniature Persiao wheel worked by feet ¹⁵⁷. When water was more than fifteen feet deep it was lifted with the power of the bullocks or camels in various ways. The most common device was the *charas* or *jhelva*, under which a large leather bag was fastened to one end of the rope which passed over a pulley overhanging the well ¹⁵⁸. When the bag was lowered, the other end of the rope was attached to a pair of

¹⁵³ Hunter, Vol VII, p 238

¹⁵⁴ Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, p 104

¹⁵⁵ Walls lined with masonry

¹⁵⁶ Well with unlined walls

¹⁵⁷ Feet are called as *pag* in Marwar

¹⁵⁸ Nath-Charitra (Illustrated) (PPJ)

bullocks or camels, who were then driven down a ramp of a length approximately equal to the depth of the well. When the animals reached the end of the ramp, the bag was drawn up to the top of the well and the water from it was flown into a trough, by a man who stood by, but sometimes by a mechanical arrangement called *Sundia*.¹⁵⁹ Another device for the deep water well was the Persian wheel¹⁶⁰ called in Marwar as *arath*.¹⁶¹

In addition to wells, land was also irrigated by canals and distributaries originating from tanks as well as in their beds flooded by water. Irrigation by tanks and canals was not very popular in the period under review, but with the passing of time their popularity increased. Consequently by the end of the 19th century there were thirty-five tanks used for irrigation in the State. The largest among these were the Jaswant Sagar, the Sardar Samand and the Edward Samand. Other were of smaller size yet of great importance for irrigation. Amongst these the tanks of Chopra, Jograwas, Kharda and Sadri deserve mention.¹⁶²

Important Agricultural Implements

The agricultural implements were mostly traditional and of simple nature. *Hal* or plough being the most important and almost an indispensable implement of the farmer in Marwar. It consisted of the *hal* or wooden boot, the *nali* or peg attached to the upright shaft let into the boot and used as a handle, the *halwan* or iron share, the draught pole projecting in front, the *jori* or neck-yoke of the bullocks, the *jat* or the collarstrap. *Binjim*¹⁶³ was attached to the shaft.

Kiri or *savar* was a log of wood, which was dragged over the field by bullocks in order to level the ground and to collect some of the weeds. Among the hand tools the *kudali* (pick), the *phaora* (spade), the *kui pi* (weeding-hoe), the *danth* (sickle), the *jai* (pitch fork), the *dantali* (rake with wooden teeth) deserve mention.¹⁶⁴

159 Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol. III-A, pp 107-108

160 It is a well known and common device used throughout India, and requires no description,

161 Panchatantra (Illustrated), IV, f 37 (PPJ)

162 Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol. III-A, p 109

163 An implement for sowing seeds already described

164 Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol. III-A, pp 104-105.

Arts and Craft and Other Manufacturers

The occupation of the majority of people in Marwar was cultivation, yet various other occupations were also practised by many ¹⁶⁵ Their number was not very large but their influence on the economic life of the period was significant. Among this class were the weavers, carpenters, dyers, potters, gold-smiths, black-smiths, tailors, steel sharpeners, masons, etc ¹⁶⁶

Weaving was an important part of the cottage industry in Marwar, but the woollen and cotton cloth produced was quite rough. It was mostly manufactured with the indigenous fibre and wool and the technique adopted was also very old ¹⁶⁷ The dyeing and printing of cotton cloth constituted a highly specialised industry. The secret of the *chaduas* who were masters of this art, was that they took great care to gratify popular love of well designed combination of colours. The *thatheras* of Nagaur manufactured various kinds of cooking utensils which were generally exported. The persons engaged in the production of *phulmala*¹⁶⁸ were known as *Patras*. The *mochis* or cobblers of Jodhpur made beautiful leather boxes for clothes which were known as *Jamadanis*, and the *khatris* prepared snuff which was an important export item. Some Mohammadan artisans were engaged in the work of manufacturing arrows and were called as *tirgais*. Nagaur, Merta and Pali were the centres for the production of ivory goods including toys and bangles. The *chunigars* were gifted in this work, and the iron-mongers were masters in manufacturing iron wires, for use in musical instruments. Other manufacturers of Marwar deserving note were the felt cloaks and rugs and the *khas-khas* fans of Merta, the drinking vessels of bell-metal of Jalor, the marble toys, cups and other utensils of Makrana, the saddles and bridles of Sojat ¹⁷¹ Matchlocks, swords and other warlike implement were fabricated at the capital and at Pali.¹⁷²

165 Marwar Census Report, 1891

166 Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, p 117

167 Tod, Vol II, p 126

168 An embroidered silk knotted thread for wearing on the turban

169 Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, p 117

170 Water, p 33

171 Irskine, p 184, Walter, pp. 33-34, Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, p 117

172 Tod, Vol II, p 126

Trade and Commerce

During the period under review, Marwar was an important trading centre.¹⁷³ It formed a link connecting the sea coast and northern India. Pali had developed into a mart of great significance,¹⁷⁴ where the goods of India, Kashmir and China were exchanged for those of Europe, Africa, Persia and Arabia. Ivory, copper, borax, gum-arabic, silk, sandalwood, camphor, dates, coconuts, dyes, drugs, spices, coffee, etc., were brought by caravans to Pali from the parts of Kutch and Gurat. On their return journey the caravans took away cuminsseeds, asafoetida, opium, silks, muslins, shawls, dyed blankets, arms, potash and salt. The caravans were escorted under the guardianship of the *Charans*,¹⁷⁵ who occupied a very sacred position in the society of Marwar, so much so that even the most desperate outlaw seldom dared to commit any outrage on caravans moving under safeguard of these men. "If not strong enough to defend their convoy with sword and shield, they would threaten robbers with the *chandi* or 'self-immolation'"¹⁷⁶

The factor that proved to be a great hindrance in the growth of trade and commerce in Marwar was the taxation policy of the state. Transit duties and several other vexatious cesses such as *rahdari*, *mapa*, *dalali*, *chungi*, *tolai*, etc., were imposed. However, in 1882-83 the customs department of the state was reorganised and a universal tariff, based on the principle of reducing duty on necessities and enhancing duty on luxuries, was introduced. At the same time all the harassing duties listed above were abolished except import, export and transit duties. In 1891, transit duties were also abolished except in case of opium and other intoxicating drugs.¹⁷⁷

Animals formed the chief export item of Marwar. Goats and sheep (male only) were sent to Bombay and Gujrat, while buffaloes, bullocks and cows were exported to Jaipur and other neighbouring

173 Jodhpur, Nagaur, Merla, Pipar, Rani, Sojani, Bilotra, Barmer, Jaitaran, and Kuchaman were other important trading centres in Marwar.

174 Tod has described Pali as the emporium of Rajputana. Tod, Vol. II, p. 127.

175 The birds of Rajputs.

176 Tod, Vol. II, d. 128.

177 Administrative Reports of Marwar.

territories. Camels were mostly sent to Sindh. Hides, cotton, wool and oil seeds sent to Bombay and Beawar. Wool was also sent to Fazilka in the Punjab. Bombay and Karachi were the chief markets for the bones. Salt and marble were the items that were sent to different parts of India. All the splendid edifices of imperial cities owe their grandeur to the marble quarries of Makrana. The marble used in the palaces of Delhi, Agra, their mosques and tombs, had been conveyed from Marwar.¹⁷⁸

The principal articles imported to Marwar were—Sugar, from Bareilly, Kanpur, Chandausi and Muzaffarnagar, opium from Kota and Mewar, gur from Bareilly, Hathras and Mewar, rice from Chandusi and Sindh, dry fruits from Bombay, Bharonch and Ahmadabad, metals, kerosine oil and ivory from Bombay, tobacco from Panipat, Malwa and Nadia, *Mahua* flowers from Sirohi and wheat and barley from Sindh and Punjab.¹⁷⁹

The Salt Industry

The salt manufacture and its trade played a vital role in the economic life of Marwar. It was the backbone of the financial structure of the state, because the revenue from this was most certain and substantial. The salt consumed in Marwar was of two varieties known locally as *khar* and *nutha*. The use of the *khar* variety was restricted to industrial purposes or to the poor villages around Bilara. It was manufactured at Pichiyag and Molkosani in Bilara district. The *nutha* salt was manufactured at the Sambhar lake and at Didwana and Pachpadra.¹⁸⁰ The product of Sambhar was significant both in quantity as well as quality.¹⁸¹

The Sambhar salt lake was situated on the borders of Jodhpur and Jaipur, and was jointly owned by these states. Jaipur claimed its sovereignty over the eastern half of the lake while Jodhpur

178 Tod, Vol II, p 126

179 Imperial Gazetteer, Vol III-A (1903), p 119

180 F Ashton, *Salt Industries of Rajputana* in the *Journal of Indian Art and Industry*, Vol IX

181. Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol. III-A, pp. 151-152

extended it to the western half including the town of Sambhar¹⁸² The lake remained under British sequestration from the year 1835 to 1839, when Sutherland handed it back to Man Singh¹⁸³

Three methods were employed in the manufacture of salt Under the first, permanent salt works were constructed in the bed of the lake These were called *Kyars* The second method was the construction of shallow solar evaporation pans of a temporary nature on the shores of the lake, the third method was to obtain salt from the enclosed sections of the bed on which it was formed almost spontaneously¹⁸⁴

The statement of receipts and disbursements submitted along with the Annual Report of the year 1847, by Greathead, to the Agent to the Governor-General, showed that the receipts from salt in 1844-45 was Rs 3,80,420, and it had increased to Rs 5,39,964 in 1846-47. The increased revenue was considered as an indication of the prosperity of the neighbouring states. In Marwar it was estimated that 18 seers of salt was consumed by one man in a year which used to cost not more than four annas Greathead observed that Mewar drew salt from the Pachpadra lake, Gwalior and Bundelkhand from the Sambhar and Nawa Mats, and the produce of the Didwana salt tracts were sent to the British provinces These lakes were thought to be capable of yielding an indefinite supply of salt¹⁸⁵

The co-partnership of Jaipur and Jodhpur in the Sambhar Mart was working very amicably and both the parties were willingly abiding by the rules adopted by Captain Morrison who was in charge of the mart, when it was under British occupation¹⁸⁶

182 Imperial Gazetteer, Provincial Service, Rajputana, pp 101-102

183 The lake was occupied by the British so as to realise the arrears of British dues from Jodhpur Report from Sutherland to Secretary, Government of India dated 1st June 1847, Cons 7 August 1847, No 845, F & P

184 F Ashtor, *Salt Industries of Rajputana in the Journal of Indian Art and Industry*, Vol IX

185 H H Greathead, Political Agent Jodhpur to Sutherland, Agent to the Governor-General dated 1st January 1848, para 11 (Annual Report of the Political Agency for 1847)

186 Greathead's annual report, *loc cit.*

In the year 1870 the Sambhar lake was leased to the British Government for an annual payment of seven lakhs ($4\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs to Jodhpur and $2\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs to Jaipur)¹⁸⁷ However, it was a condition of the agreement that if the sale of salt exceeded 63,400 tons, then 40 percent of the sale price of such excess would be paid to both the states as royalty A revised agreement was made in the year 1884 under which Jodhpur received four-fifth and Jaipur three-eighth of total royalty payable In addition to the royalty Jodhpur received 14,000 maunds and Jaipur 7,000 maunds of salt free of charge¹⁸⁸ The salt monopoly obtained by the British no doubt helped in the development of the salt works, but the act caused a vey strong reaction against the British in Marwar. The high profits earned by the British salt monopoly resulted in a deep feeling of discontent in Marwar which effected the government as well as the masses.

187 Jodhpur State Records, Khariya Bahu No 16, p 31.

188. Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol. III-A, p 216, Irskine, p. 102.

CHAPTER VI

ADMINISTRATION

The Position of the Ruler

At the apex of the administrative set up of the government in Marwar stood the ruler, who held the title of *Maharaja*. He occupied that position as the head of the clan of *Rathors*, whose ancestors first conquered the country and who had ever since possessed it.¹ The Maharaja exercised supreme civil and criminal jurisdiction within the limits of his state. In the absence of any written constitution and law, his powers were most extensive and were only restrained by the moral influence, the customary law, and the conventions established by the *Shastras*² and the power of his feudatories. All the high officials of the government including the *Pradhan* and the *Devan* were appointed by his authority and remained in office at his pleasure.³ He was the supreme head of the armed forces and in that capacity used to command it in times of peace and war.

The feudal Set up: Position in the Administration and their influence

The constitution was generally that of a feudal nature.⁴ Marwar had been characterised as tribal suzerainty rapidly passing into a

1 Watler, Major C K M, *op cit*, p 14

2 Kharila from Man Singh to the Governor-General, received on 16th October 1829 Cons 7 November 1829, No 5, F & P

3 Sutherland to Waddock dated 10th June 1839, Cons 24 July 1839, No 38, F & P

4 The system has been described variously by the writers on the subject. Tod had described the system as feudal and had compared it with the feudalism of Europe. *Tod Annals*, Vol I, pp 107-112. The Rajputana Gazetteer states that "in fact the system upon which the land is distributed among the branch families and other great hereditary landlords, is

feudal stage⁵ Next to the Maharaja in rank and power were the chiefs or *jagirdars* called *thakurs*, holding their estates directly from the head of the State⁶ Their origin could be traced to the very beginning of the Rajput rule in India and the law of succession among the Rajput rulers According to this law younger brothers of the successor to the throne were assigned *jagirs* for the maintenance of their families⁷ The size of these *jagirs* depended mainly on the size of the state These thakurs, Malcolm has observed, "claimed a right of advising their prince, and when his measures are in their opinion ruinous, they often assemble, and endeavour to sway him to a contrary course, or, in extremes to oppose him Their being indeed, on equality with their princes in birth and tribe, when they combined with the possession of a stronghold, gives character of rude independence to these chiefs, which keeps them in a state of constant warfare with the prince to whom they profess allegiance"⁸ Their acceptance of the suzerainty and supremacy of the Maharaja was conditional upon the acceptance of their services by their ruler, This fact becomes amply clear in the letter the expatriated thakurs wrote to the Political Agent in August 1821 in which they expressed that "if he accepts our services then he is our prince and leader, if not, but our equal, and we gain his brothers, claimants of and laying claim to the soil"⁹ However, the Thakurs never enjoyed the status of the ruler whom they were bound to serve according to the terms of their jagirs in times of peace as well as wars¹⁰

the basis of the political constitution of a Rajput state and forms its characteristic distinction And this is not, speaking accurately feudal, though it has grown into something very like feudalism The tenure of the great clansmen involves military service and payment of financial aids, but its source is to be found in the original clan occupation of the lands, and in the principles of kinship and a purity of descent from the original occupants or conquerors" The Rajputana Gazetteer, (1879) Vol I, pp 59-60

5 Gazetteer of Marwar, Mallani and Jaisalmer (1877), p 14

6 Malcolm, *A Memoirs of Central India including Malwa and adjoining provinces*, p 466

7 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Register No 69, p 11

8 Malcolm, *op cit*, p 466

9 Letter dated August 1821 from the expatriated thakurs of Marwar to the Political Agent, Tod, Vol I, Appendix No 1, p 159

10 Jodhpur State Records, Arji Bahi No 6, p 232, Haqiqat Register No 64, p 131

In addition to the near relatives of a ruler there existed several other types of *jagirdars*. For example, there were military adventurers who used to wander along with their supporters in search of military employment. They were sometimes given *jagirs* proportionate to their importance and utility.¹¹ Similarly, vanquished chiefs were given *jagirs* for their maintenance. *Jagirs* were granted in lieu of military or civil service. These grants were generally for a life time, but in exceptional cases they were made hereditary also.¹² In case of hereditary *jagirs*, the formal and official recognition at the time of succession was considered necessary. This was traditionally known as *Matampusi*,¹³ or condolence visit to the successor on the death of his predecessor.

The feudal lords formed the backbone of the defence system of the state and it was with their support and active participation that the ruler could exercise his power and undertake military expeditions against external power or internal rebels.¹⁴

On the eve of the development of the British relations with Marwar state, there were eight principal chiefs of *thakurs* who were considered to be of the first order and others were that of the second order. Col Tod has listed them as follows —

FIRST CLASS

S No	Names of Chief	Clans	Places of abode	Revenue.
1	Kesri Singh	Champawat	Ahwa	1,00,000
2	Bhakhtawar Singh	Kumpawat,	Asope	50,000
3	Salim Singh	Champawat	Pokaran	1,00,000
4	Surthan Singh	Udawat	Nimaj	50,000
5		Mertia	Reah	25,000
6	Ajit Singh.	Mertia.	Ghanerao	50,000
7		Karamost	Khinwasar	50,000
8		Bhatti	Khejarla	25,000

11 *Ibid*, Haqiqat Bahi No 13, p 464

12 J S R., Haqiqat Bahi No 61, p 429, Khas Rukka Parwana Bahi No 2, p 20

13 *Ibid*, Haqiqat Bahi No 43, p 185, Haqiqat Bahi No 48, p 257, Haqiqat Bahi No 33, p 174, Khata Bahi No 1, p 7

14 *Ibid*, Khas Rukka Parwana Bahi No 2 p 3

15. Tod, Vol II, p. 135.

SECOND CLASS

S No	Name of the Chiefs.	Clan.	Place of abode	Revenue.	Remarks
1.	Shivnath Singh.	Udawat.	Kuchaman	50,000	a chief of
2.	Surthan Singh.	Jodha.	Khari-ka-dewa	25,000	considerable
3.	Prithvi Singh.	Udawat	Chandawal.	25,000	power
4	Tej Singh	Udawat	Khada.	25,000	
5.	Anar Singh	Bhati	Ahor	11,000	
6	Jeth Singh	Kumpawat	Bagri	40,000	
7.	Padam Singh	Kumpawat.	Gazsinghpura.	25,000	
8.		Mertia	Mehtri	40,000	
9.	Kurrun Singh.	Udawat	Marot	15,000	
10	Zalim Singh	Kumpawat	Rohit	15,000	
11	Sawai Singh	Jodha	Chaupur	15,000	
12			Budsu,	20,000	
13	Sheodan Singh.	Champawat	Kaotah(great)	40,000	
14	Zalim Singh	„	Harsola	10,000	
15.	Sawai Sinhh	„	Degode.	10,000	
16	Hukam Singh	„	Kaotah (little)	11,000 ¹⁶	

The feudal lords of distinction were styled as *Tajum Sardars*¹⁷ who were mostly Rathors descending from the ruling stock known as *Sirayats*¹⁸ and the rest belonging to the other Rajput clans enjoyed the title of *Ganayats*¹⁹. The *Tajum Sardars* were classified into different categories. The *Suayat* nobles enjoyed the privilege of *Dovri Tazim* (or double Tazim), under which the Maharaja rose on their arrival as well as departure²⁰. While some of the *Ganayats* were honoured by *Dovri Tazim*, the others were given only *Ekevri*

16 Tod, Vol II, p 135

17 When the ruler honoured a feudal chief by rising from his seat in a formal court, the act was called Tazim

18 Jodhpur State Records, Khas Rukka Parwana Bahi No 9, p 28

19 Jodhpur State Records, Byavari Bahi No 1, p 125, Khariia Bahi No. 9, p 35

20 JSR, Khas Rukka Parwana Bahi No. 9, p, 28

Tazim (or single *Tazim*) under which the Maharaja rose on the *sardars* arrival only ²¹

General Duties of the Feudatories

In addition to the payment of the '*Rekh*' and providing militia by way of feudal service, it was the duty of the feudal chiefs to attend the court of the ruler except when they were on frontier duties or were on leave ²² In any case a succession of attendants was always secured to keep up to the splendour of the court and perform personal service at the palace The principal chiefs, however, joined the Maharaja's cavalcade and attended the court on festive and solemn occasions only ²³ It was a part of the duties of the *thakurs* to perform personal service at the palace and to look after the security and comfort of the royal *Zenana*, especially when the Maharaja was out of the capital ²⁴

As the hereditary Council or *Panchyat* of the State, the feudal lords enjoyed the right to participate in the discussions of general policy and other important matters ²⁵ On all important occasions such as the special *darbars*, marriage in the royal family, and in times of crisis, the principal chiefs were sent the *Khas Rukkas* or special letters from the ruler inviting them to the court ²⁶ These were written by the private secretaries with the sign-manual of the Maharaja attached, and sealed with his (Maharaja's) private finger ring ²⁷

Powers of the Feudatories

The feudatories were completely responsible for the safety of life and property within their jagirs and they exercised certain power

²¹ Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 43, p. 160

²² Jodhpur State Records, Arzi Bahi No 6, p. 226

²³ Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 47, p. 324, Arzi Bahi No 6, p. 226

²⁴ Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 43, pp. 147, 150, 151, 223

²⁵ Jodhpur State Records, Bazar Bahi No 1, pp. 213-218

²⁶ Jodhpur State Records, Bazar Bahi No 1, p. 196, Kharita Bahi No 15, p. 15, Khas Rukka Bahi No 4, p. 16, Khas Rukka Bahi No 6, p. 16-17, Khas Rukka Bahi No 8, p. 51.

²⁷ Jodhpur State Records, Khas Rukka Bahi No 8, p. 44

over their subjects in civil and criminal matters also. The extent of these powers depended on customs and usages regulated by the status and position of the thakur. Some of the powerful feudatories enjoyed almost complete independence in their domestic policy.²⁸ The thakurs of Ahua and Pokaran at different times enjoyed the privilege to attest by their signatures all grants of villages made by the Maharaja.²⁹ The exceptional honour of putting the *tilak* on the forehead of the ruler, with the blood drawn from his own thumb, on the occasion of the coronation was enjoyed by the thakur of Bagri.³⁰

Ministers, Councillors and Other Officials

In the Rajput states of Rajasthan, it was generally a court favourite who occupied the office of the Prime Minister. He used to occupy the position by dint of talent and character or sheer intrigue. At Jodhpur he was called *Pradhan*,³¹ and the office was hereditary in the house of Ahua till the time of Maharaja Vijay Singh, when the thakur became a victim of the treachery and was murdered in the royal court.³² The office was then transferred to the chief of Asop. During the reign of Man Singh the thakur of Asop developed a distrust for the sovereign and adopted a negative approach, keeping himself aloof from the activities of the court. Consequently the office of *Pradhan* was occupied by the thakurs of Pokaran,³³ Nimaj and Kuchaman at different periods.³⁴ Tod observed that, "in truth, these *Purdhans* of Marwar have always been millstones round the necks of their princes, an evil interwoven in their system when the partition of estates took place amidst the sons of Jodha in the infancy

28 Report on the Political Administration of Rajputana, 1865-66, Part. I, pp. 11-12

29 N. Alves to Macnaghten dated 21st October 1838, Cons. 26 December, 1838, No. 27, F & P

30 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No. 27, pp. 620-621

31 At Jaipur he was called *Musahib* and at Kota *Killadar*

32 Jodhpur *Rajya Ki Khyat*, Vol. III, pp. 51-53, *Vir Vindan*, Part II, pp. 855-56

33 Ludlow to Sutherland dated 19th June 1841, R. A. O. H. R. 228, File No. 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No. VII, p. 234

34 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No. 37, p. 162, Oudh Bahi No. 3, p. 6

of this state. It was, no doubt, then deemed politic to unite to the interests of the crown so powerful a branch, which when combined could always control the rest, but this gave too much equality".³⁵

The duties of a *Pradhan* were to a great extent related to his talents and ambition. The office could be occupied only by one of the principal Rajput feudal chiefs. He was the 'military minister which the political government of the fiefs', and as a rule did not interfere with the civil administration of the state which was under the jurisdiction of *Devan*. The two, however, maintained full co-ordination in their activities. The power and influence attached to the office of the *Pradhan* made him exceptionally important and it was he through whom all requests to the sovereign for favour were preferred and granted. His influence was not limited to the military classes only, it extended to the inferior offices of the state also. Above all, the *Pradhan* enjoyed the right to attest by his signatures all grants of land made by the Maharaja.³⁶ In the ceremonial processions, the *Pradhan* was entitled to occupy the back seat on the *howdah* of the elephant on which the sovereign was seated. It was he who was to waive the *Morchal* or peacock-feathers over the head of the Maharaja.³⁷

The *Devan* was the head of the civil administration and had a wide range of duties to perform. In addition to the general control and supervision of the administration he had to look after the finance and revenue departments. In view of the responsibilities imposed on him and the nature of his difficult task he was usually assisted by two *Naib Derans* who looked after the treasury and the office.³⁸ As a rule the *Devan* was never chosen from amongst the Rajputs.³⁹ Every *Devan* at the time of his installation into the office received a robe of honour, known as *Devangi Dupatta*, and a seal of the office.

35 Tod, Vol I, p 152

36 N Alves to Macnaghten dated 21st October 1838, Cons 26 December, 1838, No 17, F & P

37 Walter, *op. cit.*, p 65

38 Ochterlony to Adams, dated 7th January 1819, Cons 30 January, 1819, No 58, F & P

39 Ludlow to Sutherland dated 19th June 1841, R A O H R 228, File No 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No VII, p 234

with his own name inscribed. The seal was to be surrendered by the *Devan* whenever the post was vacated by him ⁴⁰

Next to the *Pradhan* and the *Devan* was the important post of the *Bakhshi*. He was a minister and councillor of the state. It was his duty to take the musters and to look after the payments to the armed forces. He had to perform civil as well as military functions. All the documents granting feudal lands as well as ordering their sequestration were issued by him. There was an established convention in all the Rajput states of Rajputana to choose the *Bakhshi* also, from the non-militant classes ⁴¹

Killadar The *Killadar* or commandant of the fortress, was entrusted with the heavy responsibility of the security and defence of the fort ⁴². The post was given to a person who had extraordinary ability to shoulder the responsibility, and one who was considered trustworthy by the Maharaja. During Man Singh's time the most important occupant of the post was Nagji, who proved utterly untrustworthy and became a victim of Man Singh's fury. Consequently his condemnation was passed and he was 'hurled over the battlements of the rock which it was his duty to guard' ⁴³. Anar Singh was the *Killadar* during Takht Singh's time and his historic sacrifice in the fighting at Ahwa in 1857 earned him an undying fame ⁴⁴. *Killadar's* faith and his ability was put to a real test when the fort was besieged by an enemy.

Vakil The post the *Vakil* was diplomatic in nature. He represented the government at the foreign courts and looked after the interests of his state and *darbar*. All communications and negotiation were generally conducted through the *vakils*. Sometimes

40 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 10, p 107

41. Tod, Vol I, p 380, Sutherland to Waddock dated 20th October, 1839, Cons 24 February 1840, No 34 (para 16), F & P,

42 Tod, Vol I, p 566

43 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 10, p 44, Tod, Vol II, p 119

44 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 18, p 384

45 Sir Charles Metcalfe invited the rulers of Rajputana in 1818 to depute their *vakils* to conduct the treaty negotiations. Vyas Bishan Ram was deputed by Marwar. Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 80 p 330

vakils were especially deputed to carry out specific diplomatic missions and were delegated wide range of powers⁴⁶ The role of *vakils* assumed greater importance after the institution of the International Court of *Vakils* in the year 1844⁴⁶ In addition to these, there were the *Dyoddar* who guarded the entrance to royal palaces and announced the visitors in the presence of the Maharaja,⁴⁷ the *Kotwal*, the officer incharge of the law and order in the city, and other subordinate officers to look after the departments of *Jawahar Khana* (store for Jewels, ornaments and other treasure), *Rasoda* (the royal kitchen), *Abdarkhana* (department of water), *Bagan-ka-koihar* (department of garden), *Sej khana* (department of equipment) and *Farrash-khana* (department of furniture and camp equipment) etc⁴⁸

The Administration of the Parganas

The territory under the rule of the government of Marwar was divided into twenty-two *parganas* or districts⁴⁹ Each *pargana* was in the immediate charge of a *Hakim* who exercised both Judicial and executive powers and communicated directly with the central government at the capital The *hakims* were appointed and removed at the pleasure of the Maharaja or his minister and they exercised for the time, the same jurisdiction in the *khalsa* lands as the *thakurs* did permanently over their estates As general conservators of the peace, *hakims* exercised certain degree of authority over the *thakurs* themselves⁵⁰ The *hakims* had a number of duties to perform In addition to the maintenance of law and order in the *parganas*, they

46 Report on the Political Administration of Rajputana, 1865-67, Part I, pp 14-15

47 Jodhpur State Records, Haqiqat Bahi No 10, p 117

48 Journal of Indian History, Vol XXXIV, Part I, p 72 An article by Dr G N Sharma on 'Society and culture of Rajasthaos as revealed from the Byava Bahi of Dastri Records, Jodhpur'

49 Excluding the *pargana* of Mallani held by the British Government in trust since 1834 These twenty-two *parganas* were as follows Bahi or Godwar, Bijara, Didwana, Jalore, Jaitrao, Jaswantpura, Jodhpur, Marote, Merta, Nagaur, Nawa, Pachpadra, pahi, Parbatsar, Phalodi, Sanchoore, Sakra, Sambhar, Shewana, Sheo, Shergarh, Sojat Report on the Administration of Jodhpur State, p 2

50 Walter, *op cit*, p 15

were to act as collectors of the revenue⁵¹ They were empowered to appoint several subordinate officials who assisted them in the discharge of their duties These were the *Amils* who looked after the work of the collection of excise and customs duties, the *Qanungo*, who maintained the revenue records of the districts and was responsible for the revenue collections also.

The unit of the *Hawala* administration was the village or a group of villages under a *Hawaladar* These units were grouped and put under the *Darogas* or *Girdawars* The work of *girdawari* and preparation of other village records was done by the *Hawaladar* who was directly responsible to the *Girdawari* The collection of rental demands were effected through the agency of the *Amils* controlled by the *Hakims* or *Pargana* officers⁵²

The other village officials were the *Kanawaria* who guarded the fields and prevented the cultivators from stealing the corn The *tasadar* was responsible for receiving and furnishing the accounts of the Darbar portion of the produce⁵³ He was sent, when the whole produce of the village was collected at one place, to receive the Darbar portions of the same The *tolavati* was another village official who measured or weighed the produce⁵⁴ In addition to all these officers, there were the *chaudhri* and *patnari* who performed a number of duties as the representatives of the government⁵⁵

Revenue Administration

The principal sources of fiscal revenue of the state were the *Khalsa* lands, salt lakes, customs and excise duties and the *Hasil*⁵⁶ No uniform system of assessment of land revenue prevailed in Marwar Though it varied from *pargana* to *pargana*, it was generally considered that one-third of the actual produce was the prevailing rate In Nagaur it was one-half whereas in the western desert *pargana* it was as low as one-fourth⁵⁷ Tod, however, observed that a corn

51 Jodhpur State Records, Hath Bahi No IV, pp 225-229

52 Report on the Administration of Jodhpur, 1937-38, p 14

53 Gazetteers of Marwar Malleri and Jeysulmer, p 18

54 *Ibid*

55 Jodhpur State Records, Hath Bahi No 3, p 42

56 Tod, Vol II, p 131, Hasil included the miscellaneous taxes.

57 Gazetteers of Marwar Malleri and Jeysulmer (1877), p 17.

rent, termed *Battai* or 'division', was appropriated equally between the prince and the husbandman, a deviation from the more lenient practice of former times, which gave one-fourth or one-sixth to the sovereign.⁵⁸ In addition to *Battai* an assessment of two rupees per maund of the yield was made to cover the salaries paid to the *Shenahs* (watchmen) and *Kanwarnis*, leaving a surplus to be divided between the *patel* and the *patwari*. Furthermore, a cartload of *Karbi* was exacted to supply fodder for the prince's cattle. The farmer, however, had the option to get this last exaction commuted for a cash payment of rupee one.⁵⁹

The land revenue was mostly collected from the cultivators in kind and there were different modes of realising it.⁶⁰ The most acceptable to the cultivators was *lata* mode, under which all the produce of the harvest was reaped and collected at one, two or more places close to the village, and after threshing out, the *darbar* portion was taken in kind on the spot,⁶¹ having been duly measured or weighed.⁶² Under *Kunta* mode it was taken by guess or calculation.⁶³ This mode was very unpopular among the farmers who generally complained against it. *Kankar kunta* was another mode under which the total amount of the harvest was calculated while the crops were standing, and the *Darbar* portion was taken in kind or cash on the basis of that calculation.⁶⁴ A fixed rate per bigha in cash was realised from the cultivators under *mukuta* mode whereas a fixed rate per bigha, after measurement was received in cash or kind under the *Bigori* mode. The last was the *gugari* mode under which a fixed amount of produce in kind was received generally from the irrigated lands.⁶⁵

Land Tenures

There were about 3,500 villages including those of Mallani and two-third out of these belonged to the feudal aristocracy of the Rathor

58 Tod, Vol II, p. 122

59 *Ibid*

60 Jodhpur State Records, Hath Bahi No. 4, pp. 94-97

61 Jodhpur State Records, Saod Bahi No. 108, p. 219

62 Jodhpur State Records, Saod Bahi No. 63, p. 16, Saod Bahi No. 108, P. 119

63 Jodhpur State Records, Sanad Bahi No. 63, p. 16

64 Jodhpur State Records, Sanad Bahi No. 52, p. 33,

65 Gazetteer of 'Marwar Mallani and Jeysulmere', pp. 17-18, Jodhpur State Records, Hath Bahi No. 4, pp. 94-97

clan, who held their lands by right of consanguinity to the ruling prince. They paid a yearly military cess or *rekh* at 8 per cent of the gross rental value of the estate. Furthermore they had the obligation to furnish one horseman for every thousand rupees worth of *rekh*. Thakurs paying *rekh* amounting to less than one thousand rupees had to provide one foot-soldier. In the event of the death of a thakur, his heir was to pay a succession tax (*Hukamanamah*). When it was a case of direct descent the Darbar took three-fourth of the gross rental of the estate, leaving one-fourth for the support of the heir, who was absolved from performing *chakri* (service) for that year. Where the heir was an adopted son, the whole of the revenue of the estate for one year was taken as succession tax and he was exempted from *chakri*.⁶⁶

The village lands were partially or wholly classified into different categories. The *bapi* land (or fatherland) was the first of these under which came the lands of ancestral inheritance from *bap* or father. Their title was confirmed either by the *darbar* or by the *jagirdar*. These lands became the perpetual inheritance of the cultivator and could not, except under extraordinary circumstances, be resumed. He could sell these lands or dispose them of in any way he liked. Only in case of the death of the owner without leaving any heir, could these lands be appropriated by the *Darbar* or the *Jagirdar* or made over to any other person. The owner of these lands was strictly prohibited from giving it in charity.

These lands were not exempt from the customary rents to *darbar* or *Jagirdar* as the case might be. The title to *bapi* lands was confirmed under certain specific circumstances.⁶⁷

66 Gazetteer of 'Marwar Mallani and Jeysulmer' pp 19-20

67 The title was confirmed when a cultivator —

- (i) had dug a well at his own expense with the permission of the *darbar* or the *jagirdar*
- (ii) had constructed an embankment with the object of fertilising his field and those of his neighbours
- (iii) had peopled a deserted site within his own village and had brought the land around that site under cultivation
- (iv) had paid a lump sum for the title or promised to pay an enhanced rate of rent in perpetuity

Gazetteers of Marwar, Mallani and Jeysulmer, pp 20-21

When *bapi* lands were held by the brahmins they were called *Mangli* ⁶⁸ Lands subject to assessments were classified as *Hasli* and formed the major portion of the lands belonging to a village. Next in order came the *Sasan* lands which were granted for charitable purposes ⁶⁹ These were exempt from all kinds of assessments but for these the *Raj Sanads* were to be secured ⁷⁰ Lands given in charity by the jagirdars were termed as *Doli*. In their case no *Raj Sanad* was required and they were exempt from assessment and taxes ⁷¹ The *Pusaita* lands were the rent free lands given to their employees by the Jagirdar and were resumed with the termination of service. Yet another category was that of *Jagir* lands. When the *Darbar* or a feudal chief resumed any village from his jagirdar, the latter was allowed to retain some lands to be tilled by him or his tenants. They were exempt from all taxes. The *Bhum* lands were given to the persons who had rendered important services to the State. The lands conquered and successively enjoyed for generations were also categorised as *Bhum* ⁷² Their owner paid only a fixed sum yearly, termed as *faubal*.⁷³ Only some political or grave offence could cause the resumption of these lands ⁷⁴

Other Sources of State Revenue

In addition to the land revenue there were other sources that contributed substantially to the income of the state. There was a poll-tax of one rupee, levied on adults of either sex throughout Marwar. It was called the *Angali* ⁷⁵ Similarly there was a graduated tax on cattle termed as the *gasmali* exacted for the use of pasture lands. A sheep or goat was estimated at one anna, a buffalo eight annas and each camel three rupees. The *Kewari* was a house tax

68 *Mangli* means propitious

69 Jodhpur State Record, Haqiqat Bahi No. 59, p. 47

70 Jodhpur State Records, Sanad Bahi No. 57, p. 111

71 Jodhpur State Records, Sanad Bahi No. 58, p. 35, Sanad Bahi No. 59, p. 47

72 Gazetteers of 'Marwar, Mallani and Jeysulmere', pp. 21-23

73, Dhohan ka Kothar Records, Jodhpur State Records, File No. 43, Jama-Kharch, No. 43

74 Jodhpur State Records, Sanad Bahi No. 105, p. 581

75 *Angali* was derived from *anga* meaning the body

imposed by Maharaja Bijay Singh and amounted to rupees three per house. Originally it was created as a temporary contribution but was later on converted into a permanent tax. Man Singh raised it to ten rupees on each house. The tax was considered very oppressive.⁷⁶ On 24th August 1840 the 'house tax' again became a subject of discussion when the Maharaja and the assembled council in the presence of the Political Agent took a decision that the deficiency of Rs 2,51,000 in the annual revenue should be compensated to the extent of Rs 1,50,000 by the continuance of the annual house tax.⁷⁷ *Kewari* was also known as *Gharbab*. In addition to these there were many other taxes, such as, *Sonar Kharch*,⁷⁸ *Dana*, *Faujbal*, etc.⁷⁹

The *Sayer* or customs duties were also one of the important sources of revenue for the Jodhpur State. Tod had estimated the revenue from *Sayer* at Rs 4,30,000. The *Dhannis* were the salaried officers entrusted with the responsibility of the collection of these duties and were assisted by a number of patty agents who were paid a certain percentage of the sums collected.⁸⁰ The practice of customs collections by *Ijaras* or the contract given to the highest bidder was also prevalent.⁸¹

Salt formed the chief article of export. In addition to salt, *til*, *sarson*, cotton, wool, marble, wheat and animals were also generally exported. Cloth, saccharine produce, timber, tobacco, rice and drugs formed the principal items of import.⁸² However, the revenue from the produce of the salt lakes was one of the most certain and substantial branch of the state income.⁸³

76 Tod, Vol II, pp 131-132

77 Ludlow to Sutherland dated 26th September 1851 (para 15), R A O H R 228, File No 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Collection No VII, pp 305-306

78 Sutherland to Secretary, Government of India, dated 1st June 1847, Cons 7 August 1847, No 845, F & P

79 Jodhpur State Records, Hath Bahi No 4, pp 94-97

80 Tod, Vol II, p 132

81 Jodhpur State Records, Hath Bahi No 1, pp 6-7; Khas Rukka Parwana Bahi No 1, p 76

82 Report on the Administration of Jodhpur State for the year 1885-86, pp 10-11. The subject is dealt in detail in the previous chapter.

83 Tod, Vol II, p. 133, It is dealt in detail in the previous chapter,

Administration of Justice

The administration of justice, during the period ending with the eighteenth century, was of a primitive nature. There was neither any written law emanating from the head of the state nor any system of permanent and regularly constituted courts of justice. The external invasions and internal disorders were probably responsible for the state of affairs. In some cases disputes were settled by the efforts of the people themselves, in others the assistance of the village *panchayat* was sought. Cases were also settled by the primitive mode of trial by ordeal, for which various forms were prescribed.⁸⁴ Where the matter could not be settled by any of these institutions the case was brought to the *Hakim*, who performed the executive as well as the judicial functions and was the highest authority in the district. The *Hakim* was assisted by *karkuns* and *Ijlasnavis*. Appeals against the decisions of *hakim* were to be made to the *Karkhana Adalat*, constituting four judges. Extraordinary and complicated cases were decided by the ruler himself in consultation with the judges of *Karkhana Adalat*, the *Devan* and the *Bakhshi*.⁸⁵ The ruler was of course the highest court of appeal. Some rulers like Bakht Singh were so dedicated to the cause of justice that their judgments set a very high tradition. Unfortunately very few rulers took so keen interest and the result was that the cause of justice received a great setback. Tod has observed that since the time of Maharaja Bijay Singh "the judgement seat had been vacant", and that "the administration of justice was very lax". Capital punishment was rarely awarded and even persons convicted of murder were punished by fine, corporal punishment, imprisonment, confiscation of property or banishment. In direct contrast to this, political offences were dealt with extremely grave punishment including capital punishment. There was special arrangements for the trial of religious persons. The Naths enjoyed special privilege, their cases were decided by *Ayasn Maharaj* of Mahamandir.⁸⁶

Army Organization—Its Nature and Foreign Elements

The armed forces of Jodhpur, till Maharaja Vijay Singh's reign (1753-1793) were chiefly constituted of the feudal contingents,

⁸⁴ Rajputana Gazetteer Vol. III-A, p. 132

⁸⁵ Jodhpur State Records, Hath Bahi No. 4, p. 229

⁸⁶ Jodhpur State Records, Hath Bahi No. 4, pp. 57-58

furnished by nobles, whenever called upon to do so. However, owing to the growing power of the nobles and the increasing menace of the Maratha depredations, Maharaja Vijay Singh was compelled to raise a small force of his own, chiefly composed of the foreign mercenaries.⁸⁷ At the time when the Maratha power was in the ascendant and the Pindaris were ravaging India, the Jodhpur force numbered some 12,000 men, of whom 4,000 were Jagir *sowats*. These latter were only called out to aid in time of war while the remainder, were a mixed force, including 7 guns, cavalry and infantry.⁸⁸ They were mostly the foreign mercenaries consisting of the Afghans, Rohillas, Sindhis, and Purbias,⁸⁹ and were irregularly paid and indifferently equipped.⁹⁰ The foreign mercenary force was maintained by the Maharaja mainly with the aim of overawing and keeping his turbulent feudal chiefs in check. Their strength fluctuated from time to time.⁹¹

At the time of the signing of the Treaty of 1818, Sir Charles Metcalfe had observed that the force of cavalry which the Maharaja of Jodhpur could collect, including the contingents of his thakurs, of which it was principally composed, did not exceed 6,000.⁹² Sir Ochterlony also found that proper and natural force of Jodhpur was six thousand cavalry and ten thousand infantry, summoned to the field as occasion required on the system or something resembling feudal tenure. The foreign mercenaries employed by the state used to cost the exchequer about rupees two lakh.⁹³

Tod had an opportunity to have a closer look at the military strength of Jodhpur during his visit to that place in 1819. He reported

87 Report on the administration of the Jodhpur State, 1907-08, p. 5

88. Major S. Beatson's report on the development of the Jodhpur State force. Annual Report, Jodhpur 1889-90, p. 132

89 Jodhpur State Records, Khas Rukka Parvan Bahi No 68, p. 198, Sanad Bahi No 7, p. 128, Haqiqat Bahi No 7, p. 48

90 Jodhpur State Records, Hath Bahi No 3, pp. 42-43, Hath Bahi No 4, pp. 228-29

91 Tod, Vol. II, p. 134

92. Sir Charles Metcalfe to Secretary, Government of India, dated 15th January 1818, Coos. 6 March 1818, No 4, F & P.

93 Memo of information sent to the Government of India by Sir Ochterlony dated 12th August 1818, Cons. 5 September 1818, Nos 12-16, F & P.

to the Government that "the existing 14 corps of foreign mercenaries then in Jodhpur, numbering nominally 5,830 foot and 2,350 horse, but really about one-third less in numbers, and those in a state of the utmost misery, their arms sold, their horses pawned for subsistence, and themselves compelled to mechanical or servile pursuits to keep body and soul together"⁹⁴ In addition to the Jagir force and the foreign mercenaries, there was a brigade of the monastic militants called *Bishanswanis*,⁹⁵ whose strength was estimated to be seven hundred foot, three hundred horse and a corps armed with bows and arrows⁹⁶

The conclusion of the treaty of 1818 with the East India Company and the resultant feeling of security and protection on the part of the Maharaja, coupled with the financial difficulties of the state, led to a substantial reduction in the strength of foreign mercenary force in Jodhpur⁹⁷ However, the reorganisation and reconstitution of the military administration of the state commenced only in the year 1839 when the Maharaja acted according to the advice of Ludlow, the Political Agent⁹⁸

Administrative Changes Effected in Jodhpur through the British Intervention

Immediately after the military expedition and the occupation of the Jodhpur fort in September 1839 by the British,⁹⁹ an attempt

94 Captain James Tod to Secretary, Government of India dated 25th November 1819, Cons 22 January 1820, No 65, F & P In his book *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol II" (p 134) Tod had, however written that "Raja Maun had a corps of three thousand five hundred foot and fifteen hundred horse with twenty-five guns commanded by Hundall Khan"

95 Jodhpur State Records, Arji Bahi No 4, p 274 They were known as *Dadu-Pantins* and *Nagas* also

96 Tod, Vol II, p 134

97 A letter from Cavendish forwarded by Colebrooke to the Government dated 20th April 1828, Cons 13 June 1828, Nos 1-4, F & P, Cavendish to Colebrooke dated 27th June 1828 Cons, 29 July 1828, No 24, F&P

98 Sutherland to Secretary, Government of India dated 3rd January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, Nos 35-36, F & P Reorganisation of the military administration is discussed at other place

99 Maddock to Sutherland dated 21st October 1839, R A O H R 227, File No 14-A, Jodhpur 1839, pp 54-56, Sutherland's review of British Relations with Marwar dated 1st June 1847, Cons 7 August 1847, No 845, F & P

was made to reform the administration of the state. As a first step a peculiar type of 'Dual Government' was set up. Under this arrangement the administration was to be conducted by a *Panchayat*¹⁰⁰ or a council of ten persons selected from amongst the principal thakurs and the officers of the state,¹⁰¹ presided over by the Maharaja and acting with the concurrence of the Political Agent.¹⁰² The same organisation was employed to draw up the 'Code of Rules' for the guidance of the administration.¹⁰³ The task was completed in the month of November 1839, when the final draft of the 'Code of Rules' for better government of Marwar was prepared by the thakurs and public functionaries under the immediate sanction and authority of Maharaja Man Singh, in communication with Lt Col Sutherland and Captain Ludlow. The Code was enforced the same year.¹⁰⁴

According to these legislative rules established by the 'Code', the administration was to be conducted on the pattern observed in the time of Maharaja Bijay Singh (1753-93). Nominations to the important offices, such as that of *Pradhan*, *Devan*, *Bakhshi* and *Khansaman* were to be made by the Maharaja solely on the basis of merit and not on recommendation. The code prohibited the extension of undue countenance or economic gains to any person and specified that the Nath priests and their heads would perform their religious duties without interfering in the state affairs.¹⁰⁵

The officers and public servants of the state were directed to follow strictly the following instructions —

- 1) Each head of an office was a distinct authority and no one was to claim control over the other, but all were to remain in submissive reliance upon the Maharaja.

100 Jodhpur State Records, Kharita, Bahi No 16 pp 252-254

101 Later on more members were included in the Panchayat which consisted of the following—Thakurs of Pokarao, Ahua, Nimaj, Rass, Rao, Kucharnao, Asop, Bhadravan, Mutsaddis, Devao, Sioghi Ghambhiri Mal, Bakshi Singh, Fauji Raj, Vakil Rao Raja Rishi Mal, Killadar Dev, Karan, Joshi Prabhulal

102 Cons. dated 24 February 1840, Nos 31-35, F & P, Cons. dated 6 April 1843, Nos 42-43, F & P

103 Cons. dated 24 February 1840, Nos 31-35, F & P

104 R A O H R 228, File No 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Vol VII, p 32

105 R A O H R 228, File No 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Vol VII, p 32

- 2) Misrepresentation of the facts was declared an offence
- 3) Coalition and combination of the public servants was prohibited
- 4) Use of influence to bring about an exaction or a grant was prohibited
- 5) Wages were to be retained in the manner observed in the time of Maharaja Vijay Singh¹⁰⁶

In order to improve the financial position of the state the 'Code of Rules' laid down that economy should be effected by reducing the expenditure of the *Darbar* at the capital, in the *parganas* (districts), *kucheree*, *chabutras* and officers were strictly instructed not to exceed even a fraction of the allotted expenditure. A substantial reduction was to be effected in the strength of the singers, pandits, servants and attendants at the *Darbar*.¹⁰⁷

As regards the problem of robbery, it was laid down that on the traces of a robbery being brought from the spot where it had been perpetrated to the boundary of a village, the *jagirdar* and *Bhomas* of that village should proceed with the people who brought on the traces, and carry them beyond their boundary. In a case where the traces terminated at the village and the losses not made good, the *khojce* (tracker) of that village would be required to submit to the ordeal of immersion in water,¹⁰⁸ and the person bringing the traces would witness the result. Should the test be borne and the truth thereby established, then the village from which the traces were brought would be answerable for the loss sustained. In case the person submitting to the ordeal fail, and thus become convicted of falsehood, then the liability rested upon the village to which the traces had been carried. *Jagirdars* and *Bhomas*, in whose possession stolen property might be discovered, were to restore it according to the ancient usage.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ 'Code of Rules' P. A. O. II P. 223, File No. 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Vol. VII, pp. 32-34.

¹⁰⁷ P. A. O. II P. 223, File No. 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Vol. VII, pp. 32-34.

¹⁰⁸ The truth is ascertained if the person submitting to the ordeal is able to hold an arrow in his hand while an arrow is discharged from a bow at him by the archer to the spot from which it was shot.

¹⁰⁹ 'Code of Rules' P. A. O. II P. 223, File No. 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Vol. VII, pp. 32-34.

Article 22 of the 'Code of Rules' guaranteed the lives of the persons obtaining *Sinua* or sanctuary. However, the restoration of the plundered property and abducted persons by an individual seeking *surna* was made obligatory. At the same time it was declared unlawful for anyone to screen persons in charge of *sayeri*, *kucheree*, *chabootra*, *public mint*, etc., against whom any just demand might exist.

In order to settle the problem of redistribution of land among the jagirdars, the Code laid down that "The title Deeds (*puttas*) of the villages to be possessed by incumbents in any manner may be commended by His Highness, who will take for his guide in the appointment, the period from the reign of Raja Bijay Singh to the present time"¹¹⁰. It was expected that this article would facilitate the distribution of land to the dispossessed chiefs, but the course to be pursued was very vaguely defined. However, the *Panchayat* with the guidance of Ludlow conducted a long and patient enquiry into records and the matter was well disposed of, although there were some persons who still remained dissatisfied¹¹¹.

Hasil Daree and *Rah Daree*¹¹² were fixed at the rate prevailing under the reign of Maharaja Vijay Singh. The provision did not affect the commerce adversely, because the transit and other customs duties were so light in Marwar that traders from the sea coast almost universally pursued the Marwar course, proceeding from Pali via Nagaur and Churu to Bhiwani, instead of the more direct course of Ajmer and Jaipur. The house tax was to be taken in proportion to the exigency of the occasion and was not to be levied annually. The *Bhoom-bab* or the land tax was to be collected as in the time of Maharaja Vijay Singh. The other customary dues like *Beegori Rakam* and the *Chaudhar-bab*¹¹³ were also to be paid in the like manner¹¹⁴.

Provision was made for half-yearly muster and marking of the Darbar's baggage and riding camels, horses, bullocks, cows, etc. In

110 Article 23, 'Code of Rules', *loc cit*.

111 Sutherland to the Secretary, Government of India, dated 3rd January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, Nos 35-37, F & P.

112 Meaning Customs, mart imposts and transit duties.

113 Amount levied on the Chaudhris.

114 R. A. O. H. R. 228, File No 228, 14-A, Jodhpur 1841, Vol 7, pp 36-37.

case of the death of the animals, the village authorities were to send either the depositions of the witnesses, establishing the facts of the casualty or the part of the animal bearing the Government brand.¹¹⁵

Article 37 of the 'Code' was somewhat extraordinary to the concept of justice. It stated, "Justice shall be administered equitably in the courts without partiality or favour towards any person. The judges shall not interfere in favour of any one nor shall they lean in favour of any one, nor shall they lean indulgently towards any individual unless he be a near relative or belonging to their family. (*Talookadars*)". The provision appeared quite strange to Sutherland also but he learnt that in the eyes of the Marwar legislators it was considered a mutual provision and therefore they did not press to disturb it.¹¹⁶ The criminals were to be punished in the manner commensurate with the offence but were in no case to suffer mutilation. This clause was included in the 'Code' on the insistence of Ludlow and Sutherland.¹¹⁷

Protection and countenance by any one to persons, who were summoned for demands of the Raj remaining unsatisfied or on account of murder, bodily injury, was prohibited.¹¹⁸ The protection and countenance here contemplated did not refer to *sarna* or asylum, for a person thus situated would not be summoned by the Raj. In case where a whole village had committed a fault, the fine levied upon it was to be imposed after reference to state records, and according to the practice which obtained in the time of Maharaja Vijay Singh.¹¹⁹

Article 41 and 42, provided that "punishment shall not be visited upon any servant of the state at the suggestion or solicitation of any one". Writs and summons were not to be issued unjustly, but upon their being issued must not be disregarded. On occasions of serving these writs by a footman, the demand was to be two and a quarter *tullos*, and if by a horseman it was a quarter of a rupee.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Sutherland to Secretary Government of India dated 3rd January 1921, Cons. 15 March 1921, Nos. 32-37 F & P.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ F & P 222, 1 to 20, 14 & Judgment 1921, Vol. 7, pp. 53-60.

¹¹⁹ F & P 222, 1 to 20, 14 & Judgment 1921, Vol. 7, pp. 53-60. Cons. 15 March 1921, Nos. 32-37 F & P.

The hire to be demanded by a *quasid* (on serving writs) was in no case to exceed one anna per *kos*. Should any one resist the claim, a heavier demand was to be levied upon the recusant as a penalty. This article was received with great satisfaction throughout the country for it ended the abuses that were prevailing in the mode of issuing writs, as well as, in exemption from them, and in imposing the amount of *talbana* (fine) ¹²⁰

The 'Code of Rules' made a strong bid to put an end to that obnoxious evil of infanticide by declaring that "from the principal nobles of the state down to Bhoomias, and possessors of a single dwelling no person shall be permitted to destroy their female infant children" ¹²¹ One of its root causes was the exorbitant demands of *Bhats and Charans* on the celebration of marriages. ¹²² The code struck at the root of the cause of infanticide and fixed the fees of the *charans* and others at the time of marriage ceremonies at the following rate -

By *Pattajat* on Rs. 1000 of *Rekh*, Rs. 25/-

By *Bhoomias* on Rs. 1000 of *Rekh*, Rs. 10/-

House holders not landed proprietors- Rs. 5/-

Dholis or Singers were to receive Rs. 5/- per every

Rs. 1000/- of *Rekh*. ¹²³

The last two articles of the Code provided for the payment of the tribute to the British Government from the revenue derived from the Sambhar Salt mart after defraying the expenses of the establishment. The remaining deficiency was to be made good from other

120 R A O H R 228, File No-14, A Jodhpur 1841, Vol 7, pp 40-42

121 Article 45 of the 'Code of Rule' *loc cit*

122 One of the principal thakurs in whose family the infanticide was practised for sometime past told Sutherland the tragic story of its origin in his house. Once the demands of the Bhats and Charans were so exorbitant that the chief of that house had been robbed of the wealth, his gold, silver and jewels were all said to have passed in the hands of these avaricious classes. At last his horse, elephants and the houses were reared up and when the thakur had nothing more to give, they demand his head, which he was said to have at once severed from his body with his own sword. Since that incident no daughter had been preserved in the house. Sutherland to Secretary, Government of India, dated 3rd January 1841, Coos 15 March 1841, Nos 35-37, F & P

123 Articles 45 and 46 of the 'Code of Rules', *loc cit*

sources The *Sowar khurchi* (the commutation money for the horse contingent) of one lakh and 15 thousand rupees was to be paid from the *Rekh* by the thakurs of the Raj¹²⁴

Judicial Reforms

In addition the administrative and financial reforms, clear and specific rules were laid down for the working of the court of Judicature in Marwar

In the capital the hench of the court of Judicature consisted of four judges, who were to sit in judgmet and decide cases equitably¹²⁵ Should any grave offence be brought before them which they were unable to dispose of then the parties were allowed to go to the court of appeal It consisted of four judges already mentioned and the important members of the *Panchayat*—the *Devan*, the *Bakshi* and the *Vakil* The highest judicial body was the *Panchayat* and the Maharaja was the supreme judicial authority¹²⁶

In towns the cases were determined by the *Kotwal*, the *Munsif*, the *Wagaya-nawis* and the *Jila-nawis* In *parganas* justice was to be administered by the *Hakim*, the *Karkoon*, the *Wagaya-nawis* and *Jila-nawis*, who were to assemble for the purpose. If cases were not settled at the towns and *paraganas*, the parties were to come to the capital where the four judges (already mentioned) would settle them according to the principle of justice

There was a separate tribunal consisting of four judges to deal with the the cases affecting "the six sects of religionist justice". Purohit Nath Raj and Bunsud Bhairo Dan were two important members of this tribunal The Shrijogeshwars (Priests) were put under the jurisdiction of the Mahamandir, and on offences being made known to *Shri Hazur* (the Maharaja), they were to be investigated and decided by the *Punchjee*.¹²⁷

124 R A O H R 228, File No 14-A, Jodhpnr 1841, Vol 7, pp 40-42, Cons 15 March 1841, Nos 35-37, F & P

125 In 1841 the following four persons were the judges Changan Shival, Bhandari Govind Das, Bhandari Uday Chand, and Pancholi Hira Chand

126 Sutherland to Maddock dated 3rd January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, No 35, F & P

127. Honourable members of the Panchayat or the Council

There were no separate tribunals for the trial of civil and criminal cases. Irrespective of the magnitude of the cases the judges were considered competent to undertake adjudication. Issuing summons and serving *dastaks* took place on application by the judges to the *Devan*. The *Dastaks* or summons were to be in proportion to the means of the accused and the magnitude of the offence.

In complicated cases where the truth could not be ascertained through depositions of witness and the statements of the plaintiff and defendant, and in which the wisdom of the judges was at fault, ordeal by immersion in water was to be resorted to, which was the established custom of the Raj.

The judges were empowered to award punishment for the contempt of court to the extent commensurate with the offence. In aggravated cases, the decision was given according to the comment of the Maharaja who determined the punishment to be inflicted upon the offender.

Captain French, the Political Agent at Jodhpur, took initiative in 1844 in introducing further reforms in the judicial system. As a first step he got appointed from Ajmer a Munsif who was trained in the reformed courts at Jaipur. But the experiment proved a complete failure. The man being a foreigner had no influence in the country and was at last courteously dismissed.¹²⁸

Another measure of reform resulted in the establishment of two civil and two criminal courts at the capital. These two courts were subordinate to a court of appeal consisting of three judges. A simple 'Code of Laws' was drawn out for their guidance. The system of taking one-fourth of the amount of claims for the benefit of the state was modified in the civil and abolished in the criminal courts. The courts took cognisance of the cases occurring in and about the capital as well as other part of the country. Complaints against Government servants were entertained and even *thakurs* of more or less note had been proceeded against.¹²⁹

128 Annual Report of the Jodhpur Political Agency for the year 1844, submitted by Captain French

129. Annual Report of the Jodhpur Political Agency office dated 14th February 1846, submitted by H.H. Greathead

The chief obstacle to the administration of justice was the opposition of a powerful body of thakurs to the enforcement of summons and the execution of decrees against them and their dependants¹³⁰ However, Captain French was of the opinion that litigants were satisfied with the mode in which the business of the civil court was transacted The transaction of the criminal courts was based on the principle of the redress of the individual instead of the general good Consequently compensation for loss through robbery rather than the punishment of the rnhhers was the thing most aimed at Even then it was considered that crime was not prevalent in Marwar, which was attributed to the responsibility under which the landowners were held¹³¹

Military Reforms

At the time of the commencement of the direct British interposition in the administration of Marwar in the year 1839, the military administration of the state was in a most unsatisfactory state There were 34 *Beras* or Corps which were composed of 30 *koomedans*, 710 *sonars* and 3267 infantry together with the establishments The soldiers of all arms generally carried matchlocks and swords but in infantry corps matchlocks were frequently exchanged for pistols The defence expenditure of the state amounted to Rs 4,52,000/- The organisation of the armed forces was extremely unsatisfactory Some of the *Beras* were without officers and the efficiency and discipline almost absent Muster was not taken regularly Arms of many of the soldiers were mortgaged to the money-lenders¹³²

Every *Bera* had its representative at the Darbar through whom all instructions were communicated and orders for payments obtained This practice led to many evils and was chiefly responsible for the irregular payment of salaries to the soldiers It was because of this practice that persons possessing influence at the Darbar obtained permission to convert small bands of men, possibly their own personal

130 Annual Report of the Jodhpur Political Agency for the year 1848, submitted by Major D A Malcolm

131. Annual Report of the Jodhpur Political Agency for the year 1848, submitted by Major D A Malcolm

132 Sutherland to Secretary, Government of India, dated 3rd January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, No 35, F & P

guards into *seras*, and were suffered to appoint Koomedans upon salaries which they appropriated themselves. The state of affairs was so hopeless that the arrears of pay due to the army was not less than 17 lakhs, but the Darbar managed, with Captain Ludlow's consent, to make the men to accept Rs. 1,23,000 in full satisfaction of their claims.¹³³

Captain Ludlow took an active interest in the reorganisation of the military administration of the state. The Maharaja, accepting the advice of the Political Agent, discharged a large number of these men and reconstituted the force on the following scale —

1st Regiment of infantry (*purdesees*)¹³⁴ 610 strong with 20 *golandazas* or gunners, and two six-pounder guns and establishment

2nd Regiment of infantry 610 strong with 20 *golandazas* and two six-pounder guns and establishment

1st Resala of Sowars 136 strong

2nd Resala of Sowars 134 strong

3rd Resala of Sowars 37 strong

4th Resala of Sowars 83 strong, eight of these were mounted on camels

1st Column of Infantry 384 strong with 4 guns of various calibre.

2nd Column of Infantry 394 strong with 12 guns

Mahapoices (coshaens) 150 employed on police duties

Bishan Swamees—75 employed on police duties,

Sindhi shazada's retinue consisting of 15 sowars and 25 infantry¹³⁵

The total strength of armed forces after reorganisation and reconstitution was 2,245 infantry and 474 sowars. The pay of this reconstituted force was estimated at Rs. 2,34,330 per annum

133 Ludlow to Sutherland dated 6th November 1840, Cons. 15 March 1841, Nos. 35-36, F & P

134 Foreigners meaning non-Marwaris

135 Ludlow to Sutherland dated 6th November 1840, Cons. 15 March 1841, Nos. 35-36, F & P.

In addition to this there were about 100 '*Mahapoorces*'¹³⁶ for the protection of the town of Nagaur and a substantial force employed on guard duties in the palace, in escorting treasure and on other confidential duties. They were not included in the regular military force of the state and the payment of their salaries was also made separately.¹³⁷

The brief review of the administration of Marwar, before the year 1839, when the direct British intervention commenced, and that of the later period shows that important changes took place in all the branches of administration. The British impact was not limited to administration only but it extended to the socio-economic life of Marwar also.

136 A corrupted form of *Mahapurshas*

137 Sutherland to Secretary, Government of India dated 3rd January 1841, Cons 15 March 1841, Nos 35-36, F & P

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The study of the relation between Jodhpur State and the East India Company, and of the economic and social development of the period under review, confirms that it was the beginning of a significant era in the history of Rajputana. It furnishes an invaluable record of developments of unique and unparalleled importance, which had a far-reaching impact on the states of Rajputana in general and on Marwar in particular.

The collapse of the Mughal empire and the increasingly defiant attitude of the Marwar feudatories, the claim of Dhokal Singh leading to the creation of warring factions, Jaipur-Jodhpur hostilities and the consequent ruin and misery, the devastation caused by the Marathas and the Pindaris and the prevailing chaotic conditions in Marwar were some of the compelling factors that made the penetration of the influence of the East India Company into the state a necessary evil.

The downfall of Sindhia's power in Northern India was sufficient for Maharaja Man Singh to realise the hollowness of his policy of supporting Holkar against the British. Consequently Maharaja Man Singh commenced his efforts for an alliance with the British from the year 1804, when his *Vakil* delivered the original treaty duly ratified¹ to Lord Lake². The Governor-General, however, had already dissolved the treaty by a despatch dated 9th May 1804, and he refused to open the issue³. In 1807, an attempt to seek British aid for the

1 Man Singh had previously refused to ratify the treaty and offered counter proposals for its amendments.

2 General Lake to Marquis Wellesley, dated 1st May 1804, Cons. 6 September 1804, No. 4-A, F & Sec.

3 Marquis of Wellesley to General Lake dated 9th May 1804, Cons. 14 June 1804, No. 57-A, F & Sec.

amicable settlement of the Jaipur-Jodhpur dispute was made by Man Singh through his *Vakil* Fateh Ram Vyas. But he was disappointed by the negative approach of Archibald Seton, the Resident at Delhi.⁴ Again in the same year an alluring offer was made by Man Singh to the British Government promising to make to the latter, a present of Sambhar, Didwana and two other districts. He further promised to "confirm in every respect to the pleasure of the British Government", and made an earnest request to save him from dishonour by extending to him British protection.⁵ The offer received the same fate, when Seton again refused to oblige Man Singh.⁶ All these instances make it amply clear that an alliance with the British power, which was then widely and universally acknowledged as a successor to the power and prestige of the Mughals, was not only welcomed but was keenly sought for by the Maharaja of Jodhpur, right from the year 1804. It was natural, therefore, that the Treaty of 1818, when signed raised high hopes for a better future for Marwar and marked the beginning of a new era.

Influence on the Ruler and the Nobility

The immediate results of the Treaty of 1818 were to a great extent favourable. The umbrella of British protection succeeded in providing a much needed sense of security to Marwar, by assuring it freedom from external dangers. However, the evil influence of the treaty soon came to the surface. The ruler who had been dependent on the support and loyalty of his nobles, now felt himself so secure that his entire outlook and attitude towards the nobility changed. The nobles were not only neglected by him, but he even set out to take revenge against some of them and to chastise others.⁷ A small number of nobles adjusted themselves to the changed circumstances, while the others turned contumacious. Thus the British influence indirectly led to a clash between the Maharaja and his turbulent

4 A Seton to N B Edmonstone, Secretary, Government, dated 20th February 1807, Coos 12 March 1807, No 12, F & P

5 Translation of a letter from Thakurdas, Akhbaravis, Cons 2 April 1807, No 65, F & P, A Seton to N B Edmonstone, Secretary, Government, dated 6th July 1807, Coos 28 July 1807, No 31, F & P

6 A Seton, Resident at Delhi to the Maharaja of Jodhpur, dated 17th March 1807, Cons 2 April 1807, No 66, F & P

7 Wilder's report, Coos 21 March 1821, Nos 13-14, F & P

nobility. Such a situation provided the British an ideal opportunity to fish into the troubled waters, and to extend their interference in the internal affairs of the State. The clash between the nobles and the ruler, leading to the British interference had, therefore, been a peculiar feature in Marwar as elsewhere, almost throughout the period under review.

Man Singh's attempt to suppress the nobility by a policy of repression plunged the whole state into disorder. Most of the important feudal chiefs viz. Asop, Ahua, Nimaj and Ras had gone into exile and their jagirs were resumed.⁸ The situation was, however, remedied by the interposition of Wilder on the part of the exiled thakurs in 1824.⁹ The reconciliation proved only temporary and the thakurs of Pokaran, Asop, Ahua, Nimaj, Ras and others raised the standard of rebellion against Maharaja Man Singh in the year 1828, and placed Dhokal Singh at their head. The British intervention this time took the shape of an offer of arbitration,¹⁰ and Man Singh had no other alternative but to accept the dictates of the Paramount power.¹¹ Nevertheless, the arbitration led to the extinction of the blazing fire of civil war in Marwar.

Extreme Subordination of the Rulers

It was not the end of British influence, it penetrated deep into the entire body politic of Marwar and reduced the ruler to an extremely subordinate position. In the year 1824¹² the British did not hesitate to interfere in the private life and family affairs of Man Singh regarding his conduct towards the *Kachhawi Rani*.¹³ Man Singh was pained to find that he was not even authorised to exercise the traditional right of granting *saran* or asylum. It was with great

8 F Wilder to Ochterlony dated 18th January 1822, Cons 20 March 1822, No 32, F & P

9. Cons 30 April 1824, Nos 19-20, F & P, Encl No 1, Translation of the agreements signed by Diwan of Jodhpur and F. Wilder, Political Agent, Ajmer, dated 25th February 1824

10 Cons 29 July 1828, No 26, F & P

11 Cavendish to Colebrooke dated 14th July 1828, Cons 16 August 1828, No 18, F & P

12 Cons 30 April 1824, Nos 19-20, F & P

13 She was a princess of Jaipur married to Man Singh

difficulty in 1829 that he got the permission of the Governor-General for allowing asylum to Appa Sahib at Jodhpur, and that too as a special case¹⁴ Similarly, he was strongly remonstrated and asked to give explanation¹⁵ for opening direct correspondence with Maharaja Ranjit Singh of the Punjab in the year 1832¹⁶ Again Man Singh's failure to attend William Bentinck's *Darbar* at Ajmer in 1832 was interpreted as a grave offence on his part and he had to submit an explanation for the same¹⁷ In the year 1834, the British influence revealed itself in the form of a massive and all-pervasive reality A field force was assembled with the aim to march into Marwar. Man Singh was to be given an ultimatum of forty-eight hours for the acceptance of the British demands, viz., indemnity for the loss sustained by neighbouring states and Dr Motley, and co-operation with the British in their plan against the *thugs*. The last demand was the most humiliating It insisted on Man Singh to offer regrets for the violations of the treaty and to explain the cause for the delay in replying to Governor-Generals *kharita*¹⁸ Finding himself utterly helpless, Man Singh got the matter settled before the march of the Field Force He agreed to reimburse the expenses for assembling the Field Force to the tune of five lakhs of *Surat* rupees A *Kharita*, expressing his regret for the past conduct was also sent to the Governor-General by the Maharaja¹⁹ The complete submission of the Maharaja whetted rather than appeased the appetite of the British who discarded all standards of moral and political conduct, and occupied the Sambhar Salt works on 29th January 1835, on the pretext of a material guarantee for the fulfilment of all the promises²⁰ Man Singh's representation against this flagrant violation of the

14 Letter from the Governor-General to Maharaja Man Singh dated 6th November 1829, Cons 7 November 1829, No 17, F & P

15 Maharaja Man Singh to Governor-General dated 6th April 1832, Cons 7 May 1832, No 32, F & P

16 Lockett to Secretary Government, dated 28th September 1832, Cons 26 November 1832, No 14/14-A, F & P

17 Kharita from Man Singh to the Governor-General dated 6th April 1832, Cons 7 May 1832, No 32, F & P

18 N Alves to Macnaghten dated 7th October 1834, Cons 2 December 1834, No 23, F & P

19 Kharita from Maharaja Man Singh to the Governor-General, Cons 2 December 1834, No 28, F & P

20 Cons 19 February 1835, Nos 33-35, F & P

treaty and his appeal to the British sense of justice and fair play proved fruitless.²¹ The British action reminded the Maharaja and the people of Marwar of the days when such methods were adopted by the Marathas for the realisation of their dues. The loss of Sambhar proved disastrous for the economy of Marwar and put a severe strain on the exchequer of the state.

The financial implications of the treaty of 1818 were also not favourable to Marwar. The tribute payable to Sindhia was to be henceforth paid to the British. It only marked a change of the masters. No reduction in the amount of tribute payable to Sindhia was made and Marwar with its limited resources continued to groan under the weight of this awful financial burden. The result was that the state became a chronic defaulter in the regular payment of the tribute.

Maladministration in Marwar and British Interposition

The constitution of Marwar was such that its progress and prosperity depended to a great extent on the ability and exertions of the ruler and the support and co-operation of the nobility. Unfortunately the British protection, assuring immunity from external and internal dangers, tended to encourage the despotic tendencies of the rulers. After receiving British protection Man Singh utterly failed to take any steps to put his house in order and became instrumental for the establishment of *Nath* ascendancy in the state. The *Nath* misrule and maladministration brought untold miseries to the people of Marwar, and resulted in the failure of the government to fulfil the obligations of the treaty particularly relating to the regular payment of the tribute. The way was opened for British interference and the Field Force marched into Marwar on 22nd August 1839.²² Man Singh was compelled to submit to the dictates of the British,²³ and an agreement was concluded on 24th September 1839,²⁴ which allowed

21 Cons 6 April 1835, Nos 37-40, F & P, Cons 18 May 1838, Nos 23-24, F & P.

22 Sutherland to Maddock, dated 23rd August 1839. Cons 6 November 1839, No. 43, F & Sec.

23 Sutherland to Maddock, dated 20th October 1839, R A O H R 227, File No. 14-A, Jodhpur 1839 Collection No VI, pp 12-13.

24 Ibid, J S R, Kharajta Bahi No 12, p 220.

the fort of Jodhpur to be occupied by the British garrison and he accepted the direct and active interference of the Political Agent in the administration of the state. The *Nath* activities were strictly restricted to their priestly functions, and arrangement for the clearance of all British dues was also made.²⁵

It must, however, be admitted that the British armed intervention in 1839, though motivated by considerations regarding arrears of tribute, proved a blessing in disguise for the people of Marwar. The British measure did not receive any popular opposition mainly due to the fact that people were fed up with *Nath* misrule and wished to get rid of it. The British intervention and the firm attitude adopted by Sutherland, as well as Ludlow, could only result in the overthrow of the *Naths* who had entrenched themselves strongly in the administration of Jodhpur. This act of the British was hailed by most of the feudal chiefs and the people in general.²⁶

Nath power having been overthrown a new administrative set up was instituted, according to which the Council of Regency or the *Panchayat* presided over by the Maharaja was vested with all powers. The British Political Agent acquired an extra-ordinarily important position, since the *Pauchayat* functioned with his assistance and concurrence. The change marked the beginning of a period of administrative, judicial and other reforms and also opened the flood gates of British domination over Marwar.

Man Singh's death in 1843, marked the end of the period under which the British relations with Marwar had passed through great stress and strain. Takht Singh, who succeeded to the throne of Jodhpur, was a young man and was treated as an outsider (*Gujrati*) in Marwar.²⁷ Finding himself placed in a peculiar situation, where he could not depend on the support of the nobles, and where his attempt to rule with the help of his trusted *Ahmadnagris* (people from

25 Sutherland to Maddock, dated 29th December 1839, Cons 24-February 1840, No 37, F & P

26 Ludlow to Sutherland dated 26th March 1842, Cons 7 September 1842, No 29, F & P

27, Report of the Officiating Political Agent, Jodhpur dated 1st November 1851, pp 40-41, R A O H R 250, File No 81, Jodhpur 1851, Vol 1, pp 40-41

Ahmadnagar) generated an adverse reaction against them, he was bound to lean heavily on the British support. The result was that his reign was marked by extremely cordial relations between the British and the Maharaja. The only exception to this was Takht Singh's resentment and frustration caused by the British rejection of his claim to the *gaddi* of Ahmadnagar.²⁸ However, the Maharaja soon reconciled himself to the situation and the incident proved to be only temporary.

The relations between the ruler and the nobility suffered deterioration. Takht Singh's extreme avarice for wealth and the taxation policy towards the nobles combined with his offensive attitude towards the nobles led to a widening gulf between them. Instead of reconciliation, Takht Singh followed a bold policy of chastising the contumacious thakurs with force. In this decision he was goaded by his confidence in British support and his own resources. The complete success achieved by him in his armed action against the thakur of Bagri²⁹ encouraged him to repeat the performance against the thakur of Kantaha and others. However, the timely and firm interposition of the British succeeded in restricting the Maharaja from the adventure.³⁰ On the eve of the general uprising of 1857, Takht Singh was again preparing for and contemplating military action against the thakurs of Gular, Ahua, Asop etc. It was, therefore, natural that the Maharaja extended his wholehearted co-operation to the British in suppressing the uprisings of 1857 and his rebellious thakurs joined the camp of the mutineers.

Economic Impact

The British impact on the economic life of the people was a gradual process and it accentuated with the passing of time. In the early years when British alliance was concluded with Marwar, the influence was on the whole quite healthy. It put an end to the period of anarchy, insecurity and uncertainty. The result was that the

28 Despatch from the Court of Directors, No 41 dated 10th December 1851, R. A. O. H. R. 241 (Old) 53 Jodhpur, 1847-52, Vol. IV. pp 259-260

29 Shakespeare to Lawrence dated 28th September 1854, Cons 10 November 1154, No 91, F & P

30 Shakespeare to Lawrence dated 21st September 1854, Cons 10 November 1854, No 88, F & P

people of Marwar could carry on their economic activities in an atmosphere of peace and security. Agriculture, trade and commerce made progress, in spite of the maladministration in the state. Consequently, the general condition of the people improved to a great extent³¹. However, a peculiar feature of the new development was that the upper middle class people living in the capital and district head quarters and attached to the administration were the most affected. Erskine rightly observed that this class has certainly changed in every way. The fine Manchester-made cloth had superseded the local *reza* (the coarse cloth), and the *dhoti* (loin cloth) had made way for a pair of trousers. A change in the design, construction and furniture of their houses was also noticed. The *kachha* or thatched dwellings of cow-dung and mud had been replaced by *pucca* (stone) houses with plastered walls. Latrines which were formerly conspicuous by their absence had almost become a normal feature³². The use of stools, chairs and tables had also come into vogue in the offices and in the houses of aristocrats. In the kitchen the earthen utensils had given way to the metal ones. The use of foreign cigarettes, formerly regarded as a veritable luxury, had become common³³. However, the vast majority of the population of Marwar still lived in the villages, and was completely unaffected by the new wave of change. They continued to remain stuck to their traditional way of life and displayed complete antipathy to the new implements and techniques of agriculture. The majority of these rural people continued to groan under the weight of the evils of the feudal society, and their lot remained unchanged and unaffected. A large number of them for various reasons migrated to the cities and towns and became landless labourers³⁴.

Prior to the penetration of the British influence the trade of Marwar was considerable and the state formed a connecting link between the sea-coast and northern India³⁵. The trade and commerce

31 Administrative Reports of the Jodhpur State

32 Erskine, Vol III-A, *loc. cit.*, pp. 111-12 (Ed 1909)

33 Ibid

34 Marwar Census Report, 1891, Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol III-A, pp 111-112

35 Tod, Vol II, p 127.

of the country was generally improved during the period under review. The import items included an increasingly large number of British goods.³⁶ However, the British occupation of the Sambhar Salt Mart, struck a terrible blow to the most important industry of the state,³⁷ and was much resented by the Government as well as the people.

Social Reforms and Education

The unfavorable impact of the British relations on the Political and economic spheres was compensated to a great extent in the form of the administrative, judicial and social reforms that were launched in Marwar at the initiative and under the superintendence of the British Political Officers. Most of these have already been discussed in detail in their respective chapters. In addition to the social reforms, viz., the prohibition of *Sati*, female infanticide and the fixing of the fees of *charans* and *bhats*, a few more measures, deserving mention, were adopted. Captain French, who succeeded Major Ludlow in January 1844, as the Political Agent at Jodhpur, took keen interest in initiating reforms. It was due to his enthusiasm that the orders prohibiting the purchase of children were issued.³⁸ Slavery was abolished and slave dealing was declared a criminal offence. Persons were sentenced to two years' imprisonment for slave dealing.³⁹ The sale of children, foreign or domestic, was prohibited in Marwar.⁴⁰

Captain French gave due importance to the works of public welfare also. Some good, though not extensive, roads were built in and about the capital, and trees were planted on either side of the new and some of the old roads. Some tanks to serve as reservoirs of water were also dug.⁴¹

36 Administrative Reports of Jodhpur State, Waller, *loc cit*, p. 34

37 Cons. 19 February 1835, Nos. 33-35, F & P, Cons. 6 April 1835, No. 37-40, F & P, Cons. 18 May 1835, Nos. 24, F & P

38 Captain French's report of Jodhpur Political Agency dated 7th February 1844

39 *Ibid*

40 Captain French's report on Jodhpur Political Agency dated 20th September 1844

41 Memoranda of the Chief events submitted by Captain French, Political Agent, Jodhpur, dated 23rd September 1844

An attempt was made to reopen a school, named *Vidhyasala* by procuring funds from the *Raj* as well as by subscriptions. Captain French was so enthusiastic in developing *Vidhyasala* into a modern educational institution that he placed an order worth four thousand pounds in Europe and managed to get astronomical instruments, globes, an orrery and other equipment. The Maharaja was persuaded to sanction an expenditure of five thousand rupees per annum for the School, and the extensive and invaluable collection of Manuscripts of Maharaja Man Singh was to be placed in this institution. In order to furnish the library with modern books, Rs 35,000/- were spent on procuring books from a professor of Elphinstone College at Bombay⁴²

However, with the departure of Captain French, his plans did not receive the same encouragement and interest from his successors.⁴³ Mr Greathed and others did not display much enthusiasm. They believed in the development of the Rajput states with the least possible British assistance and guidance

42 Jodhpur Political Agent's Report dated 9th January 1845

43 Mr Greathed who succeeded Captain French had observed, "the notion that a Rajput State is likely to retrograde in civilization, unless assisted by the British Government and the advice of its political officers, is new to me, and that it seems to have been forgotten that we are dealing with a very ancient civilization". Jodhpur Political Agency Report for the year 1845 submitted by Mr Greathed.

APPENDIX 1

UNRATIFIED TREATY OF 1803 BETWEEN MARWAR AND THE EAST INDIA COMPANY

Article 1. A firm and permanent friendship and alliance is established between the Honourable the English Company and Maharajah Dheeraj Man Singh Bahadur, and between their heirs and successors

Article 2 Whereas friendship has been established between the two States the friends and enemies of one of the parties shall be considered the friends and enemies of both, and an adherence to this condition shall be constantly observed by both States

Article 3 The Honourable Company shall not interfere in the government of the country now possessed by Maharajah Dheeraj, and shall not demand tribute from him

Article 4 In the event of any enemy of the Honourable Company evincing a disposition to invade the country lately taken possession of by the Honourable Company in Hindostan, Maharajah Dheeraj shall send the whole of his forces to the assistance of the Company's army, and shall exert himself to the utmost of his power in repelling the enemy, and shall neglect no opportunity of proving his friendship and attachment

Article 5. Whereas, in consequence of the friendship established by the second Article of the present Treaty, the Honourable Company become guarantee to the Maharajah Dheeraj for the security of his country against external enemies. Maharajah Dheeraj hereby agrees that, if any misunderstanding should arise between him and any other State, Maharajah Dheeraj will, in the first instance, submit the cause of dispute to the Company's government that the government may endeavour to settle it amicably, if, from the obstinacy of the opposite party, no amicable terms can be settled, then Maharajah

Dheeraj may demand aid from the Company's government. In the event above stated it will be granted, and Maharajah Dheeraj agrees to take upon himself the charge of the expense of such aid, at the same rate as has been settled with the other Chieftains of Hindostan.

Article 6 Maharajah Dheeraj hereby agrees, although he is in reality the master of his own army to act, during the time of war or prospect of action, agreeably to the advice and opinion of the Commander of the English army which may be employed with his troops.

Article 7 The Maharajah shall not entertain in his service, or in any manner give admission to, any English or French subjects, or any other person from among the inhabitants of Europe, without the consent of the Company's government.

The above Treaty, comprised in seven Articles, has been duly concluded and confirmed by the seal and signature of His Excellency General Gerard Lake, at Surhindie in the Soubah of Akhurrabad, on the 22nd day of December 1803 of the Christian era, corresponding with the 7th of Ramzan 1218 Hegira, and with the 9th of Poos Soodee, 1860 Sumbut, and under the seal and signature of Maharajah Dheeraj Raj Rajeshore Maun Singh Bahadur, at _____ on the 22nd day of December 1803 of the Christian era, corresponding with the _____ of _____ 1218 Hegira, and with the _____ of _____ 1860 Sumbut.

When a Treaty containing the above seven Articles shall be delivered to Maharajah Dheeraj, under the seal and signature of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, the present Treaty under the seal and signature of His Excellency General Gerard Lake, shall be returned.

Sd/- Wellesley

This Treaty was ratified by the Governor-General in Council on the 15th January 1804

Sd/- G. H. Barlow
Sd/- G. Udny

APPENDIX II

TREATY OF 1818 CONCLUDED BETWEEN MARWAR AND THE EAST INDIA COMPANY

Article 1 There shall be perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interests between the Honourable English East India Company and Maharajah Maun Sing, and his heirs and successors, and the friends and enemies of one party shall be the friends and enemies of both

Article 2 The British Government engages to protect the principality and territory of Jodhpore

Article 3 Maharajah Maun Sing and his heirs and successors will act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government and acknowledge its supremacy, and will not have any connection with other Chiefs and States

Article 4 The Maharajah and his heirs and successors will not enter into any negotiation with any Chief or State without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government but his usual amicable correspondence with friends relations shall continue.

Article 5 The Maharajah and his heirs and successors will not commit aggressions on any one. If, by accident, disputes arise with any one they shall be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government.

Article 6 The tribute heretofore paid to Sindia by the State of Jodhpore, of which a separate Schedule is annexed, shall be paid in perpetuity to the British Government, and the engagements of the State of Jodhpore with Sindia respecting tribute shall cease

Article 7 As the Maharajah declares that, besides the tribute paid to Sindia by the State of Jodhpore, tribute has not been paid to any other State, and engages to pay the aforesaid tribute to the British Government, if either Sindia or any one else lay claim to tribute the British Government engages to reply to such claim.

Article 8 The State of Jodhpore shall furnish fifteen hundred horse for the service of the British Government whenever required, and when necessary the whole of the Jodhpore forces shall join the British army excepting such a portion as may be requisite for the internal administration of the country

Article 9 The Maharajah and his heirs and successors shall remain absolute rulers of their country, and the jurisdiction of the British Government shall not be introduced into that principality

Article 10 This Treaty of ten Articles having been concluded at Delhi, and signed and sealed by Mr. Charles Theophilus Metcalfe and Byas Bishnu Ram and Byas Uhee Ram, the ratifications of the same by His Excellency the Governor-General and by Raj Rajeesur Maharajah Maun Sing Bahadur and Joograj Maharaj Koowur Chutter Sing Bahadur shall be exchanged within six weeks from this date

Done at Delhi, this sixth day of January A D. 1818

Sd/- C T Metcalfe.

Sd/- Byas Bishen Ram

Sd/- Byas Uhhee Ram,

Joograj Maharaj Koowur-Chutter
Sing Bahadur. ~ -

Maharajah Maun Singh Bahadur.
Hastings

Ratified by His Excellency the Governor-General in camp at Oohar, this sixteenth day of January one thousand eight hundred and eighteen.

Sd/- J Adam

Secretary to the Governor-
General

GLOSSARY

<i>Akhbar Navis</i>	A news reporter
<i>Arzee.</i>	Petition
<i>Bhaom</i>	Land
<i>Chabutra.</i>	Platform Specified place where Kotwal held his office
<i>Darbar.</i>	Royal Court
<i>Dastaks</i>	Summons
<i>Hakum</i>	Administrative Officer, usually head of a district
<i>Jagir.</i>	Assignment of land
<i>Kamdar.</i>	Manager.
<i>Khalsa lands</i>	Crown lands
<i>Kharita.</i>	Special letter from and to dignitaries
<i>Khas-Pasban</i>	Personal attendants of the ruler.
<i>Khoji.</i>	Tracker.
<i>Kothar.</i>	Store house
<i>Masnad</i>	Throne
<i>Mutsaddi</i>	State officials
<i>Nichhrawal</i>	Presentation of cash to the ruler, offered by officials, visitors and nobles
<i>Putta.</i>	Grant,
<i>Raj-Tilak.</i>	Coronation
<i>Rajinama.</i>	Agreement
<i>Risaldar.</i>	A cavalry officer.
<i>Sanad.</i>	Certificate
<i>Sarna.</i>	Asylum
<i>Seekh</i>	Taking leave
<i>Thakur.</i>	Feudal chief.
<i>Zabti.</i>	Sequestration



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